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PREFACE
In this study, I assume that the written word provides a
valid source of information about the ideas and issues of
central importance to a particular culture at a particular
historical moment.

I have further assumed that the verbal

meaning of a text is determinable and stable and that,
accordingly, the act of textual interpretation is comparable
to the acts of observation that express the methodology of
natural and social sciences.
These assumptions are not as radical as they might
appear on first reading.

In the late nineteenth century,

textual interpretation received support by the work of the
influential philosopher and social scientist, Wilhelm Dilthey
(1833-1911), who proposed a science of hermeneutics that
would serve as the basis for interpreting all forms of
writing in the human sciences, including literature, the
humanities and the social sciences.1

In Dilthey's

formulation, the determinate meaning of a text consists of an
interaction between the meaning of the text as a whole (made
explicit by reference to the general norms of the language of
the culture, time, or discipline; the author's cultural
milieu and personal characteristics and biases) and the
meaning of the text's constituent parts (the meaning of
particular words and sentences; the use of particular
metaphors and analogies to convey ideas). According to
Dilthey, it was possible to achieve a valid interpretation of
a text by a sustained, mutually qualifying interplay between
the reader's evolving sense of the whole and retrospective
vi
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understanding of its component parts.
I submit, in this regard, that the procedures employed
by scientists are similar in kind:

In both the natural and

social sciences there exists a sustaining and mutually
qualifying interplay between a whole (defined as theory or
hypothesis derived from theory) and the scientist's
retrospective understanding of the low-level observations and
measurements that constitute the theory's "component parts."2
In the sciences and in textual interpretation, hypotheses can
be confirmed or disconfirmed by continued reference to the
data:

in the humanities, by reference to the text; in the

sciences, by reference to original or replicated
observations.

If the alternative hypothesis is disconfirmed,

it can be replaced by an alternative hypothesis which
conforms more closely to all the components of the text or to
all relevant observations.

The most that can be achieved in

either textual interpretation or in scientific observation is
to arrive at the most probable interpretation.

In

textual

interpretation, according to Abrams, "this logic of highest
probability...is adequate to yield objective knowledge,
confirmable by other competent readers concerning the
meanings of both of the component passages and of the
artistic whole in a work of literature."3
The central objective of this study is to compare
expressions of the concept of consciousness in nineteenthcentury psychological and literary texts.

The success of

this endeavor relies on the validity of the interpretation of
passages drawn from these texts.

These passages serve as the

vii
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"data" from which I draw conclusions about similarities,
differences, and changes in the way consciousness was
conceptualized in nineteenth-century American discourse.

The

purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which
discipline-specific methodological commitments (in
psychology, to objectivity; in literature, to the recreation
of subjective experience) determined the way in which
consciousness was conceived.

Accordingly, my conclusions are

valid only to the degree that the passages I have selected
for analysis adequately embody the conventions adopted by
nineteenth-century proponents of these traditions.

For this

reason, I have selected passages from the works of those
writers and psychologists who are routinely cited in the
secondary literature as major contributors in these areas.
Specifically, I have judged a passage to be "representative"
of a particular genre and author if it is in substantial
agreement with the conventions adopted by the leading
proponents of the genre (as elucidated by the secondary
literature) and if it is in accord with relevant aspects of
the author's stated or implied personal biases and objective
(as understood from careful reading of an author's major
works, autobiographical statements, correspondence, etc.).4
In interpreting the meaning of these passages, I have
relied on the method advanced by Dilthey and elaborated by E.
D. Hirsch in his Validity and Interpretation published in
1976.5

According to Hirsch, meaning is conferred on a text a

priori by virtue of the hypotheses or theories a reader
brings to the text.

In this study, I have derived hypotheses

viii
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about the potential meaning of a particular text or passage
from the study of the characteristics of a particular
discursive tradition as these characteristics have been
elucidated and described in the secondary literature.

In the

case of literary realism, for example, these characteristics
include:

internationalization of action within a central

consciousness and reference to the commonplace, the ordinary.
These hypotheses may be confirmed if they correspond to the
author's verbal intention, ascertained by his or her use of
disciplinary-specific verbal conventions; by reference to an
author's stated or implied agreement with those conventions;
by reference to an author's statements (implicit or explicit)
about his or her own work and intentions; and by
consideration of the extent to which a passage accord with
those conventions and intentions.

"Meaning" in this context

is thus a measure of the extent of agreement between a
component part (word, sentence, passage) of a work and the
whole (the work from which the passage was drawn, the
author's corpus, the literary genre, the disciplinary
tradition). Following through on the above example, we may
say that the meaning of a passage drawn from the work of
Henry James (realist) is constituted by his adherence to that
convention of literary realism that relates the action of the
narrative within a central, sentient consciousness; by his
repeated statements substantiating his acceptance of that
conventions; and by the observed correspondence of that
passage with his work as a whole.

Where such correspondence

exists, we can assume with high probability that James

ix
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intends the passage to reflect a particular, quasi-implicit
"theory" of the nature of consciousness.
This statement of method and procedure is intended to
allay qualms about the validity and reliability of my
conclusions, which I hereby submit to the reader's own theory
of meaning.
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P r e f a c e N o te s

1 M. H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, 5th ed. (Fort
Worth, Texas: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1988), pp. 85-86.
Late twentieth century scholarship m the history and
philosophy of science gives support to this interpretation.
See, for example, Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. rev. ed. (Chicago, Illinois: University of
Chicago Press, 197 0); Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgraves (eds.),
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 197 0); Larry Laudan, Science and
Hypothesis: Historical Essays in Scientific Methodology
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel).
3 M. H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, p. 87.
4 The specific details of selection are not discussed in
this study.
5 E. D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven,
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1976).
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ABSTRACT

THE RHETORIC OP REALISM: AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY AND AMERICAN
LITERATURE, 1865-1910
by
Sandra L . Webster
University of New Hampshire, May, 1994
The period following the end of the Civil war in America and
extending to just after the turn of the century witnessed the
emergence of an independent discipline of psychology as well
as the emergence of a uniquely American literary tradition.
Though these developments occurred independently and operated
out of different traditions, they shared a common interest in
the concept of "consciousness."

The present study is a

comparison of models of consciousness expressed in
psychological and literary texts of two periods:

The first

period covers the emergence of literary realism and American
philosophical psychology (1865-1885); the second period
covers literary naturalism and the emergence of psychology as
a science (1886-1910).

Content analyses of selected passages

revealed that psychologists portrayed consciousness as a
unidimensional entity, divisible, in principle, into various
"powers" or aspects of perceiving, thinking, reasoning, and
the like.

Novelists, in contrast, portrayed consciousness as

a multi-dimensional, feeling-toned arena, indivisible and
unclassifiable.

However, both psychologists and novelists of

the early period depicted a passive consciousness wholly
xvii
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contained within the experiencing subject; while in the later
period consciousness was readily depicted as actively engaged
in on-going interaction with the world.

These developments

are discussed within the context of the particular
methodological commitments and traditions attending the
nineteenth-century development of two American disciplines:
the science of psychology and the American

novel.

xviii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study has two objectives:

to examine changes in

theories of consciousness in American literature and American
psychology from the end of the Civil War to just after the
turn of the twentieth century; and to compare selected
passages from literary and psychological texts for the
purpose of assessing the extent of interdisciplinary
exchange.

Because this work focuses on a single concept--

consciousness--and a defined time-period and culture
(nineteenth-century American psychology and literature), it
represents a more finely-tuned analysis than other surveys of
the connections between psychology and literature.
Nonetheless, such recent work as Michael Kearns's comparative
study of metaphorical representations in eighteenth and
nineteenth-century literature and psychology and Gordon 0.
Taylor's work on the analysis of models of mind/consciousness
in nineteenth-century novels provide useful background.1
Kearns compares selected psychological and literary
British and American texts of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries for examples of the metaphorical language of mind.
His purpose is to "analyze how the actual language used to
talk about mind changed during these two centuries and how
the changes correlate with changes in the concept of the
mind."2

Comparing across literature and psychology for the

two-hundred year period, Kearns finds that the dominant

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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metaphor of mind in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries in both disciplines is that of the mind as a
material entity that can be segmented into distinct elements-ideas or faculties--which receive "impressions" from the
external world.

The metaphors associated with this "mind-as-

entity" perspective depend on analogies with the physical
world:

Locke's definition of mind as "white Paper, void of

all Characters" or Hume's conception of mind as "nothing but
a heap of collection of different perceptions, united
together by certain relations" are salient examples of the
mind-as entity world view.3 In the works of Locke and Hume
(as well as in the work of the Scottish philosophers which we
will examine), the mind was seen as a passive "corpuscular
system [in which] each impression was discrete, each idea was
a unit, and consciousness consisted of a string of ideas and
impressions or a train of thoughts, coupled together but
still separate."4
One advantage of the mind-as-entity metaphor, according
to Kearns, was that it enabled psychologists and physicians
to assume a strict correspondence between mind activities and
brain activities and a correspondence between physical
obj ects and the the mind's knowledge of those obj ects.5
Viewing mind and consciousness as passive responders to
sensory input without the capacity to organize or transform
that input allowed nineteenth-century
philosopher/psychologists to assert a)

that the analysis of

mental phenomena was not different from the analysis of
physical phenomena, and b)

that our knowledge of the world

was direct and unmediated.

The first assertion justified the
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use of introspection as a methodological tool because the
objects of the introspected act--simple or complex ideas and
sensations--were assumed to be independent of the will; the
second assertion--that our knowledge of the world was direct
and unmediated--allowed philosophers to side-step issues
related to a mediating "self" imposing its own interpretive
structure on external events; as we will see, such issues
could not be easily encompassed within an avowedly
classificatory system of nineteenth-century science.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, this
conception of mind was "extended," according to Kearns, in
the literary works of Henry James and George Eliot.6

The new

conception of mind, the concept of mind-as-sentient-being
employed in on-going interaction with the world, is
identified with a questioning self whose aim is to make sense
of his or her experience.

In this perspective,

"mind/consciousness, " the "self" and even the individual
"will" were conceived as complex interactive processes
through which sensory information was ordered into knowledge
of both internal and external worlds.

This idea, the idea

that consciousness served a dynamic constructive function,
was taken up by nineteenth-century novelists whose goal was
to portray (in the words of Henry James) "the very drama of
[a] consciousness (at once] bedimmed and befooled and
bewildered, anxious, restless, fallible,"7 but always as an
active agent engaged with the world, where "engaged" is to be
understood in the special sense of acting and being acted
upon.
Despite the fact that novelists of the mid-nineteenth

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

century adopted this or similar perspectives on mind and
consciousness, Kearns notes that most psychologists of the
time continued to describe mind in predominantly
physicalistic terms as an entity (rather than a process) that
existed apart from a knowing self. In fact, for most
psychologists of the mid-nineteenth century, "mind" and
"consciousness" were described as distinct entities,
essentially, and for all practical purposes, passive
recorders of external and internal events, respectively.8
Gordon 0. Taylor's intent is to describe the changes in
psychological representations in American fiction in the
period 1870-1900.9 Unlike Kearns, Taylor does not rely on
metaphors to establish units of comparison between
psychological and literary ideas.

Instead, he writes:

We must first consider the novelist's psychological
assumptions as they can be inferred from his text and
seen as a set of related ideas about the mind and its
workings
[We must also consider] the ways in which
the novelist uses the techniques of fiction--diction and
imagery, characterization...point of view, narrative
method...--to make his psychological assumptions
operative in the fictive world....The relation [between
technique and assumptions about mind and
consciousness]...will be one of our principal concerns.10
Thus, Taylor's main interest is in assessing the relation
between literary techniques and theories of mind and
consciousness represented in the works of mid to late
nineteenth-century American novelists, specifically, Henry
James, William Dean Howells, Stephen Crane, Frank Norris, and
Theodore Dreiser.

Like Kearns, however, Taylor describes a

shift in psychological representation in the American novel
from a view of the mind as composed of static, discrete,
mental states with an emphasis on the typicality of those
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states "toward a concept of organically linked mental states
requiring representational emphasis on the nature of the
sequential process itself,"11 a shift that parallels Kearns's
descriptive categories of "mind-as-entity and "mind-assentient-being."

His intent is to describe these changes in

terms of the development of specific literary techniques that
provide the novelist with the means to create mimetic
reproductions of the more complex experience.

That is,

Taylor is less concerned with comparative assessments of
psychological and literary texts than he is with assessing
the "goodness of fit" between literary technique and a
novelist's assumptions about mind and consciousness.

His

purpose is to correlate changes in literary technique with
changes in the representation of conscious experience that
occurred in the period 1870-1900.12
Definitions of Crucial Terms
It is the purpose of this dissertation to describe
theories of consciousness as they were expressed in literary
and psychological texts of the late nineteenth century.
Because I am drawing on literature from two separate fields,
my task will be facilitated by providing definitions for some
of the terms I will be using throughout this work.
-Consc jp usnes_S
There is no single definition of this term that
successfully encompasses the variety of meanings and
intentions of this literature.

However, several important

points should be emphasized at the outset.

First.

Although

post-Freudian readers are accustomed to consider
consciousness in opposition to an unconscious--the source
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instinctual wishes and repressed ideas that bedevil our
conscious lives--late nineteenth-century Americans were
either unaware of the concept of "unconscious ideas" or
unwilling to consider that ideas could exist outside of
consciousness.13 The concept of consciousness, therefore, in
the years before Freud's work became known, encompassed a
much wider range of mental phenomena--including altered
conscious states, hypnotic trances, and psychopathology--than
our current understanding would acknowledge.11 Though this
idea will be taken up at length in Chapter 5, the important
point to remember is that the concept of consciousness
evolved in nineteenth-century America in the absence of a
viable understanding of what would later be called "Freudian"
processes, a fact that may account for the variety of
meanings and functions of different models.
Second.

In this work, I make an explicit distinction

between the concept of "mind," and the concept of
"consciousness."

This distinction is warranted by the fact

that virtually each of the psychological theorists of the
early period (1800-1885) whose work we will examine put forth
a similar distinction.

The reason they did so is a direct

consequence of their epistemological objectives:

Their

intent was to formulate an account of the mental operations
of sense perception, concept formation, judgment and
reasoning; the task was inherently reductive in that it led,
quite naturally, to analysis of these operations as
relatively independent processes originating in an "entity"
they called "mind."15 The role of consciousness in these
early models was that of reliable observer of these
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processes.
In contrast, models of consciousness of the later period
(1886-1910) were necessarily more complex.

"Necessarily,"

because the function of consciousness was conceived as
active, not passive; integrative and selective, not discrete.
In neither period, however, was consciousness conceived as
identical to mind, but rather more often as "mind-full." It
might "observe" mind and "record" or "accompany" its
operations; it might "select" and "attend;" but it could do
so only as long as it remained distinct from mind in some
unspecified sense.

The problem of the nature of the relation

between mind and consciousness was an important part of the
debate among mid-nineteenth century psychologists (Asa Mahan,
Mark Hopkins, James McCosh); and the different solutions to
that problem are a singular part of this story.
Third. That novelists of this period made a similar
distinction is one of the interesting results of this study,
one which I will address in depth at a later point. In
general, however, it suffices to say that the novelists of
this period were less concerned with epistemological
questions than they were concerned with the portrayal of
subjective experience, including sensory experience and the
experience of emotion.

Perhaps because of this emphasis on

felt-experience, consciousness, rather than mind, was the
primary object of their interest.

A quote from Henry James

is indicative of this tendency:
Experience is never limited, and it is never complete;
it is an immense sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web
of the finest silken threads suspended in the chamber of
consciousness, and catching every air-borned particle in
its tissue. It is the very atmosphere of the mind; and
when the mind is imaginative--much more when it happens
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to be that of a man of genius--it takes to itself the
faintest hints of life, it converts the very pulses of
the air into revelations.16
In Henry James's novels and short stories, it is always
consciousness that assumes center stage, distinct from mind,
within which sensory experience is converted into
revelations.

And Henry James is not alone:

Virtually all of

the authors I will examine in this study gave to
consciousness the unique capacity to make contact with the
external world and to learn from that contact.
Rhetoric/Discourse
Both "rhetoric" and "discourse" refer to the
descriptive, explanatory, and narrative texts of nineteenthcentury American psychology and literature. I do not intend
the use of "rhetoric" in the classic sense, that is, of
language that seeks to persuade or influence.

I use the term

in the more general sense as "the art or science of literary
composition, particularly in prose, including the use of
figures of speech."

Similarly, by "discourse,"

I mean "a

communication of thoughts by words; the expression of
ideas."17
The use of these terms assumes that different discourses
are structured along different lines, depending on the
intentions or objectives of the writer.

In their

epistemological and empirical quest, nineteenth-century
philosopher/psychologists sought general laws of mental
operations; accordingly, discourse assumed an objective
posture, devoid of self-reference and subjective
interpretation.

Novelists, in contrast, sought to describe

the individual experience; accordingly, discourse assumed a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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subjective posture, drawing on the notion of individual,
multiple realities and seeking to convey the on-going felt
experience.

As we will see, the concept of consciousness

received different treatment in these distinct discourses.
Realism
In literary theory, "realism" refers to that particular
mode of fiction writing which takes as its common theme the
accurate reproduction of experience amid cultural and
material change.

The term is opposed to "idealism," a mode

of fiction-writing that described man and man's experience as
transcending and transcendent, and which upheld the notion of
a permanent stable order (Emerson and Thoreau are well-known
examples of this school) . M. H. Abrams describes the typical
realist as one who "sets out to write a fiction which will
give the illusion that it reflects life and the social world
as it seems to the common reader....[one who] prefers the
average, the commonplace, and the everyday over the rare
aspects of the social scene."18 Donald Pizer, however, argues
that there is a greater diversity in the subject matter of
American realism and a more subjective and idealistic view of
human experience than is generally recognized.19 Nonetheless,
the central focus of literary realism is the internalization
of action within a central consciousness.

In general, this

action involves the presence of a moral dilemma which is
resolved by the story's end with a consequent increase in
self-awareness.
American literary realism is to be distinguished from
philosophical realism on two levels:

First, literary realism

is intended to describe a literary genre--a style of writing
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that purports to describe the common experience; it does not
necessarily imply a philosophical position on the independent
existence of physical objects and events.

In fact, a more

appropriate term--and one which has become part of the
language of literary theory--is "psychological realism," a
term which defines the literary realist's explicit aim of
rendering the ordinary experiences of life through a single
interpreting consciousness.

Second, to the extent that

literary realism does assume the independent existence of
physical objects and the direct perception of them, the
primary interest remains the individual consciousness
irrespective of epistemological issues.
Chronological Development
Throughout the forty-five year period of this review
(1865-1910), American psychologists and novelists were
engaged in a process of defining and articulating the goals
and objectives of their disciplines.20 In the early years of
this period, American psychology was largely a philosophical
enterprise under the dominion of Scottish philosophical
psychology; by the end of this period, American psychology
was established as an experimental science with its own
laboratories and recognized professorships.21

In the same

forty-five year span, American literature sought its
particular voice in the representation of common, ordinary,
human experience and developed a set of methods to ensure
that the "new realism" of the mid-nineteenth century would
capture the American experience.22 By the turn of the
twentieth century, American writers had yielded to the spirit
of "naturalism," espousing Darwinian themes (along with a
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deterministic pessimism) and portraying humankind at the
mercy of biological and social forces.23

Within each

tradition, the concept of consciousness underwent a series of
conceptual refinements.
Psychology
In the early period (1800-1885), American psychologists
were intent upon constructing models of mind and
consciousness that would account for the acquisition and
structure of knowledge.

That is, they were concerned with

such epistemological issues as a) the role of sensory
information in the formation of ideas of physical objects; b)
the compounding of simple ideas into complex ideas; and, c)
the "powers" of judgment, reasoning, abstraction, and the
like.

One problematic issue these thinkers confronted was

the relation between "mind," often conceived as a
constellation of powers or "faculties," and "consciousness,"
variously conceived as part of mind, distinct from mind, or
some uneasy combination of these two alternatives.2'
1
Coincident with these epistemological issues about the
relation between mind and consciousness was a more specific
concern with the nature of consciousness itself.

Is

consciousness merely an adjunct of mind, acting as a sort of
passive recorder of the mind's activities?

Thomas Reid, for

example, asserted that consciousness is just that "immediate
knowledge which we have of our present thoughts."25 Is it the
very essence of the self, the certain knowledge of one's own
existence?

Virtually each one of the psychologists whose

works v/e will examine assumed that consciousness is the
source of the self-concept.

Does consciousness itself have
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specific powers of selection and association independent of
mind activities?

Not until William James's work in the

1880s would consciousness be described as the "realm of pure
experience," with the power to select, order, and integrate
sensory information, a conception already employed by his
novelist-brother nearly a decade earlier.26
In the mid- to late nineteenth century, these questions
were not minor concerns; by the fourth quarter of the
nineteenth century, they served to direct the focus of
debate away from epistemological concerns toward issues more
explicitly "psychological," that is, toward the description
of consciousness as a series of feeling-toned sensations, or
toward the description of altered conscious states (hypnotic
trances, psychotic episodes, or s l e e p ) I n psychology, this
objective took the form of an analysis of the development of
the faculties of knowing, feeling, and thinking, the
"phenomena of consciousness."28

In contrast to the earlier

period, psychologists of this later period (1886-1910) were
concerned with both the content and function of
consciousness:

They wished to describe not only conscious

states, but their development over time; to describe not only
conscious acts, but their role in the complicated adjustment
of an individual to the environment.29 in this post-Darwinian
period, the concept of consciousness was indeed "extended"
(to borrow Kearns's terminology) to include the means by
which an individual acquired the knowledge to adapt to a
world that operated according to immutable natural laws.30
Literature
American literature of the immediate post-Civil War
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period (1865-1885) explicitly and self-consciously took
subjective experience as its cardinal theme and sought to
portray the "common, the ordinary, and the true" of human
existence as it was known to the experiencing subject.31
Readers of realist fiction were asked to identify with a
moral dilemma fought within a central consciousness, an arena
in which sensory experience, conscious reflection, Puritan
morality, and practical necessity must have their say.32 The
moral dilemma, the conflicted consciousness, was not new to
realist fiction; it emerged out of a long tradition of
theological questioning.

What was new and different--what

marked this period off from the period which preceded--was
the idea that consciousness might serve an adaptive function.
Rejecting both the Poe-like descent into madness as the
inevitable result of a mind

turned inward upon itself aswell

as the transcendent visions of an Emerson or Thoreau,
American realists adopted the belief that conscious
reflection would yield positive gains in terms of an
individual's knowledge of his world and his place in it.

For

consciousness to serve such an adaptive function, they
reasoned, it must be receptive, it must be modifiable.
This theme is pursued by each of the three American
realists we will examine.

Readers of realist fiction were

invited to participate in a developmental process--to
witness, as it were, the gradual "unfolding" of a self-aware
consciousness.

For Henry James, this objective was met by

reference to a central character whose intelligence and
sensitivity and personal integrity were extraordinary,
capable of ever finer discriminations, as he writes in the
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following excerpt from the Preface to his New York edition of
The Princess Casamassima:
This in fact I have ever found rather terribly the
point--that the figures in any picture, the agents in
any drama, are interesting only in proportion as they
feel their respective situations; since the
consciousness, on their part, of the complication
exhibited forms for us of their link or connection with
it. But there are degrees of feeling--the muffled, the
faint, the just sufficient, the barely intelligent...the
acute, the intense, the complete, in a word--the power
to be finely aware and richly responsible. It is those
moved in this later fashion who "get most" out of all
that happens to them and who in so doing enable us, as
readers of their record, as participators by a fond
attention, also to get most. Their being finely aware-as Hamlet and Lear, say, are finely aware--makes
absolutely the intensity of their adventure, gives the
maximum of sense to what befalls them.33
A finely tuned consciousness, according to James, would serve
characters of great depth and complexity.

Variations on this

theme will be seen in the work of realist novelists selected
for this study:

Elizabeth Stuart Phelps's The Story of Avis

(187 9), William Dean Howells's The Rise of Silas Lapham
(1885), and Henry James's Roderick Hudson (1876) and What
Maisie Knew (1897) .3t
Realist authors of this early period recognized a clear
demarcation of subject matter and style between their work
and that of the preceding Romantic era ( 1 8 4 0 - 1 8 6 5 ) The
demarcation between nineteenth-century American realism and
"naturalism" is, however, less clearly defined, though
present-day literary historians generally agree that by the
fourth quarter of the nineteenth century a new literary style
emerged.36

In contrast to the realist affirmation of the

human potential for growth through sensitive self-awareness,
late nineteenth-century naturalist writers viewed

humankind
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in perpetual struggle against "natural" forces--whether
biologically or culturally driven.

In the words of literary

historians Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury, these authors
wrote within an atmosphere of Darwinian pessimism, "in search
not just of the 'facts' but of the iron laws behind them that
'really' determined existence--the biological constitution of
man, the impersonal machinelike operations of society, the
functions of evolutionary process."37

This literature, in

contrast to the moral liberalism of Phelps, Howells, and
James, assumes a characteristic 'scientific' posture:

an

image of humankind at the mercy of large impersonal forces.
Donald Pizer notes, however, that it is just this
deterministic ethos that allows the naturalist writer to
create characters who find meaning and dignity not in the
resolution of a moral dilemma, but in the battle against
forces beyond their control,38 whether those "forces" be
social and cultural or biological.

In this context, moral

"laws" were as fixed and immutable as any laws of the
physical world, as this brief quote from Theodore Dreiser
shows:

"[Others] did not believe, as I still did, that there

was a fixed moral order in the world which one contravened at
his peril."39

The theme of struggle and survival is

characteristic of each of the literary texts

published under

the rubric of "naturalism" I have selected for this study:
Henry Adams's autobiographical work, The Education of Henry
Adams (1907), Charlotte Perkins Gilman's short story, "The
Yellow Wallpaper" (1892), and Theodore Dreiser's novel,
Sister Carrie (1900) /°

Table 1 lists the psychologists and

novelists by period whose works form the basis of this study.
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Table 1
The table lists the four comparison cells containing the
names of the psychologists and novelists whose works forms
the basis of the present study.

Period

Psychology

Literature

1800 - 1885

Thomas Reid

Elizabeth Phelps

Laurens Hickok

William D. Howells

Asa Mahan

Henry James

Mark Hopkins
James McCosh
1886 - 1910

William James

Henry Adams

George T. Ladd

Charlotte P. Gilman

James Mark Baldwin

Theodore Dreiser
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Method
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to
which discipline-specific methodological commitments
influenced the development of models of consciousness in
nineteenth-century psychological and literary discourse.
Because the comparisons I wish to make are between
disciplines (broadly understood) and not between persons, I
have selected passages from the works of those writers and
psychologists who are routinely cited in the secondary
literature as major proponents of the conventions adopted by
each discipline during each of two time periods:41 1865-1885
(philosophical psychology and American realism); and 18861910 (experimental psychology and American naturalism) .
These period divisions reflect the end (in 1886) of a largely
speculative American psychology (George Trumbull Ladd
published his widely celebrated text Elements of
Physiological Psychology in 1887); and the beginning in 1887
of a new strain of realist literature, one which is often
distinguished from its predecessor by its allegiance to an
"iron" determinism, a belief that existence is controlled by
forces beyond human control.42

Included in the survey of the

first period of (pre-experimental) psychology are Laurens
Hickok, Asa Mahan, Mark Hopkins, and James McCosh; and
American realist novelists, Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, Henry
James, and William Dean Howells.

In the second period of

experimental psychology I cover psychologists George Trumbull
Ladd, William James, and J. Mark Baldwin; and naturalist
authors Henry Adams, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Theodore
Dreiser.

Chapter 2, a discussion of the Scottish philosophy.
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is intended as necessary background to the later chapters.
Selection of Passages
My procedure involves a comparative analysis of passages
about consciousness or conscious processes selected from the
major psychological and literary works of the writers and
psychologists identified above.

Like Kearns and Taylor, I

selected passages that are both characteristic of the period
and the discipline as well as characteristic of a particular
author or psychologist.

In the first instance,

"characteristic" was assessed against those objectives that
defined a particular discipline during a specified period:
for example, epistemological and scientific/empirical
objectives in psychology and the reproduction of subjective
experience in the literary tradition.

Thus, a passage could

be said to represent late nineteenth century psychology, if,
in describing consciousness, it gave prominence to
classif icatory issues or addressed the mind/body problem or
described the function of consciousness within the human
psyche.
In the second instance, "characteristic" was assessed in
accord with all that was stated or could be inferred about
the model of mind/consciousness assumed by the author or
psychologist of interest.

In general, it was not difficult

to draw very precise conclusions about the models of
mind/consciousness proposed by the psychologists because
their primary concern was to clarify issues concerning human
mental function and the models they proposed were described
unambiguously.

The novelists, however, whose concern was not

to clarify mind/consciousness issues, but to portray the felt
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experience, posed a certain challenge.

Inferences about

their models were drawn from close readings of their work
(including critical essays, autobiographical works, and
correspondence) and re-evaluated against a selection of the
vast secondary critical literature that exists of the periods
under review.

A passage could be said to "represent" a

particular model of consciousness if it accorded with the
general model of consciousness assumed by the author.
This procedure of checking each passage--first, against
the more general objectives of the discipline and, second,
against the more specific model of consciousness stated or
implied by the author or psychologist of interest, yielded a
selection of passages that may be reliably considered
representative of late nineteenth-century discourse
concerning consciousness.

This purposive selection process

rests on a careful analysis of the objectives of each
tradition as well as the methods used to achieve them.

These

analyses are reproduced in text where appropriate, along with
a descriptive account of the models proposed by the authors
and psychologists included in this review.
Textual Analysis
Because models of consciousness are often couched in
metaphorical language, the selected passages will serve as a
source of key words and phrases that signal a particular
approach to consciousness.

A salient example of this method

of identification can be seen in the analysis following this
passage drawn from Laurens Hickok's Rational Psychology of
1849 :
The pure object [of experience] is put within this
[mind's] light, and thus the mind possesses it in its
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own illumination, and this is the same as to say that
the object stands in consciousness. Not as an act, but
as a light; not as a maker--for that is the province of
the intellectual agency--but rather as a revealer:
after such analogies shall we doubtless best conceive of
consciousness, and which may thus be termed the "light
of all our seeing."43
Consciousness, as Hickok conceived it, had no power to
create; nor did it function as a source of ideas.

In this

passage, Hickok explicitly identifies consciousness as that
"light" in which the separate mental powers--reasoning,
perceiving, intuiting, and willing--played out their distinct
roles. Wholly passive, its function was conceived as similar
to that of the action of a single spotlight upon an actor
during a lengthy monologue.

This "spotlight" theory of

consciousness is unique to a psychology that gave to
consciousness unspecified "transcendent" powers.

The passage

serves its purpose in providing a salient example of the
method I will be following in this study.
While psychological models of consciousness will be
analyzed in terms of such key metaphorical terms, analysis of
literary passages turns on drawing out the implications of a
writer's theory of consciousness in accord with
characteristic (realist or naturalist) objectives and
narrative strategies for achieving those objectives.

A brief

analysis of one passage will illustrate the procedure I
intend to follow.

The passage is chosen because it serves as

a characteristic example of literary realism, and the
analysis which follows is intended as an example of the
procedure I will be following in the ensuing chapters.
The passage is from Elizabeth Stuart Phelps's The Story
of Avis. published in 1879:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21

A stillness and strangeness deeper than a bruised
muscle could strike, came upon her when she closed the
door of the long-deserted place, and, striking a fire in
her little grate, sat down to warm her hands. The
autumn sun stepped in, and stood cool and calm against
the wall, like the friend who never forgets, or suffers
as to forget, the resolve or the aspiration which we
once expressed....Avis looked about her with a
singularly defensive feeling, as if she were summoned by
some invisible tribunal to answer for an impalpable
offense. She had something of the recoil which a man
has in turning to his books or his business after a
night's dissipation.11
Elizabeth Phelps is writing in the realist tradition
with the objective of relating the story through a central
consciousness.

It is immediately apparent that Phelps,

working within the realist tradition, is not interested in
the physical realities of existence, except to the extent to
which they dramatize the subjective experience.

In the

passage, a narrator reports the confusion of barelyarticulated feelings of guilt, loss, and regret, feelings
that are conveyed metaphorically:

She is met with the 'cool

autumn sun' whose 'calm presence' reminds her of her former
self; her guilt is established by an 'invisible tribunal'
against which she has no worthy defense. The context is not
one in which any one mental operation--perceiving or judging,
for example--dominates.

"Consciousness," as Phelps describes

it, is an arena of fleeting impressions and half-articulated
thoughts each competing for dominance.

This concept of

consciousness is not unique to realist literature, but it is
one of its most salient characteristics, as we will see.
Prospectus
My intent is to describe developments in the
representation of consciousness in both psychological and
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literary discourse in the last half of nineteenth-century
America.

Accordingly, the chapters are organized

chronologically: the first period (Chapters 3 through 4)
details the ideas of the Scottish school, American preexperimental psychology and American realism; the second
period (Chapters 5 through 6) examines American experimental
psychology and American naturalism.15 In Chapter 7, I
conclude by examining changes in theories of consciousness in
literature and psychology from the end of the American Civil
War to just after the turn of the twentieth century as a
function of disciplinary objectives and I compare selected
passages from literary and psychological texts for the
purpose of assessing the extent of interdisciplinary
exchange.
I have deliberately selected a chronological arrangement
for this study because my primary interest is to compare
across disciplines within a particular time-period.
formats might have been selected.

Other

Kearns, for example,

adopts a loose chronology subsumed by the two categories of
mental metaphors he proposes:
sent ient-being.

mind-as-entity and mind-as

Though this approach reflects clear trends

in the language of the mind, it tends to overlook movements
within psychology or literature that may not be easily
encompassed under those headings.

Though both Locke and Reid

adopted a mind-as-entity point of view, for example, their
analyses of mental function were quite different.

Kearns

clearly recognizes this difference,16 but his analysis
obscures issues that are central to intradisciplinary
development.

These issues--disciplinary conventions and
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methodological commitments are central to this study.

The

final chapter (Chapter 7) will address these issues in some
detail.

As we will see, the issues that concerned

psychologists and the themes of literary realism and literary
naturalism (respectively), though drawn from movements
outside either discipline, were shaped by those conventions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter Notes

1 Michael S . Kearns, Metaphors o£ Mind in Fiction &
Psychology (Lexington, Ken.: University Press of Kentucky,
1987) and Gordon 0. Taylor, The Passages of Thought:
Psychological Representation in the American Novel (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1969). A lesser known but equally
representative perspective is offered by Allan Gardner Smith
in his The Analysis of Motives: Early American Psychology and
Fiction (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Rodopi N.V., 1980).
Other important contributions to this field are Ethelbert C.
Barksdale, Cosmologies of Consciousness: Science and Literary
Myth in an Exploration q £ the Beginning and Development of
Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: Schehknan, 1980).
2 Michael S. Kearns, Metaphors of Mind, p. 16.
3 Cited in
53, 81.

Michael S. Kearns, Metaphors of Mind. pp. 48,

4 Michael

S.

Kearns,Metaphors of

Mind, p. 61.

5 Michael

S.

Kearns,Metaphors of

Mind, pp. 90-91, 98-99.

6 Michael

S.

Kearns,Metaphors of

Mind, pp. 179-226.

7 Henry James, "Preface to Roderick Hudson," reprinted in
Henry James, The Art of the Novel. Critical Prefaces (pp. 319) (New York: Scribner's, 1934), p. 16.
8 Michael S. Kearns, Metaphors of Mind, pp. 132-134.
9 Gordon 0. Taylor, The Passages of Thought.
Psychological Seprei^entati-.on in .the American Novel. 1870-1900
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 4.
10 Gordon 0.

Taylor, The

Passagesof Thought.

p.5.

11 Gordon 0.

Taylor, The

Passagesof Thought.

p.6.

12 Gordon 0.

Taylor, ThePassages

of Thought. p.

4.

13 see, for example, William James'sdiscussion of
unconscious thought in William James, The Varieties of
Religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature (1902), Martin
E. Marty, ed. (New York: Penguin, 1985), p. 207.
14 As we will see in Chapter 2, early American

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

psychologists were concerned with epistemological issues.
The concept of an "unconscious" was necessary only if one was
intent upon constructing an explanation for pathological or
"exceptional" mental states. Even then, however, men like
Jean Martin Charcot, Pierre Janet (in France), Frederick
Myers (England), whose work on hysteria and spiritualism
preceded Freud's discoveries, preferred to expand the concept
of consciousness to include a "subconscious" or "subliminal"
aspect. See, for example, Eugene Taylor's William James on
Exceptional Mental States. The 1896 Lowell Lectures (Amherst,
Massachusetts, University of Massachusetts Press, 1984);
Gardner Murphy and Robert 0. Ballou, eds., wi]liam James on
Psychical Research (New York: Viking, 1960); James Mark
Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology. Senses and Intellect (1889)
(Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1972) , pp. 4558.
15 The distinction between mind and consciousness was
made by Locke in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(1690) W. Yolton, ed. (New York: Dutton, 1961) whose ideas
provided the source for David Humes's (1748) An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding. T. J. McCormack and M. W.
Calkins, eds. (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1963). The
Scottish philosophers, responding to Hume, made a similar
distinction. See, for example, Thomas, Reid, Essays on the
Intellectual Powers of Man (17 85) (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
M.I.T. Press, 1969); Dugald Stewart, Elements of the
Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. 1 (1811) (Westmead,
England: Gregg International, 1971); and Thomas Upham,
Elements of Mental Philosophy, vol. 1 (New York: Harper,
1848) . Throughout the third quarter of the nineteenth
century, the distinction between mind and consciousness was
upheld by American psychologists whose work I will examine.
16 Henry James, "The Art of Fiction" (1884-1888),
reprinted in Henry James. Literary Criticism. Essays on
Literature. American Writers, and English Writers. Leon Edel
and Mark Wildon, eds. (New York: Literary Classics, 1984), p.
52.
17 Webs_ter_fs New Universal Unabridged Dictionary. 2nd.
ed.(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), pp. 522, 1555.
18 M. H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms (Fort
Worth, Texas: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1988), pp. 152-153.
Donald Pizer, Realism and Naturalism in Nineteenthcentury American Literature (Carbondale, Illinois: southern
Illinois University Press,

1984), pp. 2-5.

20 Daniel H. Borus provides a cogent account of this

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26

period in American intellectual life in Writing Realism
(especially pp. 12-26); for a thorough review of the
development of American psychology in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, see John M. O'Donnell, The Origins of
Behaviorism. American Psychology. 1870-1920 (New York: New
York University Press, 1985).
21 See, for example, A. A. Roback, History of American
Psychology (rev. ed.) (New York: Collier, 1964), pp. 137-195;
James Mark Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology (New York: Henry
Holt, 1889); Ernest R. Hilgard, Psychology in America. A
Historical Survey (San Diego, California: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1987), pp. 3-66). William James established a
demonstration laboratory at Harvard in 187 5, though G.
Stanley Hall is generally credited with founding the first
"official" American psychology laboratory. Professorships in
the "new psychology" were established at the University of
Pennsylvania in 1888.
22 In many ways the "new realism" of the third quarter of
the nineteenth century was particularly well suited for the
development of an American literary voice: In stressing the
common and ordinary of human experience it was inherently
democratic; it opened up new avenues for regional literature;
and it provided the means for vivid portrayal of the
individual man or woman in social context. The most widely
known authors of the period (Henry James and William Dean
Howells) were instrumental in establishing the standards that
defined realism.
(See Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury,
From Puritanism to Postmodernism. A History of American
Literature (New York: Viking, 1991), pp. 181-218.
23 Frank Norris (The Octopus. 1901; The Pit. 1903) and
Jack London (Call of the Wild. 1903; The Sea-wolf, 1904) are
the writers whose work is most closely identified with late
nineteenth-century naturalism, a genre that both explicitly
and implicitly recognized humankind's existence as governed
by impersonal forces.
(See Richard Ruland and Malcolm
Bradbury, From Puritanism to Postmodernism, pp. 225-245.)
24 For a discussion of this epistemological tradition in
early American psychology, see Jay Wharton Fay, American
Psychology Before William James *(New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1939).
25 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man
(1813) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 10.
26 See William James, "The Knowing of Things Together,"
reprinted in William James. Writings. 1878-1899 (pp. 10571076) (New York: Library of America, 1992), pp. 1061-1062 and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

his Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (1890) (New York: Dover,
1950), pp. 288-289.
27 See, for example, James Mark Baldwin's Handbook of
Psychology. Senses and Intellect (New York: Henry Holt,
1899), pp. 43-68.
28 George Trumbull Ladd, Primer of Psychology. (New York:
Longmans, Green, & Co., 1894), p. 7. See also James Mark
Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology. Senses and Intellect. vol. 1
(New York: Henry Holt, 1889), pp. 8-9.
29 See, for example, James Mark Baldwin, Handbook. vol.
1, pp. 43-68.
30 See, for example, William James, The Principles of
Psychology, vol 1 (1890) (New York: Dover, 1950), Chapters
VIII, IX, X.
31 For a discussion of the characteristics of American
literary realism, see Daniel H. Borus, Writing Realism, pp.
12-26; George J. Becker's discussion of literary realism in
Europe and America in the Introduction to his edited
Documents of Modern Literary Realism (Princeton, New Jersey,
Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 3-38.
32 Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury, From Puritanism
Postmodernism, pp. 188-218.
33 Henry James, "Preface to Princess Casamassima,"
reprinted in Henry James, The Art of the Novel. Critical
Prefaces (pp. 59-78) (New York: Scribner's, 1934), p. 62.
34 These novels as well as the "naturalist" novels which
follow are widely regarded by major secondary sources as
"representative" of their respective traditions. See
footnote 41.
3^ In the last half of the nineteenth century, American
realists articulated their objectives in an on-going series
of critical commentary. Statements of Henry James's literary
objectives may be found in any of the Prefaces to the New
York Edition of his works (written in the first decade of the
twentieth century) and collected in Henry James, The Art of
the Novel: in his "The Art of Fiction" (1884), reprinted in
James E. Miller, Jr., ed., Theory of Fiction: Henry James.
pp. 28-44. William Dean Howells's critical theory is
expressed in his editorial columns for the Atlantic Monthly
and Harper's Magazine (1871-1881 and 1886-1892, respectively)
and reprinted (in part) in Clara Marburg Kirk and Rudolf

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28

Kirk, eds., Howells's Criticism and Fiction and Other Essays
(New York: New York University Press, 1959).
36 For a discussion of the development of literary
realism in America, see Daniel H. Borus, Writing Realism;
Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury, From Puritanism to
Postmodernism. pp. 188-194; Warner Berthoff, The Ferment of
Realism. American Literature 1884-1919 (New York: The Free
Press, 1965), pp. 1-47; Jay Martin, Harvests of Change:
American Literature. 1865-1914 (Englewood, Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Amy Kaplan, The Social
Construction of American Realism (Chicago, Illinois: The
University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 8-14. These
references are representative of a vast literature on the
topic of American literary realism and its late-nineteenth
century counterpart, American naturalism.
37 For a discussion of literary naturalism, see Richard
Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury, From Puritanism to
Postmodernism, pp. 223-235 (quoted passage, p. 224).
3® Donald Pizer, Realism and Naturalism in NineteenthCenturv American Literature. rev. ed. (Carbondale, Illinois:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), pp. 9-12.
39 Theodore Dreiser, Newspaper Days
40 Theodore Dreiser, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Kate
Chopin are considered credible representatives of the
naturalist period of American literature.
41 By "representative" texts I refer either to a) in
psychology, models of mind and consciousness that were
typical of those constructed in the specified periods: 18651885 or 1886-1910 or were most well-known and influential
(e.g., william James; or b) in literature, works by those
novelists who were considered both in their own time and in
current histories as embodying and promulgating the realist
or naturalist strategies most explicitly. Secondary sources
from which this information was drawn include (psychology) :
Jay Wharton Fay, American Psychology Before William James:
David J. Murray, A History of Western Psychology. 2nd. ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988); Ernest
R. Hilgard, Psychology in America. A Historical Survey (San
Diego, California: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987);
(literature):Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury, From
Puritanism to Postmodernism; Harold H. Kolb, Jr., The
Illusion of Life: Writing Realism. Daniel H. Borus, Howell s r
James, and Norris in the Mass Market.
42 Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury, From Puritanism
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to Postmodernism, pp. 223-235.
43 Laurens P. Hickok, Rational Psychology (1849) (Delmar,
New York: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1973), pp. 169170.
44 Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, The Story of Avis (1879) (New
York: Arno Press, 1977), pp. 217-218.
45 The reader is cautioned that where the historical
accounts of either discipline differ from "traditional"
accounts, it is to the American experience I refer, rather
than to more general accounts.
46 Michael S. Kearns, Metaphors of Mind, pp. 35-36.
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CHAPTER 2

MIND-AS-ENTITY AND THE HUMAN WILL
Throughout the 1800s, Scottish commonsense philosophy
dominated American psychological thought.1 Indeed, the
influence of the Scottish philosophers was so profound that
many of their ideas about the mind and consciousness
persisted in American psychology even after American
students, returning from study abroad, brought with them the
ideas and experimental methods they encountered in European
laboratories and universities."“Supported by the ideas of
Scottish philosophers, nineteenth-century American
psychologists justified their science on the basis that it
had a defined subject matter ("the science of mental life")
and a legitimate method of investigating it - introspection.3
Because the history of American psychology in the nineteenth
century is a history of the Scottish influence, I begin this
chapter with a brief summary of the models of mind and
consciousness which these philosophers proposed.
My review of these ideas is both more deliberate and
more detailed than that offered by either Kearns or Taylor,
for my intent is to describe a particular epistemological
tradition.

My purpose is two-fold:

to establish a pattern

for later discussions of the link between models of mind and
consciousness and the disciplinary traditions that support
them; and to provide a context against which changes in
representations of consciousness in psychological and
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literary discourse may be assessed.
The Scottish Psychology of Mind and Consciousness
In the "Preface" to his Essays on the intellectual
Powers of Man. Thomas Reid states that the purpose of his
inquiry is to discover the "nature and force" of mental
faculties in order that man might learn to apply them ever
more successfully to the development of all science.

Reid

believed, as did his followers, that a natural science of the
mind, properly carried out, would provide a foundation of all
knowledge; indeed, he asserted (quoting Hume) that natural
philosophy "is the centre and capitol of the sciences, which
being once masters of, we may easily extend our conquests
everywhere."4 Once the properties of the mind were
understood, the laws governing the formation of ideas well
defined, the sources of error and false beliefs clearly
articulated, natural philosophy would be in a position to
adjudicate the knowledge claims of the natural sciences
(astronomy, chemistry).
To understand the human mind and its operations was to
lay a foundation for the future of all science.

This was not

a new idea in the early nineteenth century; indeed, this
clear epistemological objective had been assumed by most
Western philosophers since Descartes first formulated his
method of doubt in the sixteenth century.5 while this belief
ensured philosophy's crucial role among the natural sciences,
it also was compellingly clear that little progress had been
made:

the questions of philosophers about the mind and its

properties had achieved no certain solution.

What was

needed, Reid believed, was a method which, when applied to
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the analysis of mental phenomena, would yield general laws
about the mind of the same kind that attended Newtonian
mechanics.6
Like their eighteenth-century counterparts (Locke, Hume,
Berkeley), the Scottish philosophers believed that the
success of the natural sciences was owed to the systematic
application of careful observation and experimentation.1

As

mental phenomena differed from physical phenomena only in
respect to their locus of operation, there was little doubt
that proper attention to method and analysis would yield a
similar outcome for natural philosophy.3

"It was natural,"

concludes Isaiah Berlin, author of The Age of Enlightenment.
"and indeed almost inevitable, that those who had been
liberated by the new sciences should seek to apply their
methods and principles to a subject which was clearly in even
more desperate need of order than the facts of the external
world."5
The way to a science of the mind was through observation
and experimentation.

Accordingly, Reid's explicit

epistemological objective was buttressed by a traditional
methodological directive:

"The chief and proper source of

[knowledge of the mind and its faculties]," he states, "is
accurate reflection upon the operations of our own minds....
the same kind of operation with that by which we form
distinct notions of external objects."

As Reid defines it,

reflection is to knowledge of the mind as observation is to
knowledge of external events.

It is, he asserts, "a kind of

[reasoned] intuition [which] gives a like conviction with
regard to internal objects, as the faculty of seeing gives
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with regard to objects of sight."10
Properly used, reflection (the introspective method)
would lead to the discovery of general laws of mental
phenomena.

Specifically, Reid was concerned with both the

conditions under which certain powers of the mind were
expressed (the power of perception, the power of reason, for
example), and the conditions which led to their optimal
development.

According to Reid, introspective data were not

alone sufficient for drawing general conclusions about the
workings of the mind (after all, on the basis of
introspective data alone, David Hume drew the conclusion that
humankind was incapable of 'true' knowledge of the world).
The philosopher who would develop a sound model of the mind
and consciousness must, according to Reid, validate his
conclusions against observations of a more general character,
taking into account a wide range of human actions.

One might

study, for example, the behavior of parents toward their
children in order to determine habitual modes of thought and
conduct.

Or, one might study human errors or prejudices,

because such fallacious reasoning would provide evidence of
the way in which the human mind may be led to false
conclusions and incorrect interpretations.11

This reference

to sources of information other than introspection would
serve as a check, Reid believed, on the tendency to regard
introspective evidence as absolute; and it would serve, at
least in principle, the role served by crucial experiments in
the natural sciences.12 For the purpose of this study, it is
against these specific epistemological and methodological
objectives that the Scottish model of mind and consciousness
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should be understood.

The Scottish School
The Scottish philosophers (Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart,
Thomas Upham, and others) specifically rejected the
conclusions of John Locke and David Hume, even though their
models of mind and consciousness were constructed upon a
similar foundation, a foundation supported by the Newtonian
model of science.

In applying the Newtonian model of the

physical world to the properties of the mind, for example,
Locke envisioned the human mind as an entity (having
extension and limits) that contained a number of uniform
particles ("ideas") which, in their simplest form, could not
be reduced.

According to Locke, these simple ideas

(corresponding to sensations and emanating from the external
world) either remained isolated and discrete or, in accord
with associative laws of similarity and contiguity, were
compounded into complex ideas, similar to the way in which
objects in the external world were compounded out of atoms
and molecules.

Throughout the process, the mind, envisioned

as a mere receptacle, remained passive: the compounding of
simple ideas into complex ideas occurred automatically,
irrespective of desire or the will, according to laws that
could be precisely articulated.13

This model of the mind is

a salient example of what Kearns intends by a "mind-asentity" world-view.
Locke's thoroughgoing associationism drew forth strong
reactions (from Immanuel Kant and the Scottish philosophers),
for it implied that nothing could be known for certain, not
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the existence of physical objects, nor the existence of God,
nor even our own identity:

All that could be known were the

simple or complex "ideas" the mind contained.

Indeed, was it

possible that the only sound conclusion philosophers could
draw after centuries of debate was that certain knowledge was
unattainable?

This inevitable conclusion was unthinkable for

Thomas Reid, and his solution to the problem, though
seemingly simple in retrospect, marked a turning point in
philosophical inquiry, leading to a rejection of questions of
mere epistemological form and toward a preference for
questions of psychological import.
The essence of Reid's metaphysical position was that the
human mind is not passive, but active.

Knowledge is no mere

compilation of sensory impressions, but a unified whole
corresponding one-to-one with events and objects in the
external world.

The mind contains not a mere constellation

of simple and complex "ideas," as Locke would have it, but a
complex hierarchy of powers and capacities, both natural and
acquired.

Reid's task, as he saw it, was to delineate these

powers and operations, their characteristics, the conditions
under which they operated, and the manner in which they could
be improved.

In this regard, Reid's task differed from

Locke's at the outset:

his intent was to provide an analysis

and classification of mental powers and their development,
not to provide an analysis of the origin of knowledge.
Figure 1 is a representation of Reid's model of the mind
consisting of two parallel series, one labeled
"Understanding" and the other labeled "The Will."

Each

series consists of a hierarchy of natural "powers" or
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Figure 1
Series 1 - The Understanding
Perception

Memory

conception

Resolving

judging

Reasoning

Taste

Moral

Consciousness

Perception

"Stream of Thought"
Series II - The Will
l

Attention

Deliberation

Resolution

Figure 1
Series I represents powers of the Understanding; Series II represents powers of the Will.
(Adapted from Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man [1813-1815]

[Cambridge,

Massachusetts, M.I.T. Press, 1969], p. 70ff.; and Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers
of Man [1815]

[Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1969], pp. 76-89).
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"faculties" (represented as numbered squares).

In Series I

(the Understanding), the powers are arranged in the order
corresponding to successive steps in the acquisition of
knowledge; those in Series II are arranged according to
degree of effort.

The long horizontal line in the middle of

the page represents the entire "train of thought," capturing
the succession of thoughts emanating from the separate powers
over time.14
The model Reid proposes is a process model; my purpose
in presenting it in this way is to underscore the similarity
between Reid's model of the mind and twentieth-century
information-processing approaches to the mind, though Reid
opts for different categories--"powers"--rather than
processing levels.15

Like these later models, however, Reid

intends us to understand that the separate powers of the mind
operate both successively and in tandem:

the powers of the

Understanding are influenced by those of the Will; perception
is a prerequisite to reason and judgment.16

This interactive

aspect gives Reid's system the following structure:

The

powers of mind can be classified as predominantly Active
(involving primarily the Will) or Passive (involving
primarily the Understanding) and as Natural (innate) or
Acquired (that is, developed over time and dependent on
training or education). Within this structure, there are
four possible divisions of mental operations:

Natural

Passive powers are faculties (the power to reason, to judge,
or to perceive--represented as powers of the Understanding in
Figure 1); Natural Active powers are capacities (such as the
capacity to attend or the capacity to deliberate--represented
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in Figure 1 as powers of the Will); Acquired Passive powers
Reid calls "dispositions" (moral taste or a love of beauty);
and Acquired Active powers are habits (ethical reasoning or
moral judgment) .17
As a first-order power of the Understanding, perception
is grounded in physiological mechanisms, granted to humankind
according to God's will.

According to Reid, sense organs

receive impressions from objects in the external world; these
impressions are then transmitted from the organ to the
nervous system, and from there to the brain, though "we
cannot give a reason why [or how] it is so."

Perception,

according to Reid, is direct and unmediated: "(B)y fixed laws
of nature...[perception] corresponds exactly to the nature
and conditions of objects in the world....Without this exact
correspondence," he continues,"the information we receive by
our senses would not only be imperfect, as it undoubtedly is,
but would be fallacious, which we have no reason to think it
is."18

Perception is limited and circumscribed, by God's

will, by the nature of the sense organs themselves (we see
very little, if at all, in absolute darkness); even so, what
we do perceive directly corresponds exactly to what exists-and it is God's will that this be so.
The natural powers of the Will are similarly grounded in
physiological mechanisms, though Reid is not prepared to
submit an analysis of their origin, except to say that they
are granted by God.19 Acquired powers, in contrast, are only
potential, not fixed; their emergence depends on external
conditions, education, moral training, as well as love of God
and humankind and the desire to make the most of one's life.20
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Thus, the development of a love of beauty or the capacity to
reason ethically depends on both innate propensities and a
prescribed educational and religious program.
In this respect, Reid's view of the mind was very
different from Locke's conception of a passive mind, as he
intended it to be.

Reid saw his work as a necessary response

to Locke's passive sensationalism and Hume's skepticism, both
of which, in denying that the mind contained innate powers
and capacities, did not provide an explanation for observable
differences among people in either abilities or conduct.

By

assuming that knowledge accrued independently of the will,
Locke (and Hume) seemed to deny what was very clear to Reid,
namely that the elite (the philosopher, the academic, the
theologian) was of a different character than the "vulgar and
insensitive," who must be led to right conduct.21

Moreover,

though Locke's model had much to say about the origin of
ideas, it had little to say about conduct.

Reid's model, in

contrast, founded on the assumption of the interaction of the
various powers of the Will and the Understanding, had much to
say about the development of the "higher powers" of reason
and moral good, though, admittedly, much less about the
origin of ideas.22

It is for these reasons that I have

stated that Reid's model is less concerned with
epistemological form and more concerned with psychological
issues.

And it is for these reasons that the Scottish

approach, originating in Reid, served as a more useful model
of mind and consciousness for early psychologists than
Locke's model alone.
The model proposed by Reid is reductive in that it
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assumes that classification of the mind into distinct powers
(or faculties) and analysis of those powers in terms of
discrete characteristics and the conditions under which they
operated would yield general laws of human mental function.
The Scottish philosophers believed, however, that once these
laws were known, once the modes of operation were understood
(including those instances of false perception, illogical
reasoning, and immoral judgment) , philosophy would then be in
a position to assume its role as the arbiter of scientific
claims.

As Dugald Stewart, a student of Reid, states the

matter:
The more knowledge of this kind we acquire, the
better can we accommodate our plans to the established
order of things, and avail ourselves of natural Powers
and Agents for accomplishing our purposes,23
Though Reid and his followers were convinced that a
thorough knowledge of human mental function would provide a
firm foundation for the sciences, they also believed that
their analyses would have profound religious and ethical
implications.

Certain powers, for example, ethical reasoning

and moral judgment, reverence for beauty and God, were powers
that could be acquired through proper training and exercise.24
Indeed, this particular idea is so often repeated throughout
Reid's essays that it must be understood as a central tenet.25
In the final analysis, reason and conduct are so intertwined
in Reid's model that the proper development of the former
leads inevitably to "right" conduct and "the honour, dignity
and worth of a man."26
In many respects, Reid's concept of moral development is
more important than his epistemological agenda.

Ultimately,
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he appeals both to human intellect and human will; and it is
the human will that distinguishes humankind from animals,
civilized man (the philosopher) from savages (the "vulgar and
inattentive"), and adults from children.27

Reid's moral

agenda is intertwined with the belief that God-given powers
require constant effort and continued assessment in order to
ensure the development of ethical reasoning and moral
judgment.

Indeed, this developmental thesis is implicit in

all of Reid's work, as is evident in

the following quote:

The power of reflection upon the operations of their own
minds does not appear at all in children. Men must come
to some ripeness of understanding before they are
capable of it....Like all our other powers, it is
greatly improved by exercise; and until a man has got
the habit of [it], he can never have clear and distinct
notions of them, nor form any steady judgment concerning
them....To acquire this habit, is a work of time and
labour, even in those who begin it early, and whose
natural talents are tolerably fitted for it; but the
difficulty will be daily diminishing, and the advantage
of it is great.28
The ability to reflect is such a power acquired, and though
humankind may be endowed with the capacity to form such a
habit, its development depends on both "natural talent" and
concerted effort, that is, the human will (see Figure 1).
My purpose in emphasizing this aspect of Reid's thought
is two-fold:

Reid was one of the first, in all likelihood,

to insist on a distinction between innate powers of the mind
(perceiving, reasoning, judging) and innate capacities of the
mind (such as the capacity to reflect or the capacity to
appreciate beauty) and to incorporate into his model the idea
that one might develop both by an effort of the Will.

The

idea that the Will and the Understanding might interact, that
their interaction was part of a developmental sequence, was
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the primary- difference between the mental models proposed byReid and those proposed by Locke, for example, and Hume.29 in
summary, Reid's explicit concern with the properties of the
Will enabled him to a)

account for individual differences

among peoples (the vulgar versus the the elite, children
versus adults); b)

suggest means by which God-given powers

might be improved; and c)

account for error and false

beliefs, none of which Locke was able to account for
successfully.

Moreover, it accorded with the idea, common to

nineteenth-century Americans, that knowledge of God and
purity of soul were a product of individual effort (good
works) , not merely given by divine fiat.30 One reason, then,
for the enduring influence of the Scottish tradition in
America is precisely that their ideas gave such profound
support to individual effort.
My second purpose in emphasizing this aspect of Reid's
thought is that this idea--the idea that persons differed in
their ability to reflect upon their own thoughts (as well
upon the events which occasioned them) and, by extension, to
act upon their reflections--was assumed by each of the
writers whose works I will examine in Chapter 4.

To greater

or lesser degree, each of these novelists described
characters whose lives were directly affected by their
ability to take in information about their world, to reflect
on that information, and to act on their conclusions.
Consciousness and Reflection
As we will see in the succeeding chapters, the
distinctions Reid makes between "consciousness" and
"reflection" are upheld by both late nineteenth-century
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psychologists and novelists.

In the Essays. Reid defined

"consciousness" as a power of the Understanding, and
"reflection," as an innate capacity which depends for its
development on the activity of the Will (see Figure 1).

Reid

believed the distinction was important because reflection was
regarded as the primary tool of the mental philosopher, and
the capacity for reflection (acquired over time) was regarded
as the primary feature that distinguished those who aspired
to true knowledge of the world and those who merely existed
within it.
In the words of Thomas Reid, "consciousness is an
operation of the understanding of its own kind, and cannot
[therefore] be logically defined;"31 that is, reduced to
elements such as "ideas" or "impressions," as Locke would
have it.

Though consciousness included pains and pleasures,

hopes and fears, desires and doubts, "in a word, all the
passions, and all the actions and operations of our own
minds, while they are present,"32 its activities were confined
to the present instant.

That is, consciousness might "know"

of these operations, and know them with certainty, but only
as they occurred; consciousness was without memory,

within

this context, however, "consciousness" assumed the character
of a perceptual act, an ever-present observer of the mind's
operations, "the evidence, the only evidence," Reid insists,
"which we have or can have of [the] existence [of the
operations of our minds]."33 Like Reid, American preexperimental psychologists and realist novelists would
recognize in consciousness this same orientation to the
present; unlike Reid, the novelists would regard the
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sensations of consciousness as primary.
In contrast, reflection, says Reid, is "like to the
difference between a superficial view of an object...and that
attentive examination which we give to an object when we are
wholly employed in surveying it."34
seen, is the philosopher's tool.

Reflection, as we have

Accordingly, while

consciousness is restricted to present phenomena, reflection
is the power to examine with careful attention both the
present and immediate past experience,

while simple

consciousness is constrained by immediate experience and
transitory sensations, reflection, because it is founded on a
combination of the powers of memory, reason, and judgment, is
effectively timeless: past, present, and future coalesce.

It

is through the acquired ability to reflect, according to
Reid, that we come to have knowledge of our minds and through
which we come to understand our desires; it is, of course,
reflection that provides the philosopher's data.

As we will

see, in the hands of the novelists, "reflection" becomes the
source of self-knowledge.
Reid distinguishes consciousness and reflection on other
grounds as well:

Consciousness is described as involuntary,

operating independently of judgment and reason, and
unfocused;

reflection is described as voluntary, operating

within the constraints of judgment and reason, and focused.35
Reflection, not consciousness, is the source of invention,
the poet's creative act.

Dugald Stewart argues this point in

some detail in a passage that resonates with metaphorical
imagery:
Of the powers which the mind possesses over the train of
its thoughts, the most obvious is its power of singling
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out any one of them at pleasure, of detaining it, and of
making it a particular object of attention. By doing
so, we not only stop the succession that would otherwise
take place, but in consequence of our bringing to view
the less obvious relations among our ideas, we
frequently divert the current of our thoughts into a new
channel.36
It is "reflection" that enables the poet and scientist to
halt the progression of images, to focus on one thought to
the exclusion of others, to discover relationships among
images and ideas, and thereby to create a novel image, embark
on yet untraveled terrain.
The difference between consciousness and reflection that
Reid sought to establish may seem contrived, because within a
mind-as-entity perspective, because such distinctions were
considered the hallmark of careful analysis.

Nonetheless,

the method, patterned after the method used in the natural
sciences, was inevitably classificatory, analytical, and
reductive:

Distinctions, like that established between

"consciousness" and "reflection," were regarded by those who
advanced them as indications of progress in knowledge about
the human mind and human mental function.
Yet, reductive analysis of this kind generated its own
set of conceptual difficulties.

One difficulty that was not

to be satisfactorily resolved even into the twentieth century
was that of accounting for the human sense of self.

The

models devised by Locke and Reid within a mind-as-entity
perspective assumed relatively stable classificatory
distinctions; in Reid's model, for example, memory is but one
component of the Understanding (see Figure 1}.

In contrast,

the self-concept, introspectively known, endured through time
and across situations.

How, for example, might the
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philosopher account for the fact that each individual knows
with certainty that each thought is his or her own thought,
distinguished from all others' thoughts?

Though the question

seems odd from a twentieth-century perspective, in a
classificatory system (such as Reid's) which ought to be made
to account for all aspects of mental function, the problem of
an enduring self was not easily resolved.
system, would an enduring self be located?

Where, in such a
In such a model

it would have been as logically defensible to locate the
self-concept in Reason or the Will or Memory as in any other
delineated power.
In order to maintain consistency, Reid located the self
(or self-concept) in consciousness.
idea are interesting:

The implications of this

Though reflection might serve the

creative pursuit, though the Will in its various forms
preceded every conscious act, though Memory might serve as
the locus of former selves and past events, only
consciousness, innately given and oriented to the immediate
moment was capable of providing the essential and pervasive
sense of a self.

Reid writes:

[Though] (t)he thoughts and feelings of which we are
conscious are continually changing, and the thought of
this moment is not the thought of the last, still, there
remains, under this ebb and flow of thought, a constant
sense of certainty that the self that existed in a
single moment of perception is the same self that
existed yesterday or would exist tomorrow.37
The very core of consciousness, in Reid's model, is the
abiding sense of self.
Reid's solution to the question of a sense of self was
not a sweeping reappraisal of previous theories of
consciousness, but it is significant, if only because he
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firmly established a "self" within immediate, on-going
experience and, in doing so, took the first step in the
development of a psychology of experience.

In a very real

sense, the psychological characterization of experience as
self-owned and promulgated was at one remove from the neutral
(and neutralizing) epistemological programs of Locke and
Hume.

In this regard, Reid appears as a transition figure,

leading the way into a psychology that paid heed to
individual experience.

As we will see in the next chapter,

however, Reid's solution to the problem of the location of
the self or self-concept was not adopted without revision by
the next generation of psychologist/philosophers (1865-1885),
although each of them recognized the necessity of accounting
for the known-self in their own classification systems.
Realist authors, however, unencumbered by classification
systems and reductive analysis, assumed the known-self as an
integral and defining characteristic of consciousness.
As we will see, psychologists of the later period (18861910), less inclined to classification, supported a selfowned consciousness, even, as with James Baldwin, predicating
the development of the individual on the ability to
distinguish between self and not-self.

In the search for

general laws of human nature, the "new psychology" of this
later period was attenuated not by the development of
classification systems, but by the use of aggregate data and
the development of psychological "norms" of adjustment.38
brief passage from William James's Principles of Psvchotocrv
will reveal the influence of this idea on late nineteenthcentury psychology:
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Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each Thought,
dies away and is replaced by another. The other, among
the things it knows, knows its own predecessor, and
finding it 'warm, ' in the way we have described, greets
it, saying: 'Thou art mine, and part of the same self
with me.' Each later Thought, knowing and including
thus the Thoughts which went before, is the final
receptacle--and appropriating them is the final owner-of all that they contain and own.39
By the mid-nineteenth century, consciousness was
conceived in three different senses:

It was conceived as the

source of our knowledge of the discrete operations of our
mental powers by which general principles of mental function
could be determined.

In this context, consciousness was both

immediate and simple, capable of recording present experience
and elementary sensations; and reflective, capable of turning
back upon itself and recording thoughts on that experience
and recognition of those sensations as sensations in accord
with other sensations and past experience.

As simple

consciousness, it remained an independent act of mind; as
reflective consciousness, it was under control of the
separate powers of the will--attention, deliberation, and
resolution—
reasoning.

and included the powers of judgment and
Simultaneously, consciousness also served as the

sense we have that all our thoughts emanate from a single
self, that they are our thoughts.

In this sense,

consciousness provided the continuity that was necessary for
a system otherwise divided in theory.
Finally, both consciousness and reflection were
conceived as the source of all our knowledge of the external
world of physical objects and events and the internal world
of mental processes, of the passions, and of the body's
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physiological responses to internal and external stimulation.
Where epistemological and moral issues dominated the mode of
representation, consciousness was a necessary, but
problematic, dimension of mental functioning:

necessary,

because it provided the means for an analysis of
epistemological and moral issues (within the constraints of a
mind-as-entity perspective); and problematic, because
consciousness itself could not be "brought into" reductive
analysis. As we will see, mid-nineteenth century psychologies
of mind and consciousness offered no clear solutions.
The Scottish Influence
The distinction Reid established between immediate
consciousness and reflective consciousness occurs repeatedly
in the psychological literature throughout the nineteenth
century.

It occurs, for example, in the epistemological

models of mind and consciousness set down by American preexperimental psychologists and it occurs in the models of
consciousness offered by William James and later experimental
psychologists like James Mark Baldwin and George Trumbull
Ladd.10 Invariably, consciousness is described as consisting
of a succession of thoughts, sensations (pleasure and pain),
fears and hopes, memories, and the like, always "of the
present," that is, occurring in the here and now.
Reflection, when the distinction is made, has duration:

the

process extends over time, involves attention, deliberation,
and (often) resolution.
Reid

It is willed and focused, and, as

describes it, it is the source of knowledge and

invention.11

As we will see in Chapter 4, the distinction

between consciousness and reflection serves as a useful
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characterization of modes of consciousness in nineteenthcentury realist literature.
In contrast to Locke's over-valuation of experience,
the Scottish appeal to innate principles effectively forged a
compromise between a nativist theory of mind which supported
humankind's dependence on God and an empirical theory of mind
which allowed for the gradual shaping of mind through
education and experience.42 Certainly, the Scottish view
appealed to the American democratic ideal that individual
effort counted for much more than innate endowments in regard
to the pursuit of a moral life.

In G. Stanley Hall's words,

The Scotch philosophy represented by Reid, Stewart,
Brown and Hamilton, opened a far safer way. The "common
sense," which was its watchword, contained an immediate
conviction of right and wrong, of the reality of the
external world, freedom, etc., about which there was no
need or warrant for debate or doubt, while its
discussion of association, desire, will, and feeling,
was lucidity itself, and fitted our practical country
and had a wider vogue here than in Scotland itself. In
this form, psychology was very widely introduced in
American colleges.43
Like their twentieth-century counterparts, the Scottish
philosophers were acutely aware that a valid and useful
"science" of the mind depended on objectivity, unbiased
observation, and a more careful analysis than even the
natural sciences employed.

And they were just as self

consciously aware that the language of their science--indeed
the very subject matter--was even more than normally prone to
distortions and misinterpretations.44

The self-conscious

"scientism" exhibited in their work may be considered by
contemporary psychologists to be somewhat misplaced, but it
is there, nonetheless.

Their goal was clear:

Careful

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51

observation of the operations of the mind through conscious
reflection would yield simple and general laws of mental
function; and from those laws, through the process of
reasoning, one might discern the effect of any given
combination of them/5

As we have seen, this

scientific/analytical approach justified both their mental
science and the assumption with which they began:

namely

that our knowledge of mental events and our knowledge of
real-world events were the same in kind.
Later psychologists would follow the spirit, though not
the letter, of the program Reid set forth.

As we will see,

they were no less concerned than he was to ensure that a
science of the mind should be protected against speculative
self-interest.

One way to do that, of course, was to adopt

the conventions of classification/analysis to mental science
just as Reid did.

This strategy provided assurance that the

author's work would be accepted within the tradition.

In a

sense, mental science in America up until the late 1880s
followed a program of "normal science," a term originated by
Thomas Kuhn that refers to the practice within a discipline
of refining an accepted paradigm/6 As we will see, in the
third quarter of the nineteenth century, American
psychologists were engaged in the practice of normal science
in just this sense, elaborating Reid's model of the human
mind and consciousness.
Indeed, far too little recognition has been given to the
Scottish influence in traditional history-of-psychology
texts.

Graham Richards, for example, notes that

Associationist accounts of the mind (e.g., Locke, Hume, Mill)
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are accorded 84.3% coverage in contemporary history-ofpsychology texts, while the Scottish Enlightenment position
(Reid, Stewart, Hamilton) is accorded a mere 15.7% coverage.47
According to Richards, this unequal representation is the
result of a concerted effort among latter-day historians to
justify psychology's "scientific" heritage:

the

Associationist account is, in its particulars, more in accord
with the "'positivist', reductionist, 'materialist'
['empiricist'] tradition" that psychologists have self
consciously claimed as their own.48

The persistent neglect

of Scottish ideas, according to Richards, serves the
essential purpose of maintaining the belief that psychology-as a science--has its origins in a train of philosophical
ideas that, in spirit, support its goal of "prediction and
control."49 Though I have presented only a brief overview of
Scottish ideas (primarily Reid's), it should be evident that
their work is attended by a particular sensitivity to the
idea that a science of the mind should be approached no less
objectively than a science of the physical world.

Though

their success in that endeavor may be questioned, their acute
awareness of the problem was at least as influential as
Associationist accounts in setting the stage for the eager
acceptance of the experimental tradition by American
psychologists seeking justification for their work.
Though reduction of the mind to powers seems no less a
reduction than to (Lockean) ideas, the categorization Reid
proposed was more than relabeling:

it represented a dramatic

shift in emphasis no less important than that which displaced
humankind from the center of the universe.

The reason is
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clear:

Locke's model of a passive mind could not

satisfactorily explain why individuals of similar experience
so often disagreed; it could not explain

differences in

development (especially moral development), or, even,
differences in behavior over time.

In this account, I have

attempted to show that the Scottish thinkers accorded greater
emphasis to motivational issues than Locke (for one) had
granted, even if that emphasis rested on a theological
foundation.

From a presentist point of view, we might find

in Scottish thought the origin of a number of ideas that have
contributed to the development of psychology as a science.
Richards, for example, proposes several:

the development of

a psychology of education (which can be traced to the
Scottish idea that certain "habits" can be acquired),- the
development of a psychology of individual differences

(which

can be traced to the Scottish idea that talent and effort
both determine behavioral outcomes, foreshadowing Gall's
phrenology and providing a context for evolutionary thought);
and proto-psychiatry (which can be traced to the idea that
"excesses of the imagination," unattended by reason, would
lead to improper behavior, poor health, and madness).50

I

would add a fourth, namely Reid's idea that there is a
necessary correspondence between physiological processes and
mental powers.

All these ideas would be taken up by the

"new" psychologists of the late nineteenth century.
Summary and Prospectus
My purpose in this chapter was to provide a context in
which to assess changes in the concept of consciousness
throughout the nineteenth century.

For this reason, it is
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important to establish a clear sense of the concept as it was
understood by the leading philosophy of the time.

In various

places throughout his work, Reid refers to consciousness as
an "internal sense," similar in all respects to the act of
seeing.

The dominant metaphor of consciousness is that of a

perceptual act, "reflection" no less so:

Both are to the

mind what the senses are to the external world.51

Later

theories of consciousness (e.g., Asa Mahan, William James,
Herbert Spencer), though retaining in principle Reid's
distinction between consciousness and reflection, do not
adopt his metaphor.

Indeed, by 187 0, most

psychologist/philosophers did not even consider consciousness
to be a "power" of the mind at all.
The solution of later thinkers to the 'problem' of
consciousness had already been articulated by Reid in a
chapter entitled "The Train of Thought."

As Reid defined it,

the train of thought was not consciousness, but that which we
may be conscious of.

Distinct from consciousness, the train

of thought was caused not by external stimulation but
originated entirely within the "constant intestine motion" of
the mind itself.

It may be called, Reid asserted,

imagination, though he is cautious about the implications of
that label which implied a lack of moral constraint.52
According to Reid, the train of thought consisted of
either ideas "that flow spontaneously, like water from a
fountain, without any exertion of a governing principle to
arrange them;" or it may be "regulated and directed by active
effort of the mind, with some view and intention."53

The

similarity between these descriptions and Reid's account of
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consciousness and reflection are too powerful to ignore:

The

train of thought may be, that is, either like "consciousness"
(immediate, involuntary, and unfocused) or like "reflection"
(voluntary, focused, and involving reason and judgment).
Figure 1, an adaptation of Reid's model of the mind based
upon his work, depicts the "train of thought" as continuous
with the operation of the various faculties, of which
consciousness is one.
The distinctions Reid makes between consciousness,
reflection, and the train of thought, however consistently he
holds to them, are not compelling.

I point this out, not to

point out weaknesses in Reid's system, but to establish a
possible connection between later models of mind and
consciousness and the model Reid describes.

By the mid

nineteenth century, many philosopher/psychologists would
build on Reid's "train of thought;" would, in fact, take this
idea as the defining characteristic of consciousness.

In

later psychologies (see William James), Reid's "train of
thought" comes to serve as an apt metaphor for the experience
of consciousness itself.
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CHAPTER 3

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY, 1845-1885
American psychology in the third quarter of the
nineteenth century was founded on the ideas laid down by
Thomas Reid.

Specifically, the psychologists whose work we

will examine in this chapter upheld Reid's belief in a mind
that consisted of separate powers or faculties which gave a
true and accurate picture of the world.

With some minor

changes, they adopted the divisions of mind Reid had
proposed; and they assumed, like Reid, that the separate
powers of the mind, the Will and the Understanding,
interacted in specific and determinable ways.
Despite this implicit acknowledgement of Reid's
influence, however, American psychologists of 1845-1885 were
much less interested in the moral issues that had so
preoccupied Reid and his followers than they were concerned
with devising models of human mental function that accorded
with the latest research into human physiology, particularly
the functions of the brain and nervous system. Accordingly,
there is an incipient materialism in the work of this period
that is not present to the same degree in earlier work.
Moreover, as we will see, all of these models incorporated a
developmental perspective, to a greater degree of specificity
than Reid had done.

These ideas were influenced, in part, by

the evolutionary theories of Herbert Spencer, whose ideas had
come to acceptance in both American popular culture and in
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the academic halls.1
Although the influence of Scottish thought continued
until well into the 1880s, many of the models of mind and
consciousness developed in this period reflect the uneasy
opposition of two other lines of thought:

The first

perspective, derived from British empiricism, we encountered
before in the brief discussion of John Locke's theory of
mind.

Locke's position received support from David Hume and

J. S. Mill and remained a potent force in British theories of
mind throughout the nineteenth century, though less so in
America until the rise of Behaviorism in the twentieth
century.
The second perspective was derived from German idealism,
a philosophy of mind that emphasized the transcendent and
intuitive nature of human thought.

The primary source for

German philosophy in America was Immanuel Kant, who, like
Thomas Reid, was unwilling to accept the conclusions which
Hume had drawn from Locke's metaphysical position.

Kant

believed that the human mind was endowed with certain innate
capacities to organize experience:

in particular, Kant

asserted that the mind was innately capable of organizing
experience in space and time, determining cause and effect,
and, through memory and reflection, of acquiring such notions
as the concept of beauty or good.2
Many of Kant's ideas were also proposed by Reid.

For

example, like Reid, Kant also divided the mind into distinct
faculties or powers, though he accorded the imaginative
faculty much greater respect than Reid was inclined to do.
Unlike Reid and his followers, however, Kant believed that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64

our knowledge of the world was limited to that which could be
gained through sense experience, that is, to phenomena. The
world of noumena. that is, of objects-in-themselves, was
beyond sense-experience and thus beyond our ability to know
with certainty, though the imaginative faculty, operating in
accord with reason, was capable, in principle, of acquiring
higher-order knowledge of this sort.3
These ideas were enthusiastically taken up by the
American Transcendentalists (Emerson, Thoreau) who advocated
reason and intuition over earthly experience as a means to
certain knowledge.4 As a literary movement, however, American
Transcendentalism seemed to have little influence on mid
nineteenth century American psychology, though that influence
can be seen toward the end of the nineteenth century in the
work of William James (both William and his brother, Henry,
grew up in an atmosphere of close contact with Emerson,
Thoreau, and the others, who were part of their father's
circle).
Nonetheless, German idealism did infiltrate American
psychology, however briefly, in the work of two early
American psychologists, Asa Mahan and Laurens Hickok.

There

is no indication in available records to suggest that these
men garnered their ideas from the Transcendental movement
alone; rather, it appears that their debt is to a burgeoning
interest in German philosophical ideas that occurred in the
mid-nineteenth century among American philosophers.

At least

one source traces the emergence of this interest to the
publication of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's 1833 American
edition of Aids to Reflection, though there is evidence that
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the work of both Kant and Hegel was offered in American
colleges and universities in the early nineteenth century.5 In
the tradition of Kant and Hegel, these particular American
theorists gave greater powers to consciousness than Reid, for
example, had allowed.6 As we will see, consciousness from
this perspective is couched in "energy" metaphors: it assumes
the quality of an "internal light" or an "inner power."
Laurens Hickok (1798-1888)
In Hickok's work, we see a salient example of
consciousness cast as an internal light, though expressed in
an explicitly psychological text, Hickok's Rational
Psychology, published in 1848.

Because the text accorded

with the basic tenets of Christian theology, it was widely
used in American colleges and universities prior to the Civil
War to introduce advanced students to the scientific study of
the mind.

Like Reid, Hickok offers an extended discussion of

the faculties of sensing, perceiving, judging, intuiting and
their relations.

Unlike Reid, Hickok suggests that these

activities are made known to us by the luminate quality of
consciousness:
The whole process of the construction [of the pure
object of experience], all stand out in the mind's own
light, and such illumination will be available to reveal
what has been done, and to show the product. The pure
object is put within this light, and thus the mind
possesses it in its own illumination, and this is the
same as to say that the object stands in consciousness.
Not as an act, but as a light; not as a maker - for that
is the province of the intellectual agency - but rather
as a revealer: after such analogies shall we doubtless
best conceive of consciousness, and which may thus be
termed the "light of all our seeing."7
Hickok's concept of "consciousness" as that which
illuminates and reveals mental processes represents a
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significant departure from Reid's conception of consciousness
as a perceptual act.

Consciousness, in Hickok's system, was

envisioned as a substance-less 'power', invisible and
formless, capable of "receiving all things" without altering
its characteristics.

By definition, however, it could shed

no light on its own operations:
It is that inward illumination in which all that is
therein constructed may appear, while itself is a light
too pure and transparent to admit that it should be
seen.8
It remained an undefinable operation which possessed
different characteristics at different times--now of reason,
now of intuition, now of understanding, now of willing, yet
possessing no two simultaneously.

In Hickok's system,

consciousness appeared as that medium, changeless and
formless, in the light of which separate faculties-reasoning, perceiving, intuiting and willing--played out
their distinct roles.

The image expressed by Hickok is

wholly in accord with his view that an empirical psychology
of mind must be buttressed by appeal to "transcended
experience."9

Though this view of consciousness is expressed

in the work of the American Transcendentalists, it was
discarded by those who promulgated the new American literary
tradition of the mid-nineteenth century, American realism.
Asa Mahan (1799-1889)
Asa Mahan's major textbook, A System of Intellectual
Philosophy, was published first in 1845, reissued in 1847,
and issued again as an enlarged edition in 1854.10

What is

different about this text is that Mahan is clearly not
concerned with constructing a conception of either mind or
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consciousness that meets the requirements of his theological
principles.11
Taking his cue from Reid, Mahan insists on a distinction
between two different kinds of consciousnesses:

The first

consciousness, occurring earliest in time, is selfconsciousness--defined as "the being aware of ourselves, as
of the rne, in opposition to the not me:"
was also called "simple consciousness."

this consciousness
The second

consciousness, emerging in late childhood or early adulthood,
is referred to as "philosophical" consciousness--a process
similar in many respects to Reid's concept of "reflection."12
Although Mahan believed both forms of consciousness were
contingent upon Reason--the organ of all "universal and
necessary truths" (the elevation of Reason to the source of
all truth ensures that Mahan is working within the idealist
tradition), it is through simple consciousness, Mahan
believed, that humans, through the gradual recognition of the
self as separate from all else, come to develop their
intellectual capacities.13 Like Reid, Mahan believes the
"philosophic consciousness" is directed by the will, and
capable of yielding certain knowledge about the activities of
our minds.14
From these basic principles, Mahan constructed a model
of consciousness that is explicitly concerned with
explicating the series of mental events from which we derive
our knowledge of the world.

Knowledge begins, according to

Mahan, with the perception of a material object.

Simple

perception is attended by simple consciousness, a mere
recognition of object as distinct from self.

From this
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perception, reflective consciousness extracts certain ideas
about the object, such as that it has shape and form, exists
in space and time, etc.

Over time, reflection extracts from

the perception of physical objects the concept of abstract
notions of "contingency," for example the idea that the
existence of an object implies the existence of physical
space or that an event must have a cause.

Similarly,

reflection extracts from the repeated perceptions of
physical objects and events the abstract concept of
"necessity," the idea that physical space is a necessary
condition for the existence of a physical object or the idea
that a cause is a necessary condition for an event to occur.
Over time, these ideas, originally given by simple
consciousness and subjected to the process of reflection,
are analyzed, arranged, and generalized by the intelligence,
and presented as certainties to the Mind, the overseer of all
mental operations.15
Figure 2 represents the process Mahan has outlined.

Of

the first stage of consciousness, there is only the
perception of an external object or event; of the second
stage, of reflective consciousness, there is both abstraction
and synthesis (according to the laws of association) and
consequent classification and generalization.

This last

stage submits to the Intelligence the phenomena "so arranged"
which yields them, in turn, to the mind.
Summary
The models of mind and consciousness described by Hickok
and Mahan are not characteristic of mid-nineteenth century
models more generally.

However, like Reid, they relied on a
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Figure 2

Source

Processes

Stage 4

Mind

Reason

Stage 3

The Intelligence

classification and
generalization

Stage 2

Reflective
Consciousness

abstraction and
synthesis

Stage l

Simple Consciousness

perception*

* where Intelligence is considered a special function of Mind
and consciousness (both simple and reflective) is considered
a special function of the Intelligence.

Figure 2.
Representation of Asa Mahan's concept of mental function.
(Adapted from Asa Mahan, A System of Intellectual Philosophy,
1st ed. [New York: A. S. Barnes, 1854], pp. 47, 50-52. 5556.)
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faculty psychology, segmenting the mind into separate and
distinct powers of reasoning, judging and the like; and like
Reid, they distinguished between immediate (simple) and
reflective consciousness.

The elevation of the faculty of

reason (synthesis and abstraction) reveals Kant's influence.
Likely because of the Kantian influence, both Hickok and
Mahan gave to consciousness specific powers that Reid did
not.

For Hickok, consciousness was that internal light that

illuminated the operations of the mind and took on their
specific and discrete characteristics.
capacity is interesting:

This "reflective"

The metaphor suggests that

consciousness was not a power of the mind (as an "internal
sense" was such a power), but held a somewhat tangential
position, merely serving to mirror the activities of the
mind.

This idea was taken up by Mark Hopkins and James

McCosh, psychologists whose work represents the prevailing
ideas of the period in psychology just after the Civil War.
It is not a particularly compelling view (as we will see,
later American psychologists believed consciousness alone to
be the "proper" subject-matter of psychology) and it
certainly was not the view held by the literary realists of
the third quarter of the nineteenth century.
Mahan, in contrast,

proposes a "consciousness" of a

wider scope, one that is active, capable of development,
capable, at later stages, of abstraction and synthesis,
classification and generalization.

Mahan's consciousness

consists of levels: simple/reflective, immediate/extended in
time.

It is a combination of Reid's consciousness/reflection

distinction without the limitations imposed by equating both
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with a perceptual act.

As we will see, this model of

consciousness is very much in accord with the models adopted
by the literary realists discussed in the next chapter.
These models, as other nineteenth-century psychological
models of mind we will examine that reduced mind to a
constellation of separate powers, the dominant metaphor, was
that described by Michael Kearns as the "mind-as-entity"
world-view, even though, like Reid, these men envisioned the
mind as composed of powers, not merely ideas, simple or
complex.

As Kearns states:

The image suggests that the interior of the mind is no
longer the simple space presented by Hume and Hartley
but a textured place with localized features within
which a percipient principle [i.e., consciousness] can
experience certain impressions unavailable from the
external world....[The Scottish philosophers] place more
value on the mind's activity [but that principle is
phrased] in metaphorical language that still allows the
mind the qualities of extension and impressionability.
{The mind] is localized, hence extended, although here
it is living, active, and willful, rather than passive.16
Thus, it is the "reduction" of the mind to "localized
features" that is the primary characteristic of a mind-asentity world-view, not (necessarily) the assumption of
passivity, according to Kearns.
Still, there is something incongruous about a label that
includes Locke and Hume and Reid (and, by extension, Hickok
and Mahan) without some qualifying remarks.

The differences

between an active mind, consisting of discrete powers
modified by the Will, and a passive mind, consisting of
discrete ideas, combined according to associative law, are
major, and much too important to be trivialized under a
single all-encompassing label.

Reid's model, in contrast to
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Locke's model, for all its possible faults, allowed for the
possibility that the mind might develop over time; allowed
for the possibility that individual differences, in talent
and propensity to put forth effort, would lead to different
modes of conduct; and suggested a source for error and false
beliefs.
A Psychology of Mind and Body
Hickok and Mahan published their ideas just before the
outbreak of the American Civil War.

By 1870, however, the

epistemological/philosophical cast of American models of mind
and consciousness had faded into the background and there
occurred a shift in emphasis from a study of the human mind
as an aspect of the soul to a study of the mind as an aspect
of the brain and nervous system.
for this shift.

There were several reasons

Traditional accounts regularly and

accurately cite the influence on American thought of the work
of psycho-physicists Gustav Fechner and Hermann Helmholtz in
Germany and physician/philosophers Thomas Laycock and W. B.
Carpenter in England.17 The work of these men was founded on
the belief that psychological phenomena (that is, of the
mind) were closely related to physiological phenomena, that
is, of the brain.

We have seen this idea, of course, in

Reid's theory of the process of perception.

By the third

quarter of the nineteenth century, however, there seemed a
compelling need to clarify this connection and to incorporate
the latest findings into models of the mind.
A second factor that supported attempts to clarify the
mind/body connection emerged as a direct result of the Civil
War.

Physicians and neurologists of the late nineteenth
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century had become aware that many of the soldiers who
survived the war were suffering from a variety of ailments
(such as battle fatigue and shell shock) for which no clear
organic cause could be found, however serious and readily
apparent their physical symptoms.18

Neurologists and

physicians of the time looked for a "psychological"
explanation for these illnesses.

A similar explanation was

advanced for "neurasthenia," an illness characterized by
vague symptoms such as insomnia, headache, fatigue, and
depression which kept many people from completing even
routine tasks.

The cause of neurasthenia was often laid to

the conditions of the fast-paced world of American urban
life--stress, overwork, competition--though the physical
symptoms were debilitatingly real.19 Most physicians had come
to believe there was a connection between the mind and the
body which precipitated such symptoms, even though the
organic basis was not well understood.
Given this emphasis on mind/body relations, it is to be
expected that the models of mind and consciousness that
dominated American thought from 1865 to 1885 would attempt to
bring into account some aspect of the connection.

It is

interesting that they did so even while retaining in spirit
many of the ideas that Reid had established over fifty years
earlier.

As we will see in the work of Mark Hopkins and

James McCosh, the idea that the mind consisted of separate
semi-autonomous powers proved too powerful to reject.
Mark Hopkins (1802-1887)
Mark Hopkins, president of Williams College (1836-1872),
published his Outline Study of Man. The Body and Mind in One
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System in 1878 as a record of his lectures.

It was reissued

in 1886, and again in 1891 (revised), just one year after
William James published his Principles of Psychology.

In

this work, Hopkins offers a Kantian-like higher-order system
of classification of the faculties of the Intellect according
to their specific epistemological function.

Thus, the

Intellect is described as possessed of four distinct
regulatory functions:

a presentative faculty or power

through which we have knowledge of our minds and the physical
world;

a regulative faculty through which we have knowledge

of a priori ideas and truths; a representative faculty that
operates through the association of ideas and the
imagination; and an elaborative faculty that yields knowledge
through comparison and abstraction.20 The following is a
reproduction of Hopkins's diagram of the regulative and
presentative powers:
THE REGULATIVE FACULTY
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(immediate knowledge)
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In the diagram, the section to the right side of the
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elongated double line represents the knowledge man receives
from the external world through sense perception, and from
the observation through the "inner sense" of the operations
of his own mind.

The section to the left side of the double

line represents a priori knowledge, elsewhere in Hopkins's
text referred to as intuition or the Reason.
Within this bipartite division, Hopkins defines
consciousness as "the knowledge by the mind of itself as the
permanent and indivisible part of its own operations," a
definition which does not seem very different from any that
we have encountered before.
different vein:

Yet Hopkins continues in a

"This implies, he continues, "a knowledge of

the operations, but leaves that knowledge to be given by its
own specific faculty while consciousness holds the whole as
unitv by a constant reference of the different acts and
states of mind £p the indivisible self pr ego."22

It is not

the role of consciousness, argues Hopkins, to transmit
knowledge of the mind's operations--that function is taken up
by the specific faculty which carries out those operations.
Thus, we know of willing through the willing faculty;
judgment through the judging faculty, etc.

The role of

consciousness, as Hopkins defines it, is to provide the
necessary unity to the system by ordering these different
"acts and states" to a "permanent and indivisible self or
ego."
Consciousness, as Hopkins describes it, is not under
control of the will; it is automatic; it admits of no
diversity.

Consciousness is the glue that holds the system

together and it does so, Hopkins suggests, because
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"consciousness is not [itself] knowledge, it is that which
accompanies knowledge."23 It is the indisputable selfreferent of every mental act, and, accordingly, cannot be
regarded as a valid and trustworthy record of those
operations.24 The analogy Hopkins adopts reflects his
physician's training:
Consciousness belongs to another sphere. Its office is
to bind all the operations of the Mind into unity. It
does for the mind just what the cellular system does for
the body....the cellular membrane is found in connection
with every part of the body. It enfolds, for instance,
each fibre of the muscles. It is never by itself. It
always accompanies something else, is for the sake of
something else; and it gives unity to the body. And
consciousness does the same thing for the mind. It is,
as it were, its cellular membrane, combining everything
connected with it into unity; never found by itself, but
always present in connection with every other mental
operation.25
Unlike Reid, Hopkins does not regard consciousness as a
separate power on a par with other powers of the
Understanding, nor does he credit consciousness with any
power at all, but for its capacity to bring together as one
the separate operations of the mind.

Like every other

philosopher whose work I have reviewed, however, Hopkins is
intent upon the idea that consciousness is the sole origin of
the concept of the self.
James McCosh (1811-1894)
Though James McCosh published his major works in
psychology after 1885, his work is more closely allied with
the Scottish tradition than representative of the new age of
experimental psychology of the later period.26

In fact, by

the time his books were published, McCosh had been teaching
psychology as intellectual philosophy in Scotland, Ireland,
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and. the United States for nearly thirty years. Because McCosh
is, as A. A. Roback suggests, the last representative of this
long tradition in American psychology, his inclusion in this
section is justified.27
McCosh's psychology consists of the same division of
faculties which we encountered in Hopkins (whom McCosh did
meet briefly on his American tour of 1866)2S: His two major
texts represent the cognitive (mental) and motive
(appetitive) powers separately; the powers of the mind are
successively discussed as presentative ("cognitive"),
representative ("reproductive") and comparative powers.
Though McCosh includes recent physiological information, he
insists that while
(i)t is proper to add that light may be thrown on the
operations of the mind by the physiology of the brain
and nerves ....(and that] light may be thrown on the
action of the conscious soul by careful study of the
parts of the body most intimately connected with the
action of the mind— .[still] (o)bservation in
psychology is to be conducted mainly by selfconsciousness .25
And it is to self-consciousness that McCosh appeals
throughout.
McCosh defines self-consciousness as the power by which
"we know self in its present state as acting and being acted
on."30 McCosh describes this self-consciousness as follows:
(w)hen I perceive a material object, when I recollect an
occurrence, when I draw an inference, when I am
sorrowing, or rejoicing, when I am wishing or willing, I
am conscious that I do so. In short, consciousness
seems inseparable from the exercise of all our faculties
and to accompany every operation of the mind.31
Self-consciousness for McCosh has the same character as did
consciousness for Hopkins--with one notable difference:
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McCosh dispels Hopkins's claim that consciousness provides
the necessary unity to the system through its constant
reference to a permanent and indivisible ego.

It was clear

to McCosh (as it was clear to Reid and his followers) that
self-consciousness is solely oriented to the present. In
self-consciousness, we know only of a self as having being;
it is only by comparing a memory of a past self with our
consciousness of a present self that we can speak of a sense
of personal identity (this idea, of course, is expressed by
Reid) .32

Quoting a poem by Wordsworth, McCosh suggests that

self-consciousness is like a "shadow" which cannot be parted
from the substance, "a gleam of [one's] own image crossing
the eye's discoveries."33 Because Hopkins gave to
consciousness the explicit function of unifying the mental
system, it was, essentially, timeless.
Unlike self-consciousness (which "merely' accompanied
mental operations) "intuition," as McCosh defined it, was a
distinct faculty, the source of all our ideas of relations-of time, of cause and effect, of resemblance.

Because McCosh

wanted to distinguish his concept of "intuition" from the
sense in which it was used by the Transcendentalists, he
insisted that even intuitions must be constrained by the
properties of real-world things and events.

In McCosh's

formulation, intuitions are not formed apart from objects [as
Kant and others suggested] but are in fact discoveries of
something in objects, or relating to them.34 Though the use
of the word "intuition" seems to suggest a higher-order form
of knowledge, in fact, McCosh's "intuitions" are no different
than Mahan's "generalization and abstraction" processes or
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even, one suspects, very much different from Reid's
reflective consciousness.
Though McCosh believed that experience alone might
account for the notions of abstract relations of time and
space, and the like, he was certain that experience alone
could not provide the full import of these concepts and could
never yield to our convictions of the universal manner of
their occurrence.35 McCosh's "intuitional realism," however,
is not an indelible a priori law of the mind, but a distinct
capacity of the mind that depends on
execution.

experience for

its

What intuition grasps is the reality of the

relations among events and objects in the world.

Those

relations, when brought within the intuitive faculty, are
held to as general laws, not of the mind, but of the reality
of things of both internal and external worlds.
Despite McCosh's arguments for an intuitive faculty, he
insists, however, that the science of psychology is properly
founded on the self-conscious observation of "states or
affections" of the mind even though that self-consciousness
is little more than a shadow which attends mental operations
with the sense that it is the I who perceives (or thinks).
McCosh's consciousness is clearly neither an intuitive
consciousness nor a perceptual consciousness.

We might, for

the sake of convenience, refer to McCosh's concept of
consciousness as the "shadow" theory of consciousness, as it
has neither power nor endurance nor form nor task.
Conclusion
Three conclusions might be drawn from the models of
consciousness reviewed in this chapter.

First.

From Locke
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and Reid through Hopkins and McCosh, there is general
agreement that consciousness is the source of our knowledge
of both external and internal events as well as the source of
our knowledge of God and God's power.

Even though

consciousness was conceived in this way, the means by which
it served this function were never made explicit; it was
accepted as a "first principle" that consciousness is a
reliable source of information.

Second. There is general

agreement that consciousness consisted of two aspects:
immediate and simple (consciousness conceived as
"awareness"), and reflective and complex (consciousness
conceived as a capacity of the mind). This division implies
the notion of levels of consciousness, though none of the
philosopher/psychologists we have reviewed in this period
referred to consciousness in this sense or explicitly
asserted that their models implied a hierarchy of conscious
experiences.

This idea was to await the recognition of

mental pathology as altered conscious states, a perspective
that would gain ground in the third quarter of the nineteenth
century.
Third.

There was general agreement that consciousness

serves as the embodiment of the self or the self-concept.
Certainly, where the mind was conceived as an entity
divisible into specific operations, some aspect of mental
function must be given over to the sense of felt continuity,
the notion that all our thoughts are attended by the sense
that they are our thoughts.

Consciousness served this

function, though there is no necessary reason why
consciousness, any more than reason or memory, should serve
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this function.

(Indeed, Kant believed that the self-concept

was learned, not innate.)
That few of the nineteenth-century
psychologist/philosophers whose models we have examined
explicitly addressed these issues is, in all likelihood, the
result of their preference for epistemological issues over
psychological ones, even in an age when there appeared to be
increasing interest in the relation between mental function
and physiological symptoms.

What is missing from these

models is a clear attempt to address psychopathological
symptoms, symptoms which Reid and his followers frequently
explained as a lack of will or an excess of imagination.
Madness, insanity, neurosis, none of these could be
satisfactorily explained within a model principally oriented
to conscious processes.

If psychology was to be a science,

however, it must come to terms with both the fallibility of
mind and the existence of altered conscious states; it must
adopt a peculiarly psychological point of view that
encompassed all aspects of man's experience.

This was to be

the legacy of William James and the psychologists of the late
nineteenth century, whose ideas we will encounter in the
fifth chapter.
As we have seen, America's philosopher/psychologists
adopted the methods and assumptions of the Scottish
philosophers, the same methods that defined most nineteenthcentury science:

the belief that the proper goal of any

science was to submit a classification and hierarchical
ordering of its subject matter; and the assumption (always
implicit) that such classification constituted a sufficient
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explanation of the subject.36 These ideas dominated the work
of Mark Hopkins, and James McCosh who, following in the
tradition of Scottish faculty psychology, believed they were
setting mental philosophy upon the certain and respectable
path of science.

In contrast, the novelists of this same

period adopted a different approach.

More concerned with the

subjective experience, less concerned with epistemological
issues, the writers whose works are the topic of the next
chapter replaced "mind" with "consciousness" as the primary
subject of investigation, acknowledging it as the "ultimate
and legitimate authority."

Consequently, from the literary

perspective, the central issues of consciousness--that it
consists of both immediate and reflective (intuitive)
aspects, that it embodies the self-concept, that it is the
source of all knowledge--become the central themes of
literary representation.
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CHAPTER 4

THE "LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY": CONSCIOUSNESS EMPOWERED
My intention in this chapter is to describe models of
consciousness portrayed in selected works of realist writers
Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, William Dean Howells, and Henry
■James,

I do not mean to suggest that these authors

necessarily held to the ideas implied by these passages nor
that they set out with a particular model in hand, so to
speak, and concertedly attempted to "fit" the cha.ra.cter to
the model. Decidedly, realist authors were little concerned
with epistemological questions and were not intent upon
constructing philosophical systems.

As I hope to make clear -

they saw their work as an attempt to recreate, in narrative,
the experience of ord.ina.ry men and women in quite ord.ina.ry
circumstances; the experience, that is, of living in the
rapidly changing society of late nineteenth*century America 1
I am. suggesting, however, that, because these passages a.re
intended to reflect the experience of ordinary people, they
may be considered reliable indicators of the wav in which
consciousness would, he described, by neonle who had no
t h e o l o g j cal

or nhiInsophica1 interest in the m a t t e r . no

epistemological agenda, to pursue.
It will become evident in this chapter that the authors
of realist fiction I have selected pursue a very different
course from that of the philosopher/psychologists of the
preceding chapters= They have no desire to classify or to
explain. They are little interested, in speculating about, the
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origin of knowledge or correcting the flaws of previous
models of mind or consciousness.

Indeed, consciousness is

not an entity to be explained, but, from the literary point
of view, an on-going series of successive mental and
emotional states with which the reader is invited to embrace
and to experience as one's own.

This implicit (and

occasionally explicit) objective of realist fiction virtually
obviates against the possibility that realist authors would
recognize anything of value in the psychological literature.
As we have seen, the psychological literature offers up a
consciousness seemingly stripped of emotive significance.

It

is just that profound difference in intent that makes
comparisons between the two disciplines a problematic
enterprise.
As Michael Kearns has emphasized, the conception of
mind-as-sentient-being was promulgated by novelists long
before it was adopted by psychologists.2 The reason for this
should be clear if we remember that nineteenth-century
science was conceived as an analytical and reductive
enterprise (see Chapter 3, pp. 78-79 and footnote 35).

In

order to justify a science of mind and consciousness as
science, nineteenth-century philosophers and psychologists
adopted the same approach, reducing mind to component
"faculties" (consciousness, reason, intuition, and the will)
and speculating upon possible interactions.

Logically,

reductive analysis assumes the existence of a circumscribed
entity, for only entities can be segmented in this way.
It will become clear in this chapter that, because
psychologists and novelists of this period (1865-1885) were
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pursuing different agendas, they adopted quite different
perspectives on the nature of consciousness.

This outcome,

far from devaluing a comparative enterprise, provides grounds
for the concluding discussion concerning the constraints
imposed by discipline-specific agendas and methodological
commitments on the integrity of the object of interest.
What follows in this chapter is a series of passages
drawn from the works of noted American realists that serve as
salient examples of the mind-as-sentient-being world-view.
Because the literary realists of the mid-nineteenth century
were less than explicit about their theories of
consciousness, however, the strategy in this chapter will
rely to a greater degree than before on interpretation of
selected passages.

The interpretive strategy that I have

adopted in this chapter will include reference to the
author's explicit statements about his or her work (where
available), and the extent to which the passage accords with
the conventions and intentions of literary realism.

Because

literary realists were concerned with expressions of
consciousness as experienced, I have assumed that the
"meaning" of a selected passage serves as a reliable
indicator of a particular, quasi-implicit "theory" of
consciousness.
The Tenets of Literary Realism
Olaf Hansen has suggested that the agenda of literary
realism may be characterized as one "oriented [both] towards
transcendence and towards practicality."

And it is certainly

characteristic of this literature that there exists within it
a fundamental tension between what Hansen has termed "the old
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dilemma of having to choose between absolute subjectivity on
the one hand [characteristic of the Romantic novel] and
absolute objectivity [characteristic of the sciences] on the
other."3 Nineteenth-century realist novelists solved this
dilemma by assuming that, since their work adhered as closely
as possible to the experience of the common man (or woman)
engaged in ordinary activities, it could not help but reflect
(or come to reflect) general laws of human nature.
Justification for this appeal to a science of human
nature was supported by several sources:

It was supported by

the work of the Scottish philosophers who believed their
analyses and classifications of the faculties and powers of
the mind represented general laws of human mental phenomena
(see Chapter 2); it was supported by a tradition long
associated with Calvinist theology that assumed man's life
and struggles could be explained as part of a Divine plan,
that is, a higher order of laws;4 and it was supported by the
optimistic "evolutionism" of men like Herbert Spencer and
Hippolyte Taine who, seeing "progress in every comer,"
promulgated the idea that development (whether natural,
human, or cultural) advanced in orderly stages.5

Within this

context of ideas, realist authors saw their work as one with
the spirit of the times--an age in which subjective
experience was considered but one small part of a universe of
ordered phenomena.
As readers of realist fiction, we are asked to identify
with a moral dilemma fought within a central consciousness,
an arena in which sensory experience, conscious reflection,
Puritan morality, and practical necessity must have their
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say:

a "theatre," according to William James, "of

possibilities."6 Yet, though Herbert Spencer (and, to a
lesser extent, Hippolyte Taine; see Appendix) might have
supplied such a context, there is little evidence of their
influence in this early period.

The moral dilemma, the

conflicted consciousness, was not new to realist fiction: it
emerged out of a long tradition of theological questioning.
What was different about realist fiction, in contrast to the
fiction of the preceding Romantic period, were the kinds of
questions that were asked.

Realist authors brought to their

task an overriding concern for the relation between the
individual man or woman and the rules and standards accorded
the society in which they lived.7
That realist writers did have a moral agenda, however,
cannot be questioned, and their work should be seen in that
context. They were very much aware of the changes that had
taken place since the end of the American Civil War:

the

transition from an agricultural economy to an industrial one;
the growth of cities; westward expansion; the growth of a
large band of "urban poor" and of a middle class.
no less aware of the more subtle changes:

They were

the passing of the

"genteel tradition;" the decline of a religious ethic;
changes in women's roles (though not, necessarily, in
expectations).

Recognizing these changes, they tended to

view the individual as continually striving against a society
perpetually in flux.

The crucial point is that these authors

believed that the striving itself was important and that
success depended on an individual's ability to make sense of
his or her experience.

Their stories are stories of men and
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women who succeed (when they succeed) because of the
knowledge they have acquired from their experience.

As

readers, we are permitted to witness this process, this
striving, through the internalization of action within a
central consciousness.
As we will see, it was the dynamic process of emerging
self-awareness and the interactions between an experiencing
self and society that captured the imaginations of literary
realists.

Accordingly, the mimetic representation of

subjective experience countermanded the use of classificatory
techniques and reductive analysis.

Instead, these authors

were concerned with the use of literary techniques that
permitted the recreation of such complex mental processes as
emerging self-awareness, the growth of understanding, and the
resolution of moral conflict.

The mind-as-sentient-being

metaphor is an apt expression for what these authors intended
to convey in their work
Elizabeth Stuart Phelns (1841-1911)
Elizabeth Stuart Phelps was the daughter of a popular
mid-century novelist and a professor of philosophy who taught
at Andover Academy in Massachusetts.

Her mother's death in

childbirth when Elizabeth was eight years old had a profound
effect on her work, particular in her selection of topics and
her wide-ranging social consciousness.

In her autobiography,

published in 1896, she writes of her mother's death and her
knowledge of her mother's life with deep regret:
At the time of her death she was at the first
blossom of her very positive and widely promising
success as a writer of the simple home stories which
took such a hold upon the popular heart....Her last book
and her last baby came together, and killed her. She
lived one of those rich and piteous lives such as only
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gifted women know; torn by the civil war of the dual
nature which can be given to women only....1 have
sometimes felt as if even the generation that knows her
not would feel a certain degree of interest in the tact
and power by which this unusual woman achieved the
difficult reconciliation between genius and domestic
life.8
This theme of the gifted woman, sensitive, articulate,
capable, coming to terms with the demands and expectations of
nineteenth-century domesticity occurs repeatedly in Phelps's
work.
From the frequent references to Scottish principles, to
Spinoza, Fichte, to the works of Kant and Hegel, there is no
reason to suspect that Phelps was not well acquainted with
their ideas.

Indeed, she writes, almost as a satirical

aside, of the practical uselessness of "psychological
study...which...unquestionably finds a proper place in the
lecture room, where all well-classified feelings go."9 It is
evident from this quote that Phelps intends to describe a
consciousness of quite a different sort than that of the
classificatory systems of contemporary
philosopher/psychologists.

It is not for her to reduce

consciousness to a mere adjunct to mind, to a "perceptual
act" whose task is to reveal mental operations.

Instead,

Phelps describes a consciousness of sentient states, of
feeling-toned sensations.

A particularly telling passage

captures many of these ideas:
A being of radiant physique; the heiress of ancestral
health_a creature forever more of nerve than of muscle,
and therefore trained to the energy of the muscle and
the repose of the nerve; physically educated by mothers
of her own fibre and by physicians of her own sex,--such
a woman alone is fitted to acquire the drilled brain,
the calmed imagination, and sustained aim, which
constitute intellectual command.
A creature capable of this command, in whom emotion
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intensifies reflection, and passion strengthens purpose,
and self-poise is substituted for self-extravagance,-such a creature only is competent to the terrible task
of adjusting the sacred individuality of her life to her
supreme capacity of love and the supreme burden and
perils which it imposes upon her.10
In this passage, Phelps exalts the intellect over passion,
self-command over "self-extravagance," and makes of the
capacity to reflect the cornerstone of mental health.

But it

is the capacity to reflect in accord with emotional
commitment and the "capacity of love" that reveals most
clearly Phelps's intent to transcend the sterility of
academic analysis.

Unlike Reid and the early American

psychologists we examined in the last chapter, the language
Phelps uses has an emotive quality:

She commends the one "in

whom emotion intensifies reflection, and passion strengthens
purpose" where Reid and the others regarded both emotion and
passion as anathemic.
Quite ignoring the epistemological cast of American
academic philosophy, Phelps describes a consciousness too
acutely (though occasionally belatedly) aware of its own
frailties and false perceptions, a consciousness which
selects, constructs, and reflects back upon itself in neverending series.

In many of her stories, especially those

whose central characters are women, Phelps portrays this
development through a consciousness so sensitively attuned to
itself and its various textures that it appears as though the
external reality--the objective events which form the fabric
of consciousness--are of less import than the reflective
experience.
The following selection is drawn from Phelps's 1879
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printing of The Story of Avis. In this example, Phelps
equates consciousness with the imagination, and submits that
this imaginative quality is a stronger master than Reason:

Now and then a feature, an attitude, an accent, gets a
mathematical hold of our imaginations, as far removed
from the aesthetic or magnetic way, yet more imperious
than either; like the pattern of the wall-paper in the
room which has known some tragedy or ecstasy of our
lives. We sit enchained by a trick of speech in the man
we hate, or the cut of the brow in the creature we
despise, the shadow under the lip of the stranger we
neither expect nor care to meet again, or the glance of
the friend in whose broken faith eternity could not
tempt us to confide. These things happen as the comets
march and countermarch, by laws deeper than, though
apparently subservient to, caprice.11
The passage depicts a consciousness at the mercy of a series
of seemingly trivial events. What is it that directs
attention to an isolated feature, a "trick of speech," a
passing glance?

These small events, Phelps would assert,

command our attention and take hold of consciousness more
"imperviously" than aesthetic or intellectual study.
could such trivialities take hold so firmly?

How

This is exactly

the sort of question which Reid and his followers relegated
(with a sense of approbation) to the realm of imagination.
It is precisely that "excess" of meaning given to the
seemingly inconsequential that is beyond the classificatory
procedures adopted by all the psychologists were have
reviewed, a state of affairs with which Phelps is clearly
aware.
In The Story of Avis Phelps relates the experience of a
sensitive, articulate woman, an artist of recognized talent,
who must come to terms with the realities of nineteenth-
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century domesticity and the (inevitable, to Phelps)
abandonment of her career.

In this story, as in most of her

work, Phelps's awareness of the social constraints imposed on
women is prominently displayed:

She portrays the struggle of

women of talent in a society that has clear and fixed
expectations of women's roles.

In Phelps's work, however,

the struggle takes place entirely within the consciousness of
the central character, a woman who is acutely sensitive to
the nuances of her own psychic state.

Indeed, this is one of

the distinguishing characteristics of the realist tradition,
as we have seen. The following examples are drawn from this
work.
Following Philip's proposal of marriage, Avis returns to
her studio after a long absence. This passage reveals her
awareness that, by accepting his offer, she may have
compromised her artistic future.

Standing in the center of

her art studio, Avis considers her position and the nature of
the compromise she is called upon to make.
analogy:

Note the use of

the studio walls are "like the friend who never

forgets" a former resolve; the presence of an "invisible
tribunal" standing in judgment.

These metaphors convey the

moral dilemma, that Avis must resolve:
(2)

A stillness and strangeness deeper than a bruised
muscle could strike, came upon her when she closed the
door of the long-deserted place, and, striking a fire in
her little grate, sat down to warm her hands. The
autumn sun stepped in, and stood cool and calm against
the wall, like the friend who never forgets, or suffers
as to forget, the resolve or the aspiration which we
once expressed....Avis looked about her with a
singularly self-defensive feeling, as if she were
summoned by some invisible tribunal to answer for an
impalpable offense. She had something of the recoil
which a man has in turning to his books or his business
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after a night's dissipation....
"What have I done?" she cried. "Oh! what have I
done?"11
The quoted monologue (relatively rare in realist
fiction) which concludes this passage is not unexpected.

By

the time of her outburst, we, as readers, already know that
Avis is feeling guilt and loss and regret.
are conveyed metaphorically:

These feelings

She is met with 'the cool

autumn sun' whose 'calm presence' reminds her of her former
self; her guilt is established by an 'invisible tribunal'
against which she has no worthy defense.

That she suffers a

'radical confusion' encountering her work (in the manner of a
man whose 'night of dissipation' leaves him unprepared for
the business of his day) suggests--perhaps more strongly than
if conveyed directly--her knowledge of what she may lose in
marriage.
The use of metaphor allows the reader access to the
inner turmoil more directly, more intimately, than if the
feelings had been expressed in a more forthright manner (as
if to say, "I am afraid...").

The moral dilemma is

internalized, represented as a series of conflicting feelings
and impressions, as of a simple consciousness (the present
"I") overpowered.

More important, however, than the fact

that consciousness is represented by a succession of feelingstates, is that it is accompanied, finally, by

reasoned

recognition of their import: it is, in the end, to reflective
consciousness (and the deliberating will) that Phelps
appeals.

As literary historians have noted:

"Phelps's

appeal to the reader is to the rational mind as well as to
the feeling heart,"13 a statement that unintentionally
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reflects the idea that consciousness is both immediate and
reflective.
The following passage, also from The Story of Avis,
employs a similar technique.

Again, note the use of metaphor

to convey the inner conflict:

her former passion has become

a "diseased life" whose loss cannot be mourned; her husband's
image has become indistinguishable from the background of
trivialities of her life; and the dilemma posed is one of
learning to live without the passion that had once allowed
her to rationalize the inevitable abandonment of her career.
The italicized passages tell the inner story:
(3)
A certain terror fell upon her at finding in her
own heart no sting sharper than that of a sad scorn.
She had rather hoped she might find herself a little
jealous.... She hung over her love for her husband as we
hang over a precious, diseased life, of which we have
not the courage to despair... .Better fire than frost
Better £ha seething- than the freezing death[
With a sickening dismay she perceived that Phillip--he
too--began to seem to her like a figure seen in the
vallev of an incoherent dream. She felt as if she had
suddenly stepped into a world of pygmies, and had a
lilliputian code to learn before she could take up the
duties of citizenship therein.14
In this passage, the metaphors call up images of disease and
death and lonely isolation.

There is more than a hint of

objective distancing (of "dismay" and "sad scorn"), as Avis,
always sensitive to her own feelings, becomes aware of the
loss of her passion.

In this passage, Avis (and the reader)

are caught up in a confusing swirl of despair and loss.
In Phelps's work, the use of metaphor gives voice
to the inner turmoil. For the psychologists of the same
period, the use of metaphor appeared to authenticate their
claims to scientific objectivity.

The reader will recall,
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for example, that Reid equated consciousness with a
"perceptual act," an internal sense.

This metaphor was taken

up by his followers, Stewart and McCosh (though McCosh
referred to this sense as "intuition"). Throughout the 18651885 period, psychologists adopted a series of other
metaphors to "explain" the operation of consciousness (the
reader will recall Hopkins's

identification of consciousness

with the "cellular membrane," and Hickok's reference to
consciousness as the "light of reason"), none of these men
appeared to consider that consciousness might be equated with
a series of feeling states expressed in terms of sensory
elements.

In Phelps's work, we see this intent most clearly;

and the opposition to the work of the analytical philosophers
is striking.
Another example from the same work shows Phelps's
ability to portray a consciousness filled with visual images,
each conveying a sense of lost innocence, regret, and
(perhaps) guilt.

In this passage, Philip is portrayed as

overwhelmed by his knowledge that his callous behavior toward
his wife might well have destroyed the only aspect of his
life that was truly pure.

As before, Phelps relies on a

series of rapid, visual images to convey the unreflected
conscious state.

The reader will note the contrast Phelps

suggests between "sensations," as conveyed by the visual
imagery, and "reflections," which Philip would avoid.

In

this passage, Philip would will the images away, though his
will is powerless:
(4)
It was Philip who was wakeful that night. Visions which
he would just then have gone blind to forget,
electrotyped themselves upon the half-lit room. Long
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odorous country twilights, the scent of honeysuckle
about a farmhouse-door, the pressure of confiding
fingers on his arm, the uplifting of a young face, the
touch of trustful life, pursued him rather with the
force of sensations than reflections. With these came
other ghosts, incoherent fancies, aimless fevers,
nameless dreams.15
Despite the many dissimilarities between Phelps's work and
Reid's, it is significant that, in this passage, Phelps uses
the word "reflections" in contrast to "sensations" in the
same sense, and for the same purpose, with which Reid
contrasted the

terms:

that is, to indicate the difference

between a train of thought consisting of transitory images
and a train of thought consisting of focused ideas.

As we

have seen, Phelps uses imagery to convey a number of
different consciousness states.

In passage 2 (p. 93), the

technique was used to convey a sense of the moral dilemma
that Avis must resolve upon her marriage; in passage 3 (p.
95), the technique is used to convey loss and bitterness,
Avis's recognition that the passion that had sustained her
commitment to marriage had dissolved and all that remained
was obligation.

In passage 4 (above), she uses the technique

to convey an unreflective consciousness, a series of
pictorial images that are unusually concrete, quite as though
Philip is mentally reviewing a scrapbook filled with
mementos.

This, of course, is what Phelps intends.

Despite

these differences, there is clear indication that
consciousness as Phelps conceives it is very different from
the sterile entity depicted by the academics.
A final passage provides even stronger support for this
conclusion.

In the following selection from The Storv of

Avis. Phelps employs a series of metaphoric images to convey
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an "altered" conscious state, characteristic of those under
the influence of alcohol.:
The first thing which she saw was a huge earthen vase,
standing by itself against the wall, raised a few inches
from the floor, thus, and thus only, indicating to her
eyes that it was not what we are used to call a
reality....Through a maze of lotus-leaves, Isis went
seeking Osiris, the figures moving faintly before her
eyes till they had adjusted themselves with what seemed
a voluntary motion to their attitudes upon the clay.
The figures were black, expressed by gray lights. The
leaves were of an opaque green, without veining or
shadow. A raised design of silver and steel surrounded
the neck, lips, and pedestal of the jar. If it had been
light enough, she could have taken her pencil, and
accurately copied this design, which was very intricate,
and which pleased her....
This appearance, which lasted but for a few
moments, was the signal for a kaleidoscope of beautiful
and soulless form to stir before her, slowly and subtly,
like the outer circle of a whirlpool into which she was
to be drawn. Pottery, porcelain, furniture, drapery,
sculpture, then flowers, fruits,--a medley of stilllife, --swept through strange and half-revealed, but
wholly resplendent interiors, which glided on
indifferently, like languages that said, "What hast thou
to do with this?" Now and then, out of the splendid
maze, a distinct effect seemed to pause, and poise
itself, and woo her through the dark. An open hand,
raised, and turned at the wrist like a flower on its
stem, held water-lillies, drooping and dripping. A
sunbeam, upon an empty chair in a student's alcove,
focused upon a child's shoe and a woman's ribbon. A
skull ground a rose between its teeth. Bees, upon a
patch of burning July sky, wooed a clover. In a pool in
a cliff, a star-fish defined the colors of a tangle of
weeds and shells. In a thicket of wildbriar a single
rose-leaf had fallen upon a gray stone, across which,
and over the miniature clearing in the mimic forest, the
tattered and fringed light lay.16
In this passage, a succession of visual images dominates the
conscious state, diminishing the expression of reason and
self-awareness.

This sort of experience is beyond the range

of issues with which the psychologists of this time were
prepared to explain.

Altered conscious states were not to
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concern academics until near the turn of the century.
As a whole, these passages convey a "theory" of
consciousness in sharp contrast to the models developed by
eighteenth and early nineteenth-century
philosopher/psychologists.

Given her ideals, it is likely

that Phelps's motive was as much personal as it was social:
to give voice to her belief that the secondary status
accorded nineteenth-century American women was grounded in a
false sense of what constituted rationality and a false
identification of rationality with the male mind.

In

response to the perceived "ultra-rationality" of academic
philosophy, it is also likely that Phelps intended to convey
the idea that consciousness was not necessarily synonymous
with rational thought, but included aspects of pure sensation
and emotive significance.

For Phelps, the use of metaphoric

images conveys the impression of a multi-textured feelingtoned consciousness that is quite at odds with the
classificatory approach adopted by the psychologists, and
only hinted at by her contemporaries, William Dean Howells
and Henry James.

A consciousness of this sort is not again

apparent until the work of william James begins to appear in
the 1870's.
William Dean Howells (1837-1920)
william Dean Howells was a mid westerner, b o m and
raised in a small Ohio town.

Like many of the literary

realists, Howells had little formal education.

He began his

literary career as a journalist for the Ohio State Journal
and continued his journalistic career as chief editor of the
Atlantic Monthly (1871-1881) and as a regular contributor to
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Harper's Monthly (1886-1920), where he published his most
famous and polemic articles advancing the 'cause' of realism
in American fiction.

As editor of the Atlantic. Howells was

singularly responsible for providing a forum for other
realists of the period, notably Henry James and Mark Twain,
and for encouraging younger writers whose work spawned the
naturalist tradition in America, men like Jack London and
Frank Norris.17
Unlike Phelps, Howells was less concerned with the
individual response and more concerned with the individualas-representative-of-a-type, though not, of course, an ideal.
The tendency to portray his characters in stereotypical
colors is present in all his works from the earliest Their
Wedding Journey published in 187 2 to his last, Through the
Eve of a Needle, published in 1907, all "conventional Howells
fare," according to one biographer.13 Though his early works
are largely descriptive of social life (down to the smallest
observed details and interactions), his later works came to
include a desire to change the social reality; in the words
of present-day analysts, "to describe experience in order to
disturb man's acceptance of experience."15 Howells's
overriding social agenda led him to conceive of consciousness
as purely an inner response on a par with--or in no way more
complex than--the outward behavior.

Howells's characters are

not of the 'type' to reflect deeply or wonderingly, to brood
or to analyze; his characters are men and women of more
action than thought; more purpose than possibility.
Accordingly, Howells approached consciousness much as a
scientist might describe the behavior of a biological
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specimen--as though it were all of one piece, with no complex
turnings or twistings; as though all that could be known
could be observed by an impartial observer.
Far more than most realists of the period, Howells was
the literary man who believed that scientific method holds
the key to progress and to truth.20 Like Hippolyte Taine,
whose work he knew well, Howells partially accepted a
deterministic interpretation of literature and the literary
process.21 The author's task, he believed, was merely to set
the conditions under which the action would take place and
then watch the novel unfold according to the internal
consistency of the material.

"It is a well ascertained fact

concerning the imagination," wrote Howells, "that it can work
only the stuff of experience.

It can absolutely create

nothing, it can only compose."22
It was Howells's method to set up the plot, map out the
central characters, and allow the action to take place,
maintaining all the while an objective distance from the
inner workings of the character's mental state.

As Dorritt

Cohn explains it, it is as though the narrator of the story
"holds the unwavering stance of a wise and rational
psychologist," whose purpose it is to use the character's
plight to set forth his (or her) own generalizations about
human behavior and society.23

Because the author assumes an

objective posture, he appears in the novel as an omniscient
narrator who knows more than his characters; often, the
reader comes to identify with the narrator's objective
stance.

The extent to which the narrator's presence

dominates the story is indicative of the extent to which the
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character's consciousness comes to play a significant role in
the development of the story line.

As Dorritt Cohn has

asserted: "The more conspicuous and idiosyncratic the
narrator, the less apt he is to reveal the depth of his
characters' psyches or, for that matter, to create psyches
that have depth to reveal,"2i a statement which is aptly
applied to Howells's work.
The following examples of this technique are drawn from
William Dean Howells, The Rise of Silas Lapham. written in
1885:
(6 )

He could see the young people down on the rocks,
and his heart swelled in his breast. He had always said
that he did not care what a man's family was, but the
presence of young Corey as an applicant to him for
employment...was one of the sweetest favors that he had
yet tasted in his success. He knew who the Corey's were
very well, and, in his simple brutal way, he had long
hated their name as a symbol of splendor which...he
could not hope to realize in his own.
Nothing had moved his thick imagination like this
day's events since the girl who taught him spelling and
grammar., .had said she would have him for her husband.25
This passage is a salient example of an observer's
careful reporting of what might well be occurring in the mind
of a well-known but not necessarily well-liked acquaintance.
We are given to understand Lapham's "brutal way" and "thick
imagination" so as to preclude our ability to identify with a
character who, incidentally, clearly knows less about his own
mind than we are given to know of it.

Silas Lapham is a man

unencumbered by complexities or acute sensitivities--he is,
after all an American businessman, a representative of late
nineteenth-century American industrialization.

Accordingly,

he is less likely than the too-sensitive characters portrayed
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in Phelps's works to reflect profoundly or with evident
benefit upon either internal or external events.

His is a

consciousness that must be "interpreted," even as a patient's
meandering thoughts might, on occasion, need be explained to
him.

Lapham is aware only of his sense of pleased

satisfaction ("his heart swelled in his breast"); the
connection between this feeling and an earlier one are not
made by him but by the invisible narrator.

The presence of a

third-person narrator must have appealed to Howells because
it represented (or seemed to represent) the most 'scientific'
way of negotiating a compromise between the "dilemma" of
subjectivity and objectivity.
In another passage from the same text, however, Howells
ventures closer to the conscious state of his character.
There are no authorial intrusions of the "thick imagination"
type; Howells offers no judgment on his character's actions.
Nonetheless, Howells maintains his characteristic
objectivity:

Lapham's psychic state is observable in

behavioral language:
(7)

He could not keep about his work steadily, and with his
nerves shaken from want of sleep, and the shock of this
sudden and unexpected question, he left his office
early, and went over to look at the house and try to
bring himself to some conclusion there. The long
procession of lamps on the beautiful street was flaring
in the clear red of the sunset towards which it marched,
and Lapham, with a lump in his throat, stopped in front
of his house and looked at their multitude. They were
not merely a part of the landscape; they were a part of
his pride and glory, his success, his triumphant life's
work which was fading into failure in his helpless
hands. He ground his teeth to keep down that lump, but
the moisture in his eyes blurred the lamps....There was
no such facade as that on the whole street, to his
thinking.26
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Even though Howells permits us, as readers, a more intimate
connection with his character, we do not encounter in this
passage a man who pauses long enough to consider the meaning
of his plight, a man, that is, capable of reflection as Reid
used the term.

The moral dilemma remains unresolved, if only

because the character is inherently (it would seem) incapable
of resolving it.

For such people, Reid would predict,

nothing would be gained by the experience, as Lapham gains
little.

At the end of the novel, when Lapham's financial

ruin is near-complete, Howells, as omniscient narrator,
returns:
(8 )

He was more broken than he knew by his failure; it did
not kill, as it often does, but it weakened the spring
once so strong and elastic. He lapsed more and more
into acquiescence with his changed condition, and that
bragging note of his was rarely sounded. He worked
faithfully enough in his enterprise, but sometimes he
failed to seize the occasions that in his younger days
he would have turned to golden account.27
In this passage, Howells's use of the third-person narrative
works well with' a character whose ability to articulate his
own conscious states is limited; essentially, it has allowed
him to create a character whose psychological depth is of
less importance than the author's intended social statement.28
Where Phelps realized her social agenda within the
confines of a too-sensitive consciousness, Howells realizes
his in the social arena.

Nonetheless, Howells retains the

technique, common to literary realism, of implying that the
most important "action" of the narrative is that which takes
place within the belabored consciousness of his central
character.

The difference between Howells's Silas Lapham
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character and Phelps's Avis is that Avis is able to profit
from her experience and Lapham is not.

Phelps's character

succeeds, at least, in rising above her situation; she
appears to resolve her difficulties; she comes to acceptance.
Silas Lapham does not profit from his experience; he does not
reflect; he is not self-aware.

Silas Lapham fails because he

is incapable of of reflecting on the nature of his failure,
and, consequently, he lapses over time "more and more into
acquiescence."
Is it possible to construct a "theory" of consciousness
from these brief passages?

In many ways, Howells's concept

of consciousness parallels that of the academic
psychologists.

His is a consciousness of single dimensions,

the literary equivalent of a unified entity responding
passively to external events.

Unlike consciousness as

portrayed by Phelps, Howells does not suggest that
consciousness is anything other than a point of contact
between the external and internal worlds.

Although Lapham is

prepared to respond to events, his responses do not emerge
out of increased self-awareness; they are the products of
long-held habits, uniformed by changes in circumstance.
Where external action dominates the narrative, consciousness
recedes; and we have seen Howells's emphasis on behavioral
descriptions (see passages 6, p. 101; 7, p. 103; and 8, p.
104) in lieu of visual sensory images.

Nonetheless, there is

an implicit moral contained within Howells's narrative:

The

failure to develop the capacity to reflect is a failure with
profound moral implications. Both Lapham's success and his
failure are a consequence of his single-mindedness;
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complexity, intuitions, self-revelations, as experienced and
accounted for, are not the character of Silas Lapham.

Nor

was it Howells's intention to portray such characters.

As we

have seen even in these brief passages, Howells's social
agenda was realized in the creation of characters whose
uncertain fate may be laid to their inability to profit from
their experience.

By extension, we may conclude that

Howells's portrayal of a consciousness of simple dimensions
was intended to advance his belief that the fulfilled life
was inextricably linked to self-knowledge, acquired through
full awareness of the felt experience.

As we will see, this

theme is the central theme of the last realist whose work we
will examine in this chapter.
Henry James (1843-1916)
Henry James, Jr., was b o m in New York, the second
oldest son of a man given to grand thoughts and religious and
social zeal and a woman of gentle birth and quiet manners.29
He was considered by his family more stable and more
trustworthy than his older brother, William James, sometime
psychologist, philosopher, scientist, though William's
charming manner often overshadowed Henry's quieter nature.
There was, indeed, a subtle, though persistent, rivalry
between the two, somewhat aggressively pursued by William
(whose critical comments on his brother's work suggest, at
times, a reluctance to recognize his brother's ability) to
which Henry, however, always responded mildly.

In 187 6,

after trying literary life both in New York and Paris, James
settled in London, where he would be based for most of the
rest of his life.
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Throughout his life and work, James was preoccupied with
the theme of the betrayal of the young and innocent.

Judith

Woolf credits this preoccupation to the effects of the Civil
War (many of James's childhood friends were killed in that
war) and to the death of a much-loved younger cousin from
tuberculosis.30

A psychoanalytic interpretation would

suggest that, perhaps, James himself felt "betrayed" by
parents who seemingly assented to William's every whim, at
some cost to the other members of the family.31 Whatever the
reason, this theme is present throughout many of his novels
and short stories:

A child, often female, is left at the

mercy of parental whims and insensitivities.

In order to

survive (to succeed) she must learn to interpret her world
correctly, to understand others' motives, to make sense of
rejection (if that is what it is), and to realize her real
potential.

The stories are related through the child's

succession of impressions, thoughts, and reflections, through
a sensitively aware, ever expanding consciousness.

This same

technique is used in his "adult" novels as well (e.g.,
Roderick Hudson, The Princess Casamassima), and toward the
same end:

the portrayal of a consciousness that expands

through aware self-experience.

The crucial ingredient, at

least for James, is the creation of characters who are (in
his own words), "intense perceivers all, of their respective
predicaments."32
Reviewing James's essay "Is There a Life After Death?"
Courtney Johnson suggests that James himself was such a
perceiver, a man intensely aware of changes in his own
internal world.33

In the essay, James describes what he
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considers the important aspects of consciousness, how it
functions and how it changes over time.

Again, the crucial

ingredient is the capacity for self awareness, the ability to
reflect on one's experience.

According to James,

consciousness evolves, not, as Spencer would have it, from a
state of "incoherent heterogeneity to coherent homogeneity,"
but, rather, from simple apperception of the world and ideas
to active participation in the world via an on-going,
interactive internal dialogue.

The result, James proclaims,

is that consciousness expands, it becomes infinitely more
interesting, more complex, a multi-textured topographical
relief.

He writes:

(F)or...consciousness at least contained the world, and
could handle and criticize it, could play with it and
deride it; it had that superiority: which meant, all
the while, such successful living that the abode itself
grew more and more interesting to me, and with this
beautiful sign of its character that the more one asked
of it the more and the more it appeared to give.3*
The distinction which James intends to convey is between
what Courtney Johnson has called "ordinary" consciousness,
arising out of sense experience, and an "extraordinary"
consciousness, based on sense experience, but drawing upon
and emerging out of "something other than that."35

It is

Johnson's position that James's distinction between the two
kinds of consciousnesses is a "paradox," which cannot be
resolved within the context of Kant's assertion that "'all
our knowledge is grounded in experience' ."36 But we have seen
similar ideas expressed before in, for example, the
distinction Thomas Reid makes between consciousness as a
power of the Understanding ("the only evidence which we have
or can have of...the operations of our minds") and the
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capacity of "reflection" ("a kind of intuition" acquired over
time).37

We have also seen this idea in Mahan's distinction

between "simple consciousness" and "reflective consciousness"
in James McCosh's "intuitional realism" (see Chapter 3) and
it appears as a central tenet of American Transcendentalism,
expressed as the belief that reason and a sort of intuition
combine to make the transcendent experience possible (see
Appendix).
The distinction James is making in this essay and which
underlies his approach to fiction, is embedded in a long
historical tradition.

(One might also argue that the

distinction is implicit in Kant's discussion of the
difference between phenomena and noumena.)

In this essay,

James is suggesting that a self-aware consciousness
continually strives to make sense of experience by engaging
in a dialogue informed by past dialogues, sensory experience,
creative "insights," religious ideals, personal desire, in
sum, a never-ending, constantly expanding series of thoughts
and impressions.

The image is one of consciousness spiraling

outward, though James conveys an image of a calmer sort:
Experience is never limited, and it is never complete;
it is an immense sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web
of the finest silken threads suspended in the chamber of
consciousness, and catching every air-bomed particle in
its tissue. It is the very atmosphere of the mind; and
when the mind is imaginative--much more when it happens
to be that of a man of genius--it takes to itself the
faintest hints of life, it converts the very pulses of
the air into revelations.38
James's view of consciousness as the source of
understanding and creative insight is carried out in his
creation of characters who have the potential to transcend
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their experience.

Less concerned than Howells to maintain a

scientist's objective stance; less concerned than either
Phelps or Howells to promote his own social agenda, Henry
James's use of this narrative technique is intended to
portray a consciousness actively engaged in observing and
reflecting on the world.

Several selections which follow are

from James's self-acknowledged first novel, Roderick Hudson.
written in 1875.

This novel, like many of James's later

novels, embodies a deliberate effort on James's part to view
an entire fictive action from within the mind of a central
participating observer.

In the 1907 preface to this work,

James writes:
The centre of interest throughout "Roderick" is in
Rowland Mallet's consciousness, and the drama is the
very drama of that consciousness--which I had of course
to make sufficiently acute in order to enable it, like a
set and lighted scene, to hold the play. By making it
acute, meanwhile, one made its own movement--or rather,
strictly, its movement in the particular connexion-interesting; this movement really being quite the stuff
of one's thesis.35
In this context, the narrative technique serves as a vehicle
for the depiction of a sensitive consciousness engaged in
continual reflection, appraisal and reappraisal of his
experience.

And, because it permits a character to engage in

a kind of retrospective analysis, it makes possible the
portrayal of an evolving consciousness within a specified
context and without the necessity of inferring the inner
process from outward behavior.
Roderick Hudson is the story of a young and relatively
rich man (Rowland) who has taken responsibility for the
support of a similarly young but very temperamental artist
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(Roderick) whose artistic genius he admires.

The difficulty-

presented is that Rowland is singularly attracted to
Roderick's fiance; and Roderick is not a faithful lover.

The

internal dialogue is presented thus:
[Rowland] had wondered over the whole matter first and
last in a great many different ways--he had looked at it
in all possible lights. There was something that mocked
any sense of due sequences in the fact of [Roderick's]
having fallen in love with her. She was not, as Rowland
conceived her, the "type" that, other things being what
they were, would most have touched him, and the mystery
of attraction and desire, always so baffling if seen
only from without, quite defied analysis here.40
Unlike Howells, James (as narrator) knows little more than
his character about "the mystery of attraction and desire;"
neither the observer "from without" (James) nor the "observer
within" seem to have access to a possible resolution of the
feelings of a man for a woman who is not free.

As the

passage continues, however, James moves further and further
away from the figural consciousness : He tells us that
Rowland "would have been at a loss to say" why Mary's type
failed to appeal to Roderick, had he really confronted the
question.

He notes that "our virtuous hero did scanty

justice" to the idea that Roderick could hardly be held
responsible for Rowland's "irregular" attraction.

He makes

sure we, as readers, see the "subtle sophistry" of Rowland's
mental argument. By the time we arrive at the concluding
assertion (to the effect that "any other girl would have
answered"), we feel screened off from the character's mind.
The movement in the narrative from near-identity with
the figural consciousness to a distinct separation from it,
suggests that that consciousness has undergone a significant
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transformation.

It is less open to us; less, in all

likelihood, open to itself: the Rowland who openly admitted
his bewilderment in the first passage, has concluded, by the
last passage, that what he wished not to be true, was not
true--that Roderick certainly could not love her, she was not
his "type."

Unlike Howells, James

moves toward the figural

consciousness, nearly identifies with it, and moves away from
it (in the form of judgment and objectivity) all to suggest a
flow of conscious action, a consciousness in process.

The

"moving away," which results in our disengagement with the
character's mind, is symbolic:

the technique suggests that

the character has "closed off" his mind to himself and is no
longer willing (or capable) of uninhibited reflection.

The

process is halted, suggesting, perhaps, that Spencer's
"coherent homogeneity" is not the end James would crave.
A primary theme running through many of James's novels
and short stories is that of mental growth, the notion of
innocence lost to experience, the gradual coming-to-awareness
of a young mind.

We have seen evidence of this theme before

in Phelps's portrayal of Avis's confrontation with the loss
of her career and the loss of her passion.

Similarly, it is

in James's novels in which a central consciousness comes to
possess, over time, a truer sense of "reality" than it
originally possessed (something which Howells's characters
manage to avoid). Accordingly, the Jamesian consciousness is
best described as an on-going stream of sensations,
reflections, and retrospections; an eternal "discussion" of
faint and vivid thought-series (halos and fringes). As James
himself writes in the Preface to the 1907 edition of Roderick
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Hudson:
[Relations] are of the very essence of the novelist's
process, and it is by their aid, fundamentally, that his
idea takes form and lives; but they impose on him,
through the principle of continuity that rides them, a
proportionate anxiety. They are the very condition of
interest, which languishes without them; the painter's
subject consisting ever, obviously, of the related
state, to each other, of certain figures and things. To
exhibit these relations, once they have all been
recognised, is to "treat" his idea, which involves
neglecting none of those that directly minister to
interest....
Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and
the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to
draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which
they shall happily appear to do so.41
The following selections are from James's What Maisie
Knew.42 The story portrays a young child who is often a pawn
in a game of wits and revenge between her divorced parents
and their respective spouses.

At this point in time, Maisie

has begun to understand the conditions under which her
presence {or absence) may please (or not) the adults of her
life:
She was conscious enough that her face indeed could
n't please him if it showed any sign - just as she hoped
it did n't - of her sharp impression of what he now
really wanted to do. Was n't he trying to turn the
tables on her, embarrass her somehow into admitting that
what would really suit her little book would be, after
doing so much for good manners, to leave her wholly at
liberty to arrange for herself? She began to be nervous
again: it rolled over her that this was their parting,
their parting for ever, and that he had brought her
there for so many caresses only because it was important
such an occasion should look better for him than any
other. For her to spoil it by a note of discord would
certainly give him ground for complaint; and the child
was momentarily bewildered between her alternatives of
agreeing with him about her wanting to get rid of him
and displeasing him by pretending to stick to him. So
she found for the moment no solution but to murmur very
helplessly: "Oh papa - oh papa!"43
The presence of the inner question ("Was n't he trying to
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turn the tables on her...?") is characteristic of reflective
consciousness portrayed, and the language is that of a child,
so different (as we have seen) from James's own.

What is

given to us to know of this child's mind is coincident with
her knowledge of it; there is no other interpretive presence.
The conscious moment portrayed is indeed a "discussion" of
alternative actions which are suggested on the basis of her
past experience.

It is, in william James's words, "a theatre

of possibilities."
The following selection from the same novel shows us a
consciousness that has evolved:

the child has become more

confident and more aware:
As she was condemned to know more and more, how could it
logically stop before she should know Most? It came to
her in fact as they sat there on the sands that she was
distinctly on the road to know Everything. She had not
had governesses for nothing: what in the world had she
ever done but learn and learn and learn? She looked at
the pink sky with a placid foreboding that she soon
should have learnt All. They lingered in the flushed
air till at last it turned to grey and she seemed fairly
to receive new information from every brush of the
breeze.14
In this passage, the conscious state is constrained to
the present mental instant and to the character's own
experience; accordingly, it is subject to the limitations and
distortions of the character's own knowledge, sensitivity,
reason, and judgment.

When employed throughout a novel, in

different stages of development, the technique is useful for
portraying a consciousness which evolves over time, which
appraises, remembers, reflects on and about; a consciousness
which makes connections (more or less valid), which flows and
teems with "questions, exclamations, repetitions,
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overstatements, colloquialisms."15 Depending on the narrative
context, however, we, as readers, may judge that evolving
awareness as more or less truthful, more or less correct, to
the extent that the author supplies us with information
beyond the character's knowledge or to the extent that our
own experience allows us to fill in the gaps.
Discussion: Part I
In the period between 1865 and 1885, neither American
literature nor American psychology had achieved the status of
professionalization or respectability that would come at the
turn of the century.

Writing within a tradition of naive

realism and under an aura of suspicion with which the
Scottish philosophers and their followers regarded the
(imaginative) novel, American realists were simultaneously
working out and defending the techniques which would come to
define the realist novel.

One characteristic of American

realism was its emphasis on the "ordinary, the commonplace,
and the common man," the representative "type," as Silas
Lapham was a representative type, as most of Howells's
characters were representative types.

Since neither Poe's

madness nor Emerson's other-worldliness were experiences
common to ordinary men and women, rejecting the romantic
consciousness led American realists to a confrontation with
consciousness as it was experienced to the experiencing
subject, a consciousness bound up with, inexorably tied to,
the events of everyday life.
The solutions offered by the literary realists to the
"problem of consciousness" were as varied as those offered by
the psychologists, reflecting their particular agenda as much
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as any one author's singular experience and introspective
sophistication.

To the observant and somewhat superficial

William Dean Howells who equated "truth" with emotional
distance and "objectivity" with the journalistic eye,
consciousness was purely a behavioral phenomenon, to be
described as a scientist might describe a chemical reaction.
To the compassionate, sensitive, and often-sentimental
Phelps, consciousness was described as a series of emotion
laden images and reflective monologues.

To the introspective

and analytical James, consciousness was described as a series
of ever-expanding revelations, the path to certain knowledge,
the threshold of personal transcendence.
As I indicated at the beginning of this chapter, there
are no obvious connections between the concepts of
consciousness described by the philosopher/psychologists and
the concepts of consciousness employed by literary realists
of this period, 1865-1885.

Indeed, the passages I have

selected provide additional evidence in support of both
Kearns's and Taylor's conclusion that the shift toward a
mind-as-sentient-being perspective occurred in literary
discourse before it became common currency in psychological
discourse.

Of the novelists whose work we have examined,

most were acquainted with the philosophical models I have
described, but there is no indication in either published or
unpublished sources that suggests they intentionally drew on
those ideas; indeed, there are several indications that
suggest they deliberately rejected them.
There may be personal reasons for this seemingly
deliberate rejection of the academic enterprise.

Howells,
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for one, was a journalist whose training did not include a
background in philosophy or psychology, though he was likely
aware of William James's early work through his association
with Henry James.

As we have seen, both Phelps and Henry

James did indeed reject the academic models and purposefully
set out to portray a consciousness of sensory complexity with
the capacity for self-aware exploration, expansion, and
transcendence.

Their models of sentient consciousness were a

result of their deliberate intent to portray experience as it
was experienced; to invite the reader to share in that
experience.

By internalizing the action of the narrative

within a central consciousness, these authors promulgated
what has become known as "psychological realism" (defined as
the realistic portrayal of experience) that opposed the more
conservative (and, perhaps, sterile) philosophical realism of
their academic contemporaries.

(This emphasis on

psychological realism was no less a concerted opposition to
the idealism of the early nineteenth-century
Transcendentalists.)
Taking consciousness as their central theme led literary
realists to a direct confrontation with the nature of
consciousness itself.

And, although each of the realists

whose work we reviewed adopted a somewhat different
perspective on that issue, their solutions to the "problem of
consciousness" largely ignored the emphasis on rationality
and mental segmentations that characterized the psychological
enterprise.

In contrast to the language of science, the

accepted language of the novel of consciousness is replete
with self-reference and metaphoric embellishments.

That
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American pre-experimental psychologists (including Reid) so
readily adopted the language of science is testimony to their
desire to accord "psychological topics" the same status as
the objects of inquiry in the natural sciences.

This, of

course, was not a literary concern.
Whether assumed objectivity in some way alters the
topics under consideration, whether "consciousness" (or the
"self," or "emotions"), as experienced, can be wholly
captured in objective discourse, is a matter of some debate.
Graham Richards, for example, asserts that the
"objectification" of psychological terms so central to the
goals of prediction and control (the goal of all science) is
fundamentally at odds with the goals of "critical selfref lection," and self-understanding that have long been
recognized in the humanities (history, literature, clinical
psychology)

If this is so, then recognition of these

opposing aims would lead us to expect profound differences
between, for example, "consciousness" as characterized within
an empirical/epistemological system (Locke, Reid, Mahan) and
"consciousness" as characterized in the metaphorical language
of the nineteenth century novel.

As we have seen, there are

profound differences between the psychological and literary
models of consciousness of this period (1800-1885).
By the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century, the
Scottish influence had begun to wane, eclipsed by the
evolutionary ideas of Charles Darwin.

By then, psychology

had acquired disciplinary status, aided by the return of
American students who had trained in German laboratories.

By

then, American literature had acquired, if not disciplinary
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status of the same sort, at least respectability.

In the

next section, Part II of this study, I will examine models of
consciousness in psychology and literature of this later
period, 1886-1910.

As we will see, the psychologists of this

later period adopted many of the ideas expressed by the
literary realists we have just examined.

And, somewhat

surprisingly, the novelists of this later period addressed
many of the issues that came to the attention of these later
American psychologists.
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CHAPTER 5

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS, 1886-1910
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century and
well into the third quarter, Scottish Commonsense philosophy
dominated American thought--particularly in matters relating
to concepts of the mind and consciousness.

As we have seen,

the models proposed by America's pre-experimental
psychologists Laurens Hickok, Asa Mahan, Mark Hopkins, and
James McCosh, adopted many of Reid's ideas, particularly his
analysis of the mind in terms of separate powers or
faculties, and his idea that the Will and the Understanding
were important interactive processes in determining the
direction and flow of thought.

What changed in those years

between, say, 1813 (the publication of Reid's Essays) and
1886 (the beginning of the "new psychology"), was less a
matter of structural change in the models themselves and more
a matter of reorganization of the particulars.
For example, following Reid (and the Scottish school
more generally), consciousness was no longer regarded as a
separate power of the mind but, rather, as an irreducible
succession of feeling states, containing all the acts of
which the mind was capable (perceiving, judging, reasoning)
as well as memories, sensations, and all the properties
formerly associated with the Will.

Indeed, long before the

late nineteenth century, consciousness had come to be
identified with Reid's "train of thought" (see Figure 1); as
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we have seen, this is the view adopted by Hickok and Mahan,
Spencer and Taine (see Figures 2 and 4), and it is certainly
the view adopted by the realist writers we examined in the
last chapter.

The difference between the novelists' models

of consciousness and those of the psychologists of 1865-1885
was less a matter of substance than of emphasis:

the

psychologists we examined held to the view that consciousness
was merely an adjunct to the operations of the mind; the
novelists regarded consciousness as primary.
By the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century/
however, even philosophically-minded, experimentally-oriented
psychologists had come to regard consciousness as the proper
subject-matter of a science of psychology.

For example,

George Trumbull Ladd, in the "Introduction" to his seminal
text, Elements of Physiological Psychology, writes:
(l)t will serve our purpose best to 'define' this
science simply by ascribing to it a certain more or less
definite sphere of phenomena. Thus we shall consider
psychology as that science which has for its primary
subject of investigation all the phenomena of human
consciousness, or of the sentient life of man.1
Similarly, James Mark Baldwin in volume 1 of his Handbook of
Psychology defines Psychology as the "science of the
phenomena of consciousness." cautioning that we must be
"careful to include consciousness where-ever and in whatever
stages it be found."2 William James, perhaps less willing to
commit himself, states simply that "Psychology is the Science
of Mental Life," though it is clear that he understands
mental life as occurring within consciousness.3
The reasons for this shift in emphasis from "mind" to
"consciousness" are nov/here stated precisely in these early
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works.

Granting a certain interpretive license from the

perspective of nearly one-hundred years, however, we can
recognize several theoretical advantages that resulted from
the shift.

First. Even a brief survey of their work

indicates that psychologists of this later period were no
less interested in the intellectual processes--perception,
reason, judgment, and other discrete contents of mind--than
were psychologist/philosophers of the early period.4 However,
they were at least as concerned with the emotions and the
will (the sentient life of humankind), and, following Reid,
with the interactions between intellectual and motivational
processes and their consequences in behavior.

From a purely

definitional perspective, the mind had long been associated
with rational acts (the mind could think, reason, and judge)
but rarely with acts of feeling or passion.

Only

consciousness, long since identified with the "stream of
thought," encompassed both intellectual and motivational
processes, rational and irrational attitudes, sensations as
well as ideas.

If we consider the terms "mind" and

"consciousness" as serving a purely theoretical function (as
"mind" served the epistemological objective), then
"consciousness" was a more flexible construct with which to
identify the wide array of topics that, by the late
nineteenth century, had come under the umbrella of
psychology.
Second.

Purely as a construct, consciousness also had

the appeal of neutrality.

At one remove from "mind,"

consciousness was also at one remove from the mind/body
debate which, in the wake of new discoveries about the brain,
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had become such a central issue.5

The relation of mind to

brain was assumed by all; the question was whether or not the
relation should be understood as one-to-one or many-to-one;
whether, that is, whether each mind-act could be reduced to a
particular activity within the brain or whether the
activities of mind required another level of analysis.

The

question, phrased in terms of the relation between the powers
of the mind and the brain, had profound religious and moral
implications, calling into question the freedom of the will,
personal responsibility, and God.

In contrast,

consciousness, long considered a shadowy accompaniment to
mind, seemed to have an equally ambiguous relationship to the
brain.

Most thinkers of the time, however, were willing to

admit that certain aspects of consciousness (for example,
sensations and affect) had concomitant somatic parallels:
the conscious experience of fear corresponded to increased
heart rate; grief was expressed as tears.6

The relationship

of consciousness to somatic processes did not seem to carry
with it the same profound metaphysical implications that were
part of the mind/brain debate.

My point is that

consciousness, because it was the more enveloping construct,
was more amenable to the objectives of a scientific
psychology that sought to encompass both the physical and
mental aspects of the human condition.
James Baldwin's defense of this issue is not unique.
After presenting a series of reasons why mental states and
physical states cannot be considered "one and the same," he
concludes:
The absolute separation of psychology from physiology,
however, in point of matter does not imply their
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independence of each other in point of fact. They are
united in fact by a bond which finds analogy only in
that which unites the science of the inorganic,
chemistry, with that of life, biology. Life introduces
a new series of phenomena into nature, but the
morphological changes it produces are accomplished
immediately through the processes of inorganic or
chemical change. So psychology, while introducing a new
order of phenomena, proceeds immediately upon the data
of physiological change.7
All of which suggests that consciousness--as a psychological
construct--served the new psychology well precisely because
it did not carry with it the limitations and conceptual
baggage with which the concept of "mind" had long been
associated:

consciousness was "life" ("a theatre of

possibilities") in a way that "mind" was not.8
One issue arising in the late nineteenth century,
however, that Reid did not address in any substantive way was
the issue of psychopathology.

Abnormal mental states,

according to Reid, were expected consequences of a too-active
imagination coupled with a lack of willful effort, a tendency
to allow passion to rule conduct rather than reason.3

Such

tendencies, Reid believed, were more characteristic of the
"vulgar and inattentive" social class than of the elite.

By

the late nineteenth century, however, a number of highlypositioned people began to complain of symptoms for which no
organic cause cause could be found.10

Their symptoms--

insomnia, headache, fatigue, dyspepsia, depression,
persistent anxiety--were sufficiently debilitating to force
them to withdraw from normal activities, a cause for concern.
Clearly, these men and women, "pillars" of society, could
hardly be charged with willful negligence or shameful
malingering; their position in society obviated such claims.
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The most popular diagnosis was "neurasthenia" {coined byneurologist George Beard in 186911) a term that was meant to
cover a wide variety of such symptoms; the label made it
official (as labels do), a legitimate medical condition, but
one of psychological import.

Psychologists, as scientists of

the mind, were obliged to recognize this fact, to incorporate
into their models of mind and consciousness some explanation
for mental dysfunction.12
That consciousness served this role more adequately than
the concept of mind is one assumption I intend to illustrate
in this chapter.

By way of example, consider the meaning of

the phrase "She's lost her mind."

Most lay people would

agree, I think, that the phrase accounts for an apparent
break with reality, a disorder of logic, with delusions,
hallucinations, and paranoia.

This identification of mind

with "powers" of reason, judgment, and rational thought was
no less powerful in the nineteenth century than it remains
today.

The symptoms of neurasthenics, however, evinced no

break with reality; their symptoms were disorders more of
affect than of logic.

In retrospect, it seems as though

"consciousness," so long as it was conceived as a succession
of affect-laden sensations and ideas (the "stream of
thought"), served a necessary theory-constitutive function:
it was the means by which nineteenth-century psychologists
would endeavor to bring into account symptoms and behavior
that were clearly maladaptive.
Even so, these later psychologists were drawing on ideas
that had long been part of American thinking about the mind
and consciousness, ideas drawn largely from the work of the
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Scottish philosophers, changing merely the particulars (in
line with new discoveries concerning the brain and in
response to new demands on the discipline), while holding on
to the basic structure.

As we will see, the psychologists

whose work forms the basis of this chapter--William James,
George Trumbull Ladd, and James Mark Baldwin13-- shared many
of Reid's concerns: a)

a concern to establish psychology as

a science with clearly defined subject-matter and objective
methods (including experimentation), and careful analysis of
the conditions as well as the consequences of mental acts; b)
an interest in the process of mental development (by the late
nineteenth century, "development" was conceived within the
context of evolutionism); and c)

a concern to incorporate

into psychological analysis all the latest advances in the
knowledge of human physiological functioning.
In its late nineteenth-century usage, consciousness was
implicitly understood as a process akin to awareness and
receptivity.

It was conceived as the end-point of experience

and the source of action.

As we have seen, Henry James and

the other realist writers we have examined conceived
consciousness in this way.

By the late nineteenth century,

psychologists, too, would come to this view.

That they did

so even while retaining many of the ideas first proposed by
Reid is testimony to what Graham Richards has called the
"essential phenomenological and humanistic character" of
psychological ideas.15
In this chapter, I examine models of consciousness
developed by George Trumbull Ladd, William James, and James
Mark Baldwin.

The usual account of faculties and of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

134

consciousness is present in their work; however, each of
these men made important contributions to particular topics
within the new psychology:

Ladd in physiological psychology;

James in psychopathology; and Baldwin in developmental
psychology.

Accordingly, while I will devote some space to

a general discussion of their models, I intend to emphasize
these important aspects of their work.

Because George

Trumbull Ladd's important text, Elements of Physiological
Psychology, was heralded as the harbinger of the "new
psychology" by no less than G. Stanley Hall in 1887, I will
begin this overview with a discussion of Ladd's work.
George Trumbull Ladd (1842-1921)15
George Trumbull Ladd began his career as a psychologist
in a program of self-study of the works of Locke, Reid, the
British empiricists, the German experimentalists, and all of
the Americans, including Mahan, Porter, Hickok and others.
Though his intent was to learn all he could about the "new"
mental science, his motives were less a reflection of his
intellectual interests and curiosity than of his concern lest
the application of scientific principles to the study of
human nature should run counter to or trivialize classical
religious ideals.

As Eugene Mills states the issue, "A

confirmed dualist, Ladd believed that, whatever might be
revealed by the methods of science, there was still a
psychological reality immune to scientific method which could
be known only by immediate experience."16 Like his
contemporaries, william James and James Mark Baldwin, Ladd
believed that the mental life of humankind could not be
reduced to "localized features" or brain mechanisms, but
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retained always the character and quality of a "something
more."

Ladd insisted that

the development of Mind can only be regarded as the
progressive manifestation in consciousness of the life
of a real being which, although taking its start and
direction from the action of the physical elements of
the body, proceeds to unfold powers that are sui generis
according to laws of its own.17
Psychology could be a science, Ladd would assert, but it
would be a science unlike other sciences and its laws would
be laws of a different order.
It is strange indeed that a man who was devoted to
classical study, a man who was a philosopher first and a
scientist (if at all) only second, should claim the distinct
honor of presenting the first American textbook oriented
almost wholly to the physiological basis of mental life.
Yet, the publication in 1886 of Ladd's text is widely
recognized as the pivotal event signifying the end of
philosophical psychology and the beginning of scientific
psychology in America.

G. Stanley Hall's comment is typical:

"It is at last possible," he writes in November of 1887, "to
read a plain statement of the facts of a good part of the
field of experimental psychology in English."18

According to

Mills, however, Ladd's purpose in publishing the text did not
emerge out of a desire to "set psychology on the proper path
of science," but was the result of a long, sustained, and
concentrated attempt to make sense of this new field.

As a

scholar, Ladd was attracted to tasks of this sort, according
to Mills, with the result being a careful and systematic
summary of the main issues in the field.

For this reason,

the book established Ladd's reputation as one of the leading
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scientists in the field of psychology.15
Qn Consciousness
"It will be the task of the book itself," Ladd writes in
the Preface to the Elements. "to set forth the assured or
alleged results of Physiological Psychology; and this will be
done at every step with such degree of assurance as belongs
to the evidence."20
objective.

This is not, however, Ladd's only

An examination of the Table of Contents reveals a

second, perhaps primary, concern:

Although the first

section, entitled "The Nervous Mechanism," contains seven
chapters reporting the latest advances in knowledge of the
central nervous system, sensory mechanisms, and embryonic
development, the last two sections (entitled "Correlations of
the Nervous Mechanism and the Mind" and "The Nature of Mind,"
respectively) contain fifteen chapters discussing
localization of function, visual, auditory, and tactile
processes, and the physical basis of the higher powers of the
mind, ending with a philosophical account of the mind/body
relation and a concerted refutation of the materialistic
thesis.

It is this last section that forms the foundation

for much of what follows.21
Psychology, according to Ladd, is the science of the
phenomena of consciousness.

By "phenomena" Ladd means

precisely that consciousness consists of a series of events:
the yellow of the the watch, the red of the rose, the feeling
of cold, or of heat, or of pain, acts of imagination, and
pure thought which, according to Ladd, all occur within
consciousness.22 More than these events, however,
consciousness also consists of "synthetic" acts, events in
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themselves, such as discriminating, combining, and localizing
of sensations.

"Our entire conscious existence," writes

Ladd, "...is a continually shifting succession of individual
mental activities, no one of which is exactly like any other
or is to be considered as a mere repetition of any other."23
Given the complexity and interrelationship of the phenomena
of study, therefore, it would seem that a science of
psychology would tackle an impossible task, "(f) or what is
infinite in variety and always changing its kind cannot be
described;" and that which cannot be described, cannot be
science.”
But a science of psychology can be attempted, however,
with some assurance, because the phenomena of consciousness
can be classified on the basis of our immediate awareness of
the "likenesses and unlikenesses" of the different states of
consciousness which we all experience.
Reid's "reflection".)

(This, of course, is

Such classifications, Ladd believes,

are necessary to the science because they "tell us much that
scientific inquiry desires to know about the origin or
correlations of...mental phenomena."

They can tell us, for

example,
what special part of the external organ of sense, or
what area of the brain, is more directly concerned in
producing the psychical state which precedes or causes
the mental phenomena....[and] they may demonstrate what
kind of physical stimuli result, respectively, in
exciting such and such states of consciousness.25
These classifications are necessary, Ladd asserts, because
they "set the way" for experimental and physiological
elaboration.
Ladd begins, as we have seen, with the same set of
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assumptions with which Reid and others have begun.

Like

them, he agrees that all the "faculties" of consciousness may
be assumed under three heads:

"phenomena of knowing,

phenomena of feeling, and phenomena called acts of will."26
Such classification is permitted, however, only on the
assumption that there exists a "real being" called "mind"
(the proper subiect of the phenomena of consciousness) which
is distinguished in every respect from the "real beings"
understood as the physical molecules of the brain system.
There is no one-to-one correspondence between psychical
states and physical states, Ladd asserts, because the mental
and the physical are different categories of analysis: "(t)he
principles which regulate the formation of classes among the
conscious states of the mind are very different from those
which regulate...the physical basis of these states."27
This is not to suggest, however, that no relation exists
or that conscious phenomena and brain states are absolute and
independent operations.

Ladd's solution to the difficulty is

to envision a system in which the brain acts as the "medium"
through which the will "acts" toward its ends, through which
sensations and perceptions are "presented" to the mind; the
brain acting as a kind of transmission center sending and
receiving messages.23

As to the connection between mind and

brain, Ladd insists any literal answer would lead at once to
absurdity.

The answer "best consistent with the facts,"

according to Ladd, is the same connection we always find
between two "any so-called 'real beings':"
The molecules of the brain (so far, at least, as psycho
physical science knows anything of them) are composed of
elements of material reality, called atoms; these atoms
act by way of motion, according to their constitution
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and relations to each other and to their environment.
The mind, on the other hand, is a real unit-being of
another order than that of the atoms. Its acts are the
various modes or states of consciousness. This being
called mind is causally related to the beings called
atoms; the relation is mutual. The mind behaves as it
does because of the constitution and behavior of the
molecules of the brain. The molecules of the brain
behave as they do because of the nature and activities
of the mind....The action of each accounts for the
action of the other. But the action of neither is to be
explained as solely due to the action of the other;
neither mind nor brain can be regarded as the subject
for the phenomena ordinarily ascribed to the other.23
As Ladd suggests, this view is unmistakably dualistic;
specifically, it is interactionist.

The phenomena of

consciousness operate according to laws distinct from the
laws that govern the operation of the brain, yet mind and
brain interact, each one serving on occasion as the cause of
action in the other.

The fact that each is not conceived as

the sole influence, one on the other, leaves open the door
for free will, individuality, and the pursuit of higher
goals.
There is little in Ladd's conception of consciousness
that we have not encountered before; only the distinction
between immediate consciousness and reflective consciousness
is missing.

The introspective method is heralded as "the

only way we have "of ascertaining what are the phenomenon
that require explanation," but it is never equated with
"reflection" in the sense in which Reid intended, nor is
"reflection" understood as a capacity which must be developed
over time.

Though the classification of mind into various

"faculties" receives Ladd's support, these faculties are not
to be understood as entities "having an existence of
themselves;" or as capable of being compounded in any way.
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"They are not divisions of the mind," writes Ladd,
nor are they powers of the mind, if by this word be
meant some permanent recognizable reality, stored up in
a spiritual subject, or attached to it or inherent in
it, after the analogy of the relation of physical forces
to their subjects, the atoms. The faculties of the mind
are the modes of the behavior, in consciousness, of the
mind.30
One can not imagine a more decisive refutation of the faculty
psychology of Reid and Stewart.

Yet the “faculties" are

retained, if only because they provide the focus for
psychological research.

Moreover, it is clear that Ladd,

like Reid, would retain a measure of free-will, even in the
face of new discoveries of functional correlates within the
cortex.
There is one aspect of Ladd's account that is worth
mentioning because we will encounter a form of it in the next
chapter in the work of Henry Adams.

In his discussion of the

relation between mind and brain, Ladd develops the following
thesis:31

Events

physical events.

occurring within the

brain are,at base,

All physical events, even those within the

human brain, are modes of action, specifically, "alterations
in the relationsof the material atoms or masses
other in space."

Consciousness, also, is motion,

to each
though not

of elements in space; consciousness is motion in time, a
constantly shifting organization of mental experience.

The

concept of motion is central, however, to both fields of
action and it is that concept that Henry Adams employs (more
or less successfully) to describe the historical development
of human knowledge.
The publication, of Ladd's physiological text was a
pivotal event in the history of psychology, indicating the
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abandonment of a purely speculative psychology and the
development of psychology as a scientific discipline.
in that context that I presented his views.

It is

William James,

in contrast, presents a view of consciousness more in the
tradition of Reid than of Ladd, not rejecting, but certainly
-deemphasi-z-isg-,— its—phy&iological^-a&geefes^— As—ws—w-i-l-l^see^---consciousness, for James, has active, selecting properties.
Perhaps James's most under-rated contribution to psychology,
however, was his realization that a theory of consciousness
was incomplete that did not also account for abnormal mental
states.

Because many of James's ideas are reflected in the

literature of the time, I will give some account of these
ideas.
William James (1842-1910)
William James is the recognized father of American
psychology, a man whose contributions to the field are as
varied and unclassifiable as they are insightful.

During the

last half of the nineteenth century, his was the voice of
compromise and reason and, though he developed no
comprehensive program, the breadth of his knowledge and his
incomparable style have carried the weight of his ideas
through nearly one hundred years of psychological debate.
James began his work in psychology in the shadow of
Scottish common-sense realism and the American Transcendental
movement (see Appendix). From the Scottish school, James
derived the ideas of a consciousness of immediate experience
(of fleeting sensations and transitory impressions) and a
reflective consciousness of reasoning, willing, remembering,
and judging.

From the Scottish school James also derived the
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conviction that our ideas and our feelings and passions were
as real as the objects of the external world, though, as we
will see, he allowed that neither subjective nor objective
experience may be exactly what they seem.

From the

Transcendentalists, James derived the idea that consciousness
might serve a higher purpose than the mere ordering and
classification of sense impressions.

It was from their work

and from their presence in his life that James would come to
insist on the "something more" of conscious life to which
every man aspired.
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of James's thought is
that it was well-grounded in every ideological current of his
time.

Like Ladd, he knew intimately the work of Locke and

the British empiricists (many of his ideas reflect his
opposition to their reductionistic sensationalism); he knew
intimately the work of Kant and the various strains of German
idealism which followed (he rejected their Soul and retained
their spirituality); he applauded experimentalism (but
despaired of German psychophysics); he was well acquainted
with the work on hysteria of Pierre Janet and Jean-Martin
Charcot in France, of George Beard in America, and of Henry
Maudsley in England (though a physician, he did not practice
formally); and he was perhaps the sole American supporter of
psychical research in both America and England, frequently
citing the work of the English psychic researcher, Frederick
Myers.
According to James, the science of psychology was
defined by the following set of criteria:

a)

psychology is

the study of mental life (the word itself calls to mind a
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teeming universe of ideas and emotions); "the knowledge of
particular men about the particular things that surround
them;"32 b)

properly, psychology ought to concern itself with

the full range of man's experience, considered as a unified
whole, including the emotions as well as the intellect; and
c)

that there are not and should not be absolute criteria

for defining the truth or falsity of ideas or actions except
according to their utility.

As we will see in the following

discussion of James's ideas, these convictions inform every
aspect of his thought.
On Consciousness
In the work of John Locke, in the psychologies of Asa
Mahan, Mark Hopkins and James McCosh, one encounters a
consciousness peculiarly passive--a consciousness whose task
was merely to observe and record the operations of the mind.
Even Ladd, concerned as he was with the relation between
conscious states and brain mechanisms, proposed a singularly
unresponsive consciousness.

No ephemeral shadowy

consciousness such as these could serve James's uniquely
psychological point of view, for consciousness as James made
use of it was a dynamic process endowed with the capacity to
order experience in particular ways, to select, to choose. to
compare, to judge, to create, to disregard; it was the Self
in active response to both inner and outer worlds. It was
sentient, emotional, analytical, synthetic.

And it was

unquestionably free, as the following quote reveals:
(T)he mind is at every stage a theatre of possibilities.
Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with
each other, the selection of some, and the suppression
of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of
attention. The highest and most elaborated mental
products are filtered from the data chosen by the
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faculty next beneath, out of the mass offered by the
faculty below that, which mass in turn was sifted from a
still larger amount of yet simpler material and so on.
The mind, in short, works on the data it receives very
much as a sculptor works on his block of stone. In a
sense the statue stood there from eternity. But there
were a thousand different ones beside it, and the
sculptor alone is to thank for having extricated this
one from the rest. Just so the world of each of us,
howsoever different our several views of it may be, all
lay embedded in the primordial chaos of sensations,
which gave the mere matter to the thought of all of us
indifferently. We may, if we like, by our reasonings
unwind things back to that black and jointless
continuity of space and moving clouds of swarming atoms
which science calls the only real world. But all the
while the world we feel and live in will be that which
our ancestors and we, by slowly cumulative strokes of
choice, have extricated out of this, like sculptors, by
simply rejecting certain portions of the given stuff.
Other sculptors, other statues from the same stone!
Other minds, other worlds from the same monotonous and
inexpressive chaos! My world is but one in a million
alike embedded, alike real to those who may abstract
them. How different must be the worlds in the
consciousnesses of ant, cuttle-fish, or crab!33
In his unique style, James has portrayed a consciousness
that, by attending to some things more than others, actively
selects from the "arena of possibilities" which the mind
conveys.

He suggests that this selection is made possible in

concert with the various "faculties" of the mind which
perform the functions of "filtering" the mass of data
available to it.

At all levels of this sensory process,

consciousness plays the role of choosing which to recognize
and which to disregard.

It is given in each man's

experience, says James, to make those choices in response to
his own self-interest and all that he has experienced before.
In this way, each of us "carves out" our singular lives.
James's model of consciousness is, in part, one of a process
of adaptive selection.34 The premise is Darwin's; the
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application is uniquely James.
What consciousness selects, however, is only a small
part of what consciousness actually is. "Traditional"
psychology (i.e., faculty psychology), according to James,
because it has focused on primary processes of the mind, has
neglected the marginal, hazy, barely perceptible "fringe" of
consciousness.35 we think, we plan, we judge, but surrounding
that thinking, planning, judging, is an affective web of
relations that informs the direction of thought.

"What is

that shadowy scheme," James asks, "of the 'form' of an opera,
play, or book, which remains in our mind and on which we pass
judgment when the actual thing is done?

What is our notion

of a scientific or philosophical system?"36

Any idea or

event upon which our thought is focused, shades imperceptibly
into these margins of consciousness from which we come to
know the form of a thing, its prototypical "gestalt," just as
we come to know the thing in itself.37
James describes a consciousness of two aspects:

the

first is that which commands our attention; the second is the
relational fringe.

James's terms are the more compelling:

he describes them as "resting places" and "places of flight,"
respectively.

The resting places are filled with sensations

or images which can be held before the mind for extended
periods.

These resting places, according to James, have been

for too long the sole interest of psychology; they are, he
asserts, the source of the ideas of sensationalists (Locke)
or faculty psychologists (Reid) who describe a consciousness
of discrete events.

The places of flight are rapid and

transitory; they are "filled with thoughts of relations,
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either static or dynamic:

"We ought to say," writes James,

that these relations are feelings, "a feeling of and, a
feeling of if, a feeling of but."

The places of flight

within the conscious stream are resistant to analysis,
according to James; "examination annihilates them; words
cannot capture them."38
Figure 3 is a adapted diagram of James's consciousness.
In the diagram, time is represented along the horizontal
axis, while the height of the curve represents the intensity
of the feeling-state.

The letters a, b, c, d, e, f, g,

represent successive conscious states.

All states are

present, James notes, in the intensities shown by the curve;
the letter "d" representing the most intense state.

The

small "o's" and "pluses" representing the relational fringe.
One might conceive of each letter as a resting place
represented by a specific image or sensation or thought; the
pluses and "o's" are the relational fringe (the connecting
links), the series of associated ideas and images which are
concurrently called to mind.39
Consciousness, as James described it, bears striking
similarity to the "theories" of consciousness conveyed by
literary realists Elizabeth Stuart Phelps and Henry James,
suggesting that William James is less interested in
epistemological issues than in describing a consciousness of
felt experience.

There is little of the "simple" and

"reflective" consciousnesses described by Reid and his
followers in this account, though, like his brother Henry,
James believed that, under certain conditions, reflection
would yield dividends in terms of higher-order knowledge and
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Figure 3.
William James's "Stream of Consciousness" (adapted from
William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1
(1890) (New York: Dover, 1950), p. 243).

a

b

c

d

e

f

g
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the emergence of secondary conscious states.
Secondary Consciousness
During the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century,
there occurred a resurgence of interest in altered conscious
states.

Following the work of Pierre Janet and Jean-Martin

Charcot in France, hypnosis had gained a new respectability
in the treatment of mental disease.40

In America and in

England, spiritualism, mediumship, and demoniacal possession,
co-existed with the new psychology, evidence of a particular
kind of the popular interest in matters of the mind.41
Finally, there were a growing number of cases with symptoms
like depression, lethargy, withdrawal, and hysteria for which
no organic cause could be found.42 Surely, thought James, the
science of psychology was as responsible to these conditions
as it had long been to "normal" function.

Unlike many of his

contemporaries, James was convinced that a science of
psychology was incomplete that did not also attempt to
account for these "exceptional" states of human mental life,
for they were, after all, psychic states, albeit states with
pronounced mystical implications.43
It is, accordingly, no accident that the diagram
representing James's concept of consciousness approaches
infinity at either end of the time-line, for James believed
that there had to exist some aspect of psychic life "beyond
the margin" of relations that directed normal conscious
life.44

In James's model, therefore, consciousness did not

end at the margins; it expanded outward (as though in space)
and beyond the known and the present.45 This second
consciousness was referred to by James alternately as the
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subconscious or the subliminal, and it serves as the core of
his belief that altered mental states were nothing more (nor
less) than the intrusion of subliminal contents into ordinary
consciousness.16
Many of James's ideas on this theme were drawn from the
work of Frederick W. H. Myers of England, a man whose
interest in psychical phenomena carried him to the forefront
of the field of psychical research.

According to Myers the

subliminal is "the enveloping mother-consciousness" from
which our normal consciousnesses evolve.

From its

intercourse with the spiritual world the subliminal
consciousness draws energy and makes contact with ideas and
impressions that can not be acquired through the usual
channels.17

There is, as well, a less ethereal aspect to the

concept of a secondary consciousness:

Wot only can the

subliminal make contact with other minds (and presumably
other worlds48 ) but it also serves as a holding place for all
manner of archaic and rudimentary memories of automatic
processes (such as walking), all impressions passing through
consciousness to which we do not attend, and "buried
feelings" which are kept out of conscious awareness.15
The two forms of consciousness--the normal and the
subliminal--flow like parallel streams within the psyche,
merging occasionally (as in instances of great insight): the
subliminal remaining out of contact with the external world;
the normal waking consciousness pursuing its worldly task.
In theory, all cases of mental disease, whether of hysteria
or the popular 'neurasthenia', or cases of altered conscious
states--of mediumship, spiritualism, hypnotic trance, or
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sleep--represented an unexpected eruption of the subliminal,
"like a wave that rises to the surface, swamps the other
waves, overflows the banks,
course of the current.50

[and] deflects for a while the

Under these conditions, the entire

broad field of normal consciousness would contract to a
single idea, upon which "the whole of knowledge is brought to
bear."51

Instead of the controlled associative stream of

waking consciousness, the single idea with its random
association of feeling-toned ideas and sensory images would
dominate thought and behavior.

All that which did not in

some manner accrue to the single idea (either by chance or
affective association) would not, indeed could not, be
recognized by the beleaguered subject.52

This explanation,

according to James, fit the facts as well as any other, and
better than most:
(O)ne cannot help admiring the great originality with
which Myers wove such an extraordinarily detached and
discontinuous series of phenomena together. Unconscious
cerebration, dreams, hypnotism, hysteria, inspirations
of genius, the willing game, planchette, crystal-gazing,
hallucinatory voices, apparitions of the dying, mediumtranees, demoniacal possession, clairvoyance, thoughttransference- -even ghosts and other facts more doubtful-these things form a chaos at first sight most
discouraging....Yet Myers has actually made a system of
them, stringing them continuously upon a perfectly
legitimate objective hypothesis, verified in some cases
and extended to others by analogy.53
Certainly among the prominent psychologists of the late
nineteenth-century, William James was unique in his readiness
to accept the notion of a subliminal that had the powers and
capacities that Myers gave to it.

It is interesting that

before Freud's ideas became well known, few American
psychologists were willing to recognize an "unconscious" of
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the sort Freud proposed, though they were ready to accede
that certain activities of the mind might become unconscious
in the sense that they had become "automatic."54

Perhaps the

concept of a subliminal consciousness set the stage for a
general acceptance of Freud's ideas.
In the following section, we will examine consciousness
from a developmental perspective.

By the late nineteenth

century, the core themes of evolutionary theory had become
part of every developmental theory proposed, and the theory
proposed by James Mark Baldwin proved no exception,

in

contrast to Thomas Reid, whose ideas of mental development
were confined to the attainment of reason and judgment and
moral responsibility,55 Baldwin was concerned with
maturational issues and the differences between healthy and
diseased minds, children and adult, animal and human; this is
"genetic" psychology, as Baldwin explains in the following
quote:
The new and important question about the mind which
is...recognised is this: How did it grow? What light
upon its activity and nature can we get from a positive
knowledge of its early stages and processes of
growth?...How is the growth of the child related to that
of animals?--how, through heredity and social
influences, to the growth of the race and of the family
and society in which he is brought up? All this can be
comprehended only in the light of the doctrine of
evolution, which has rejuvenated the sciences of life;
and we are now beginning to see a rejuvenation of the
sciences of the mind from the same point of view.56
James Mark Baldwin (186 J-1934 )
James Mark Baldwin is considered one of the founding
fathers of American psychology:

Along with James McKeen

Cattell, he founded the Psycho1ogica1 Review in 1894, the
Psychological Index (forerunner to Psychological Abstracts)
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and Psychological Monographs. In 1904 he founded the
Psychological Bulletin. His Handbook of Psychology (1889 and
1891) was a small review of major theories in psychology of
the period; his Mental Development in the Child and the Race
(1895) was a landmark text in the application of evolutionary
theory to the development of the mind.
Throughout the nineteenth century (and including, to
some extent, the theories of Ladd and James), consciousness
was defined largely by its content. Consciousness
"contained" ideas, thoughts, sensations, memories; forms or
levels of consciousness were distinguished by the kind of
operations performed or the kinds of ideas to which one might
attend:

revelations and insights were products of the

subliminal; plans, purposes, actions proposed, were products
of normal consciousness.

The apparent difficulty of talking

about the mind and consciousness without also speaking in
terms of discrete units was no easier in the late nineteenth
century than it had been a century earlier.
Baldwin, however, confronts this problem squarely; that
he does so in the context of a long-held tradition in
psychological thought is testimony to the flexibility of
psychological concepts.

The core of Baldwin's developmental

theory rests on the distinction between two stages of
consciousness we have encountered before:

the distinction

between simple and reflective consciousness.
The reader will recall that the distinction between
simple and reflective consciousness proposed by Reid was
founded on this one crucial difference:

simple consciousness

was immediate, involuntary, and unfocused; reflective
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consciousness included both present and past events, was
voluntary, and focused.
claim:

Baldwin makes a somewhat different

simple consciousness is present when the conscious

subject makes no distinction between herself and other
thinking subjects; reflective consciousness is present when
such a distinction is made. (The reader will remember that
Asa Mahan defined simple consciousness as the ability to
distinguish between the me and not me : while reflective
consciousness consisted of the ability to synthesize higherorder ideas.)

According to Baldwin, however, development

from simple to reflective consciousness occurs at that point
when the experiencing subject "embraces simply the
circumscribed area of [her] own experience considered in
reference to [herself] ."57
This is an oversimplification of Baldwin's ideas, though
the general point of his theory is not thereby lost.

The

question of interest to Baldwin is, At what point does the
child acquire the capacity to embrace her experience as her
experience and what are the conditions under which she does
so?58

The answer, according to Baldwin, is that the "me/not-

me" distinction occurs as soon as the child becomes sensitive
to particular forms of sensation, especially as she is able
to distinguish between sensations of touch and the muscular
sense.

This process gives the child a sense of the form of

her own body, as well as the location and relative function
of its various parts.

From this bodily sense, the child

develops an awareness of things external and a sense of the
bodily movements that are necessary to make contact with
them.

"This fact of control of the body," writes Baldwin,
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"seems to be the first beginning of the exercise of the
will. It involves a subjective reference more distinct
and peculiar to itself than any of the purely affective
sensations, and leads to the notion of the I and so to
self-consciousness."59
Consciousness, according to Baldwin, precedes hand-in-hand
with physical development; is, in fact, dependent on
maturational processes for its emergence as reflective
consciousness.

In reflection, the notion of a self has

distinct form:
In reflection...the self is discovered through the act
of attentive inspection, as having and exercising the
characteristics of mind....The...ego...is defined and
enriched by added marks, such as efficiency, identity,
and permanence....Through reflection, therefore, the
idea of self is attained and assumes its important place
in the mental world....It brings coherence into the
circuit of consciousness, by giving it a centre of
reference and a circumference of limitation to the
individual.60
The words are familiar:

"Reflection," "self," "identity,"

"coherence," are all words we have encountered before in
early theories of consciousness.

Locke's consciousness was

the embodiment of the self, as was Reid's. The reader will
remember that Asa Mahan's theory of consciousness was the
first to embrace a developmental pattern of the sort that
Baldwin describes in these paragraphs (see Chapter 3}.6l
"Reflection," for Locke and Reid, however, was the source of
all higher knowledge, not merely confined to knowledge of the
self.

Finally, the use of term "coherence" is consistent

with all the models of mind and consciousness we have
examined:

Like Baldwin, each model gave to consciousness the

singular role of providing unity to the psychic system.

In

one way or another, the concept of a psychological "self" has
endured.
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This very brief summary of Baldwin's theory of the
development of consciousness does not do justice to the
importance of his work.
points may be made.

Nonetheless, a few interesting

Baldwin's theory of conscious

development is, at base, a theory of personality because it
is explicitly concerned with the development of a sense of
self-identity.

Early theories (epistemological systems), as

we have seen, conceived identity as coexistent with
consciousness itself. The fact that these early theories
were wholly and entirely concerned with the adult mind is
true enough, but neglects the more compelling issue:

By the

end of the nineteenth century, evolutionary theory had taken
hold of American psychology and laid the path it was to
follow for the next one hundred years.

There is no more

convincing evidence of the influence of evolutionism than
Baldwin's theory of the development of consciousness.62
Conclusion
By the late nineteenth century, consciousness had
usurped mind as the focus of interest of psychologists.
Indeed, this is precisely what Kearns means to suggest in his
use of the phrase "mind-as-sentient stream" to characterize
this period.

Though possible reasons for this shift were

given at the beginning of this chapter, a brief summary is in
order.

Admittedly, these ideas are conjectures, and post hoc

ones at that.

However, I have yet to find a source that

details this shift in any substantive way; it seems to have
occurred without comment. I submit these ideas, therefore,
only as possibilities.
First. Consciousness was a more flexible and enveloping
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construct than mind.
Psychologists of this later period, were intent upon
developing theories not (merely) of knowledge but of the
physiological and psychological nature of humankind.

They

were looking for general laws that would encompass a variety
of issues with which earlier theorists had only been
marginally concerned:

the relation between mind and body;

the origin of mental disorder; and the differences between
children and adults, animals and humans.

Any theory capable

of addressing these issues need have as its terms such
constructs as were connotatively flexible enough to encompass
both physiological and psychological meaning, both reason and
affect.

In nineteenth-century discourse, "consciousness" was

such a term.
Second.

"Consciousness," as a theoretical construct, also

had the appeal of neutrality.
Unlike mind, the relationship of consciousness to somatic
processes did not seem to carry with it the metaphysical
implications that were part of the mind/brain debate.
Consequently, consciousness was more amenable to the
objectives of a scientific psychology that sought to
encompass both the physical and mental aspects of the human
condition.
Third.

Consciousness provided the foundation for a theory

that would encompass mental pathology. "Consciousness," so
long as it was conceived as a succession of affect-laden
sensations and ideas, served a theory-constitutive function.
Because mental disorders were understood as disorders of
affect as well as reason, the concept of consciousness served
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an explanatory function.
One of the consequences of the shift from "mind" to
"consciousness" was a more finely-tuned, textured, multi
layered conception of consciousness itself.

One might

envision the whole as a series of parallel adaptive
processes: normal consciousness, with its affective, sensory,
and ideational content; a subliminal consciousness, extending
outward and beyond the sensory instant; and the physiological
substratum, the molecular movements and neural processes of
the brain.
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"consciousness" refers to the sentient life of humankind
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nature, and acts and develops according to laws of its
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25 William James, Principles, vol. 1, pp. 255-258.
James's description of the stream of consciousness from the
perspective of traditional psychology resonates with
metaphorical imagery:
What must be admitted is that the definite images of
traditional psychology form but the very smallest part
of our minds as they actually live. The traditional
psychology talks like one who should say a river
consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful,
quarpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of
water. Even were the pails and the pots all actually
standing in the stream, the water would continue to
flow. It is just this free water of consciousness that
psychologists resolutely overlook. Every definite image
in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that
flows round it. With it goes the sense of its relations,
near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us,
the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. (p. 255)
26 William James, Principles. vol. 1, p. 255.
27 William James, Principles. vol. 1, p. 259. "Relation,
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attention focused, of having our flow of thoughts interrupted
by a sound, an idea, a memory. Sometimes the interruption is
a welcome addition to the task at hand; it may lead to a
creative insight, a "breakthrough;" it may, however, stop the
flow entirely, our attention disengaged.
One further note: There is no question that Henry and
William James held similar views of consciousness: Relations
within consciousness were as important to Henry as they were
to William. The following quote from Henry James's preface
to the New York edition of Roderick Hudson is reproduced here
from Chapter 4, page 106:
[Relations] are if the very essence of the novelist's
process, and it is by their aid, fundamentally, that his
idea takes form and lives; but they impose on him,
through the principle of continuity that rides them, a
proportionate anxiety. They are the very condition of
interest, which languishes without them; the painter's
subject consisting ever, obviously, of the related
state, to each other, of certain figures and things. To
exhibit these relations, once they have all been
recognised, is to "treat" his idea, which involves
neglecting none of those that directly minister to
interest....
Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and
the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to
draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which
they shall happily appear to do so. (Henry James,
"Preface," in Roderick Hudson [New York: Scribner's,
1907], pp. vi-vii.)
38 William James, Principles. vol. 1, pp. 229-264.
39

William James, Principles. vol. 1, p. 243.

40 Henri F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the
Unconscious.. The History and Evolution pf Dynamic Psychiatry
(New York: Basic Books:1970), pp. 89-101, 143-174, 331-417.
41 Jeffrey Mishlove, The Roots of Consciousness. Psychic
Liberation through History. Science and Experience (New York:
Random House, 1975), pp. 64-106.
42

F.G. Gosling, Before Freud. p. 10.

43 William James, "The Hidden Self," Scribner's Magazine
1 (Fall 1890): 361.
44 "We are by this time familiar with the notion," James
writes, "that a man's consciousness need not be a fully
integrated thing. From the ordinary focus and margin, from
the ordinary abstraction, we shade off into phenomena that
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look like consciousness beyond the margin." (William James,
"Notes for the Lowell Institute Lectures on Exceptional
Mental States" [1896], reprinted in William James, Manuscript
Lectures [vol. 19 of The Works of William James1 [Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988], p. 70.
45 William James, Principles. vol. 1, pp. 222-290. We
have met this same idea in the work of Henry James (Chapter
4, pp. 102-103); the following quote by the novelist, here
reprinted, expresses the essence of the Jamesian
consciousness:
Experience is never limited, and it is never complete;
it is an immense sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web
of the finest silken threads suspended in the chamber of
consciousness, and catching every air-bomed particle in
its tissue. It is the very atmosphere of the mind; and
when the mind is imaginative- -much more when it happens
to be that of a man of genius--it takes to itself the
faintest hints of life, it converts the very pulses of
the air into revelations. Experience is never limited,
and it is never complete; it is an immense sensibility,
a kind of huge spider-web of the finest silken threads
suspended in the chamber of consciousness, and catching
every air-bomed particle in its tissue. It is the very
atmosphere of the mind; and when the mind is
imaginative--much more when it happens to be that of a
man of genius--it takes to itself the faintest hints of
life, it converts the very pulses of the air into
revelations.
( Henry James, "The Art of Fiction,"
(1884-1888), reprinted in Henry James. Literary
Criticism. Essays on Literature. American Writers. and
English Writers. Leon Edel and Mark Widon, eds. [New
York: Literary Classics, 1984], p. 52.)
46 Eugene Taylor, william James on Exceptional Mental
States. The 1896 Lowell Lectures (Amherst, Massachusetts: The
University of Massachusetts Press, 1894), p. 27.
47 William James, "Review of 'Human Personality and its
Survival of Bodily Death (by Frederick W. H. Meyers),"
Proceedings of Lhe Society for Psychical Research w i l l
(London, 1903). Reprinted in Gardner Murphy and Robert 0.
Ballou, eds., William James on Psychical Research (New York:
Viking, 1960), pp. 225-239.
48 William James, "Review of 'Human Personality and its
Survival of Bodily Death," p. 233.
49 Frederick W. H. Myers, "The Subliminal
Consciousness," Proceedings of the English Society for
Psychical Research 7 (1891-1892): 310. A complete list of
the contents of the subliminal may be drawn from a variety of
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James's published works: buried feelings, momentarily
inactive memories, the passions, impulses,
likes/dislikes/prejudices, intuitions/hypotheses,
fancies/superstitions, convictions, all non-rational
operations, fixed ideas, supra-normal cognitions, and
religious convictions.
50 Eugene Taylor, William James on Exceptional Mental
States. p. 27 (adapted from Boris Sidis, The Psychology of
Suggestion [New York: Appleton, 1898], p. 15.
Eugene Taylor, William James on Exceptional Mental
States, p. 16. See also William James, "The Hidden Self,"
pp. 363-364.
52 "Hysterics" were particularly susceptible to such
intrusions. The fault lie in the weakness of their ego:
The attention has not sufficient strength [writes
James] to take in the normal number of sensations or
ideas at once. If an ordinary person can feel ten
things at a time, an hysteric can feel but five, Our
minds are all of them like vessels full of water, and
taking in a new drop makes another drop fall out; only
the hysteric mental vessel is preternaturally small.
The unifying or synthesizing power with which the Ego
exerts over the manifold facts which are offered to it
is insufficient to do its full amount of work, and an
ingrained habit is formed of neglecting or overlooking
certain determinate portions of the mass. (William
James, "The Hidden Self," pp. 363-364.)
53 William James, "Frederick Myers's Service to
Psychology," Proceedings of the Society for Psychical
Research XVII (May 1901). Reprinted in Gardner Murphy and
Robert O. Ballou, eds., William James on Psychical. Research
(New York: Viking, 1960), pp. 219-220. In the twentieth
century, pervaded as it is by the Freudian idea that all
behavior is motivated by unconscious impulses, the idea of a
subliminal consciousness with connections to 'other worlds'
seems as far-fetched and unlikely as the concept of an
unconscious seemed to James. Indeed, one wonders which of
these two explanatory mechanisms is the more parsimonious:
the idea of an unconscious of seething impulses and
unconscious desires; or the idea of a subliminal
consciousness that makes contact with other minds and other
worlds? In many ways, Myers's (and James's) formulation
seems to encompass both.
34 William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1,
pp. 164-175.
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55 One of the least considered characteristics of the
ideas of Carl Jung is that his theory is an amalgamation of
James's and Freud's ideas.
58 See, for example, James Mark Baldwin, Handbook of
Psychology, vol 1, pp. 45-58.
37 These themes were noticeably current with the issues
in the realistic novels we examined in Chapter 4. In the
works of Phelps and James in particular, the story depended
on our recognition that people gain through resolution of
their moral dilemma.
58 James Mark Baldwin, The Story of the Mind (1898) (Ann
Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1974), pp. 1-5, 5361.
59

James Mark Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, p. 63.

60

James Mark Baldwin, The Storv of the Mind, p. 54-57.

61 James Mark Baldwin, The Storv of the Mind, pp.

66-67.

62 James Mark Baldwin, The Storv of the Mind, pp.

143-

144.
63 Baldwin, however, does not cite Mahan, who seems, by
this time, to have vanished from the psychological literature
(neither Ladd nor James make any reference to Mahan at all).
There are (at least) two possible reasons for this neglect:
Mahan was, after all, one of the transcendental psychologists
(like Hickok), who held reason to be the pathway to
knowledge. In rejecting his thesis, many psychologists may
have rejected out-of-hand the particulars of his theory.
Alternatively, as we have seen, many "psychological" ideas
are absorbed into later theories which are developed in a
context so different from the original as to render the
source irrelevant. Certainly, Baldwin's ideas were developed
within the context of evolutionism (Spencer and Darwin).
Mahan's ideas (if known) might well have seemed to represent
a mode of thinking that no longer seemed fitting.
64 See, for example, the discussion in David J. Murray,
The History of Western Psychology. pp. 267-268; John M.
O'Donnell, The Origins of Modern Behaviorism. American
Psychology. 1870-1920 [Mew York: New York University Press,
1985], p. 167-171.
In 1893, Baldwin prepared a paper for the Columbian
Exposition at Chicago. In this paper, he refuted "ready-made
views of consciousness (such as those of Locke, Reid, and
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others).
The old "faculties" of consciousness should be
regarded as "growing" not "ready-made:"
The new functional conception asks how the mind as a
whole acts, and how this one form of activity adapts
itself to the different elements of material which it
finds available....The particular way in which this one
function shows itself is a matter of adaptation to the
changing conditions under which the activity is brought
about. .. .The mind is looked upon as having grown to be
what it is, both as respects the growth of man from the
child, and as respects the place of man in the scale of
conscious existence. (James Mark Baldwin, "Psychology
Past and Present," Psychological Review. 1, pp. 367-368
[1894]; reproduced in John M. O'Donnell, The Origins of
Modern Behaviorism, p. 168.)
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CHAPTER 6

CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER SIEGE: THE NATURALIST RESPONSE, 1886-1910
In a recent book purporting to establish a connection
between psychology and literature, Judith Ryan sets forth an
interesting premise:

From the fourth quarter of the

nineteenth century until about 1940, she proclaims, American
and British novelists, responding to the
empiricist/materialist devaluation of a "self," gave form to
characters whose self-identities appeared unusually
fragmented and unstable.1

Though her description of the

naturalist literary genre is undoubtedly correct (as we will
see in this chapter), her description of the psychology of
the period rests on a traditional interpretation of
psychology that is not supported by the facts.
It is not correct, as Ryan would have us believe, that
the "new" psychology of the late nineteenth century, in its
quest for scientific respectability, devalued the
experiencing subject.

Rather, the psychologists of the

period made every attempt to incorporate a self-concept
within their models of consciousness, even, as Mahan and
Baldwin proposed, predicating the development of
consciousness on the capacity to distinguish between a self
and all that was not-self .2

From a psychological point of

view, the self was defined through this capacity, not
devalued by it, though it is probably true, as Ryan asserts,
that the philosophical problem of self and not self was not
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so easily resolved.3
Nor is it accurate to suggest, as Ryan suggests, that by
the nineteenth century "(t)he self was no longer firmly
anchored in the body but in consciousness itself,"1 for, as
we have seen, the psychologists of this survey, at least,
held to the view that consciousness and somatic processes
were linked, though the nature of the connection was
certainly a matter of debate.

Indeed, one might truthfully

ask, At what point in the history of philosophical thought
was the self ever conceived as purely (or even mostly) a
somatic entity?
Nor is it accurate to suggest, as Ryan does, that, by
the nineteenth century, consciousness "was no longer a
discrete unit but included everything that was within the
individual field of perception."5

As we have seen,

consciousness was no more defined by the perceptual field
than it was defined by anv single sensory or affective
strain.

Even should one take as the defining conditions of

the "perceptual field" an unusually broad spectrum of sensory
input (which it is clear Ryan does not), there is no logical
connection between "discreteness" as a description of the
limits or unity of consciousness and the perceptual panorama.
The connection between psychology and literature is by
no means as direct as Ryan's analysis would suggest.

Though

there were clear echoes of an empiricist strain in the new
psychology, it was certainly not as pervasive and allencompassing as Ryan would have it.

Nor can it be said that

"empiricism" automatically confines itself to the
reductionist mode of thought that is generally understood to
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characterize British Associationism.6

We have seen, for

example, that William James rejected a reductionist approach
to consciousness, though an empiricist he certainly remained.
Although Ryan has failed to establish a connection between
nineteenth-century psychology and m o d e m literature, she is
correct in recognizing that a new literary genre emerged in
the period following the realist literature of Phelps,
Howells, and Henry James; and she is correct in recognizing
that that literature seemed (at least on the surface) to
entail a devaluation of the self.
Traditionally, literary naturalism has been defined as
realism "infused with a pessimistic determinism," a depiction
of everyday life at the mercy of causal forces which none
could control, but which man or woman could hope, on occasion
to defeat (see Chapter 1).7 Donald Pizer, however, suggests
that literary naturalism, far from being the reductive,
pessimistic genre it seems to be, actually portrays human
beings in their most self-affirming, even transcendent
character:
[Naturalism] suggests that even the least significant
human being can feel and strive powerfully....Naturalism
reflects an affirmative ethical conception of life, for
it asserts the value of all life by endowing the lowest
character with emotion and defeat and with moral
ambiguity, no matter how poor or ignoble he may seem.
[The naturalistic novel] involves us in the experience
of a life both commonplace and extraordinary, both
familiar and strange, both simple and complex.6
Pizer would characterize the naturalist literature as a
struggle for self-affirmation.

The naturalist writer comes

to his work in search of the noble challenge, the
extraordinary courage, though he knows or she knows that the
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odds are great and the victories few.
These issues define the ethical dilemma posed by
naturalist writers.

Unquestionably, there is an undertow of

pessimism and defeatism running through these novels:

A man

or woman confronts a society that seems to have changed too
quickly, that has become too loud, too fast and too alien; a
man or woman is driven or opposed by forces beyond the
control of either, be they forces of society or forces of
nature.

The self of the distant past (the coherent self

assumed by Reid, Mahan, Hickok), seems lost indeed to these
turn-of-the-century writers who confront the changes of late
nineteenth-century life with something like a wail of
despair.
A quote from a later Elizabeth Stuart Phelps is
indicative of the general case:
We are taught that the law leans over, far beyond the
scope of physics; that the human, like the ultimate
atom, serves the large decree; and that human experience
itself is a slave to the eternal rhythm. We are
reminded that grief and joy and hope and anguish
alternate as much as the budding and the fading of a
wind-flower. We are asked to observe that misery has
paroxysms as well as neuralgia; and that mourners smile
because they have wept, and weep again, since they did
smile. We are reminded that crime and pestilence
pulsate in epidemics across the globe. We are called
upon to record the throbs of the pendulum of history,
whose swing sweeps from civilization to ruin, from the
people to the throne, from tyranny to riot, from
confusion to order, from morality to madness, from
atheism to bigotry, from despair to faith.9
There is nothing stable or certain about life; the "pendulum
of history" swings from chaos to order, "despair to faith,"
without end and seemingly without concern for the individuals
who are caught in its path.

In the face of such
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powerlessness, how is it possible for any one human being to
retain a sense of personal identity?

How can a self cohere

in an unstable world?
The pessimistic/optimistic tensions in American
naturalism can be traced to two sources: Herbert Spencer's
evolutionism and Auguste Comte's positivism.

In the late

nineteenth century, Herbert Spencer was the leading
evolutionist; periodicals of the time were crammed with
criticisms, interpretations, and defenses of Spencer's
theories.

Though his ideas certainly fueled the literary

imagination, the reason for Spencer's popularity cannot be
attributed to the depth of his understanding or the
profundity of his ideas.

What Spencer provided the late

nineteenth century reading public was an essentially
optimistic, all-encompassing universal principle of progress
that satisfactorily accounted for the physical evolution of
the universe, of organic life, of human knowledge, and social
organization.

The whole of Spencer's "Synthetic Philosophy"

could be reduced to the movement from "coherent homogeneity
to incoherent (but integrated) heterogeneity," as mind,
nature, individuals, and societies adjusted to environmental
conditions.

The ultimate goal was always human perfection;

the process was inevitable and incontrovertible.

The source

of this change, according to Spencer, remained the
"Unknowable," the principle behind the principle, variously
interpreted as God or Force, according to individual
predilections.10
It is easy to appreciate the appeal of Spencer's ideas
in the chaotic atmosphere of the late nineteenth century.
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They promised that present conditions would improve, that
humankind would again rule the universe.

The same sort of

hopeful optimism was expressed in the Comtean idea that
humankind, armed with the methods of science, would give up
the Unknowable to the observation, description, prediction,
and control of nineteenth-century science.11

Though natural

law doomed humankind to insignificance, the condition was not
permanent; ultimately, science would bring nature to its
knees.
Spencer's evolutionism and Comtean positivism
represented a synthesis of ideological oppositions:
determinism and free-will, realism and idealism, pessimism
and optimism, catching the individual self in a cross-fire.
These are the themes of naturalist literature with which this
chapter will be concerned.

Granted, there are other themes:

social protest, regionalism, war;12 but even in these works,
the issue of humankind against natural forces is paramount;
only the context of confrontation changes.
The difference between realism and naturalism can be
understood as the difference between the assumption that
one's place in the world is fixed according to moral law and
the assumption that moral law no longer holds.

Realism

assumes that self-identity is constant; naturalism assumes
that life is a process of self-definition.

This was not, as

Ryan suggests, a consequence of an "empiricist" psychology;
rather it was a consequence of sweeping cultural changes
(industrialization and the rise of capitalism), advances in
the physical sciences, a cyclical conception of humankind's
cultural history, and most important, a consequence of the
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evolutionary theories of Darwin and Spencer.

As Ruth Brandon

states it in describing the strong appeal of spiritualism to
the people of the late nineteenth century:
It was not that they wanted to adhere to the
fundamentalist view that the Bible was the literal
truth, but the notion of randomness which was so
essential a part of the theory of natural selection
seemed to preclude any possibility of there being a God.
Darwinism meant that there was no grand plan, no
pattern, no thought behind the universe.13
In effect, God had been lost to humankind, and men and women
no longer felt a personal connection to their world.

It is

that personal connection that naturalist literature attempts
to establish.
In this chapter, I will examine the works of three
naturalist writers, focusing only, however, on single works:
Henry Adams's The Education of Henrv Adams (written in 1905),
Charlotte Perkins Gilman's "The Yellow wallpaper" (1891) and
Theodore Dreiser's Sister Carrie (1907).14 I do not claim
that these particular works are representative of these
authors (though they are well known). They are, however,
salient examples of the themes of naturalism I have discussed
above, and it is for this reason I have chosen them over
others.
As we will see, the theme of a search for personal
identity is an important one in this literature.

It is, for

example, the central issue Henry Adams addresses in his
Education:
Of all studies, the one he would rather have avoided was
that of his own mind. He knew no tragedy so heart
rending as introspection, and the more, because...he was
not the first. Nearly all the highest intelligence
known to history had drowned itself in the reflection of
its own thought, and the bovine survivors had rudely
told the truth about it, without affecting the
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intelligent.15
Adams refers, in this passage to the introspective methods
used by psychologists of the time.

Indeed, this passage

fairly thunders as an indictment of that method and its
results.

Of what practical use is philosophical inquiry into

the faculties of the mind?

Neither psychology nor philosophy

had managed to bridge the gap between the internal world and
the experience of everyday life.

Even so, such an indictment

would not have occurred had there not existed a loss of a
grander sort; had there, for example, been a sense of
societal confirmation of the individual or a sense of
personal communion with a force greater than oneself.16

By

the late nineteenth century, the laws of "science" had made
God superfluous; yet science had not proved capable of
filling the gap.

Indeed, the passage reflects the profound

disappointment of one who, having believed that a science of
the mind would re-establish the sovereignty of man, was
confronted with the possibility that humankind was of no
particular significance in the world.

"Education" for Adams

was nothing less than the search for meaning within a world
doomed to the swing of the pendulum.

As we will see, this

same issue is confronted by Gilman and Dreiser's Sister
Carrie.
Henry Adams (1838-1918)
Henry Adams was b o m into the Quincy Adamses, grandson
of the sixth president of the United States and great
grandson of the second.

Of his birth into this famous family

Adams writes: "Probably no child, b o m in the year, held
better cards than he."17

The Adams tradition promised status
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and security, "safeguards" against an unknown world, though
even in that tradition "as elsewhere a cruel universe
combined to crush a child."18

His education was that of a

typical late-nineteenth-century male child of privilege: a
smattering of mathematics, training in the classics and
languages, history, religion, the arts, and moral philosophy.
"At any other moment in history," he writes, "this education,
including its political and literary bias, would have been
not only good, but quite the best.

Society had always

welcomed and flattered men so endowed."19

Looking back from

the vantage of fifty years, however, Adams believed the boy
of 1854 was no more prepared for the tv/entieth century than
if he had been educated in the year 1; he had had as yet no
education at all.20
The question presents itself:

What was it that Adams

needed to understand which his classical training could not
provide?

What, indeed, was Adams in search of?

John Carlos

Rowe defines the search in both the Education and Adams's
Mont -Saint-Michel and Chartres (1913) as a quest for "order,
origin, and unity,"21 a pursuit generated by the profound
changes that had occurred in the nineteenth century.22
According to Rowe, Adams's search for unity and origin was a
search for a fundamental principle or law that, in accounting
for the apparent discontinuites in man's cultural
development, would give meaning to man's existence.23
Adams views the world from the perspective of one who
observes, rather than participates, who reflects, rather than
acts.21

Education is thus embodied in a series of

impressions and reflections--in, that is, experience.

Though
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the series as a whole appears fragmented, in the final
analysis, the fragmentation dissolves in the author's attempt
to impose order on these disparate elements.

Consciousness,

far from being a mere particle in a sea of supersensual
chaos, is that which establishes each individual's existence.
John Rowe explains:
Cutting and piecing together the history of his
education, Adams constitutes meaning in the very
struggle to find a place in a bewildering modern world.
The constant imperative that one must choose in order to
be remains amidst the fragmentary narrative of a
life....Only the function of consciousness itself
enables man to react successively to a constantly
changing universe of force.25
If a unifying principle be found, human consciousness (in the
widest possible sense) would surely be confirmed as the
interpreter, indeed the only interpreter, of historical
change.26 It is as interpreter, Adams believes, that man's
life acquires meaning, though meaning of a very different
sort than Reid or early psychologists would acknowledge as
valid.

As John Rowe states the matter:

Knowledge becomes a means of survival rather than a
desire for final definition or identity. The process of
inquiry itself reveals how meaning and understanding
depend upon the activity of making problematic choices
between conflicting evidence. Such choice and selection
make the game possible and "amusing," turning education
into a vital experience.27
The role of mind/consciousness for Adams was conceived as
just that process of choosing, selecting, and interpreting
that we have seen before in William James's description of
consciousness:

"The mind," James writes, "works on the data

it receives very much as a sculptor works on his block of
stone," carving out a unique statue, when it might have carved
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out any other.28 The statue, of course, is a singular
interpretation of the world.

By a similar act. according to

Adams, did humankind ensure its survival; by a series of such
acts, history is made.
Humankind continually attempts to impose order on the
world, Adams believed,29 to "bring nature to task;" the
historical record is a record of such interpretations, which
nature, obstinately, resists.30

Historically, there is only

the fact of action and reaction, force and resistance, out of
which emerges new complexities of thought.31 How else to
explain variation and change?

In that context, the mind

itself becomes a force with which nature must contend.
Nothing forbids one to assume that the man-meteorite
might grow, as an acorn does, absorbing light, heat,
electricity--or thought; for, in recent times, such
transference of energy has become a familiar idea; but
the simplest figure, at first, is that of a perfect
comet...which drops from space, in a straight line, at
the regular acceleration of speed, directly into the
sun, and after wheeling sharply about it, in heat that
ought to dissipate any known substance, turns back
unharmed, in defiance of law, by the path on which it
came. The mind, by analogy, may figure as such a comet,
the better because it also defies law.32
The mind defies law because it does not succumb to the forces
of nature, though it is itself nature.

The chronological

history of the series of confrontations between the human
mind and natural force suggests to Adams that, comet-like,
the mind-force has accelerated:

"Complexity had extended

itself on immense horizons....The force evolved seemed more
like explosion than gravitation."33 By 1900, it was clear to
Adams that the human mind had succeeded in building up untold
complexities:

the science that produced the compass and the

typewriter also produced weapons and war.34

"At the rate of
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progress since 1800," Adams writes, "every American who lived
into the year 2000 would know how to control unlimited
power."35
Adams's analysis leads to a single conclusion:

Mind is

motion; consciousness is interpretation, adaptation.

Both

mind and consciousness are driven by a desire for unity and
order.

There is no unifying principle, however; there exist

only the laws defining the interaction of forces.

There is

no order; there is only complexity, multiplicity.

Humankind

is defined by its interpretive acts, its confrontations with
natural forces,
else.

in Adams's analysis, it is defined by little

"Knowledge becomes a means of survival rather than a

desire for final definition or identity."36

If there is only

motion and confrontation, there can be no stable centering
self. The Henry Adams of the Education is little more than a
"manikin" on which...education is to be draped in order to
show the fit or misfit of the clothes."37
Adams's conclusion is as much an emotional response to
the changes wrought by nineteenth-century technology as it
was a response to the devaluation of humankind which Darwin's
theory of evolution suggested.

He takes his cue from the

physical and biological sciences--the laws of mechanics and
evolutionary theory--not from the new psychology.33 Yet,
there are parallels between Ladd's physiological thesis and
Adams's dynamic theory of historical change:

Each appealed

to laws of mechanics to explain change in state and each
appealed to evolutionary theory to explain change in time
(see Chapter 5).

The parallels are intriguing in that they

suggest that the psychology-literature connection was
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mediated by discoveries in the natural sciences. To draw
this conclusion on the basis of one correspondence is to make
an unsupported leap.

Such a possibility, however, is

suggested by Stephen Brush in the following quote:
[At times] scientific facts and theories may have a
direct influence on those who construct philosophical
systems, write novels, or criticize society. Thus the
mechanistic materialism of mid-nineteenth century
physics and biology was reflected by "naturalism" in
philosophy and literature, and by "positivism" in the
social sciences.39
Such "borrowing" of concepts seems most often to flow from
established disciplines in the direction of the less
established or "softer" disciplines.

Certainly, both

psychology and literature were "soft" disciplines in the late
nineteenth century.

As we saw in Part I, however, the

connection between the philosophical models of
mind/consciousness and the literary models developed by
Phelps, Howells, and James was tenuous at best; indeed, the
two disciplines employed different languages (a dynamic
language for novelists; the objective language of "science"
for philosophy). At least regarding Adams and Ladd, both use
the language of science, and the connection seems stronger
for that.
In the next section, the language of science is replaced
by the language of medicine.

In the late nineteenth century

mental disorder was a medical problem, not a psychological
one, even though most psychologists of the time had come to
believe that psychology ought to address disorders of the
mind as well as normal conscious states.

As we will see,

there are clear parallels between the model of consciousness
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developed by william James and the model that describes the
gradual deterioration of mental function described by the
following author.
Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935)
Charlotte Perkins Gilman was well known in her time as
author and lecturer on what today would be called "feminist"
issues.

She was never a member of established intellectual

circles, academic or otherwise, however, but made her living
giving voice to her belief that society as a whole would
profit from the emancipation of women from the narrow
confines of domesticity.10

Her published works include Women

and Economics (1898), in which she discusses the value of
earned income to self-respect and the good of society as a
whole from a Darwinian perspective; Human Work (1904), in
which she describes the discrepancy between "the collective
social relations that shape our economic life" and the
"individualistic way we think about the social and economic
order;" and Herland (1915), a Utopian novel about an
insulated country inhabited only by women.11

Gilman,

according to Ann Lane, made "gender the center of her
analysis," calling attention to women's rights, not to secure
women's economic independence, but because she believed that
the good of society countermanded that any one class of
people should serve another.12 Gilman wanted a much a
different world for the women of nineteenth-century America.
The core of Gilman's humanism was her belief that the
power of ideas was the primary tool for changing behavior: To
change the world, one must first change consciousness; false
ideas (incorporated in theology, medicine) must be replaced

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

181

with truth.

The relation between conscious thoughts and

action was accepted as incontrovertible, fundamental.
modify our behavior, she asserted, to fit our ideas.

We
If we

see ourselves as wicked or subservient, we will behave so,
and become so (a Jamesian notion) . Her ideas are couched in
the language of late-nineteenth-century rationalism, partly
because of her belief in the relation of ideas and behavior,
but also because she was convinced that emotionalism (with
which women were often associated) often led to women's
subservience.43

These ideas are present in "The Yellow

Wallpaper," for which Gilman draws on personal experience.
"The Yellow wallpaper" is the story of a young mother's
descent into madness, caused by a well-meaning but insidious
husband-doctor who follows S. Weir Mitchell's Rest Cure.

In

the story, John, the husband, takes his ailing wife, who is
suffering from a nervous disease (neurasthenia), to the
country for the summer.

He insists that she needs perfect

rest, and prescribes tonics, air, exercise, and absolutely
forbids her to leave the room or to work at her writing until
she is completely well again.
He insisted that she remain in a former nursery on the
top floor of the house, away from the bustle of daily life.
The room contains a barred window and dirty yellow wallpaper
of an unusual wavy pattern.

She spends most of her time in

this room alone, "recovering" and, forbidden to work or to
read, becomes obsessed and increasingly disgusted with that
yellow wallpaper.

Increasingly, as she tries to follow the

pattern in the wallpaper, the "lame, uncertain curves...
suddenly commit suicide."

Within the wallpaper there appears
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a "strange, provoking, formless sort of figure that seems to
skulk about," an ambiguous form that threatens, frightens by
its skulking.

As the days pass, the shape gets clearer.

"And it is like a woman stooping down and creeping about
behind the pattern."

At night the pattern in the paper seems

like the bars on the windows, and the woman in the wallpaper
becomes plainly visible, creeping around behind the patterned
bars, looking for a way to escape.

Later, as she peels off

the wallpaper "to let the woman escape" (to escape?), there
are many creeping women; she is surrounded by them, and
becomes one of them, crawling around the walls of the room.
Charlotte Gilman's "The Yellow Wallpaper" was published
in 1891 in the May issue of Mew England Magazine to mixed
reviews.

Though a record of her own experience, the story

was originally seen as a horror story: One unnamed doctor
published a letter suggesting that, since it gave no pleasure
"to any reader," and "must bring the keenest pain" to those
"whose lives have become a struggle against a heredity of
mental derangement," it ought not "be allowed to pass without
severest censure."

Another physician, however, sent her a

note of congratulations, saying that there had yet been "no
detailed account of incipient insanity."44
There are two diagnoses presented in the narrative.

The

first diagnosis (claimed by the medical profession and the
husband) was predicated on the assumption that the changes
that had taken place in late-nineteenth-century life
(industrialization, urbanization, etc.) had a deleterious
effect on the human constitution, which was more suited to
the slow pace and relaxed atmosphere of an earlier time.45

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

183

According to this model, women, because of their frailty,
were particularly vulnerable.

The medical model was based on

the idea that each person possessed a certain amount of
nervous energy, which was transmitted to different parts of
the body.

"Neurasthenia" was thus a result of a breakdown in

the system, of the demand exceeding the supply.46 Once
diagnosed, treatment consisted of isolation, enforced rest,
nutritious meals, and the like, all intended to permit the
restoration of depleted energy and return to normal life
tasks.47
A second diagnosis is founded on what is best referred
to as the "mental therapeutics model."

This model (claimed

by Gilman and the woman in the narrative) was based on the
idea that the subconscious was the source of unpleasant
thoughts and irrational ideas that intruded occasionally into
consciousness, especially under conditions of great stress or
anxiety, overwork or trauma.

At such times, the individual's

weakened will was unable to resist the irrational thoughts,
which tended to revolve around a single idea.

F. G. Gosling

quotes from a nineteenth-century neurologist:
Probably in all of us impulses, fears, or doubts arise
suddenly in consciousness as isolated thoughts or
emotions, and which may be apparently totally
disconnected with the mental state immediately preceding
their appearance. For instance, many of us, I presume,
have been seized with the desire to count the windows or
doors in passing along a street, or in walking to avoid
carefully the cracks in a pavement or to touch
fenceposts.... Certain words or phrases, lines of poetry
or bars of music, may thrust themselves into
consciousness at odd times.48
The difference between normal and abnormal was founded on the
ability to resist committing acts contrary to volition.

The
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completely normal man or woman committed no such acts; the
neurasthenic committed some; the insane committed many more.
Mental therapy consisted of the rest cure in addition to firm
assurances that the ideas themselves were not unusual,
although the patient was encouraged to banish such thoughts
from consciousness.

The physician who took this approach

attempted to convince the patient that, while the ideas were
troubling, the physician had full confidence that the patient
would be able to control them.

A strict regimen of diet and

exercise were also prescribed.19
"Personally, I disagree with their ideas," writes the
women in the narrative of her husband's treatment plans.
"Personally I believe that congenial work, with excitement
and change, would do me good."

And further, "I think

sometimes that if I were only well enough to write a little
it would relieve the press of ideas and rest me."50

A better

treatment, given the relation between ideas and behavior
according to Gilman, would be to erase the false, oppressive
ideas with "congenial work...and change;" to strengthen
will; to turn out "useless and debilitating thoughts."

the
The

medical model dominates, however (as the husband dominates)
and the reader is witness to the consequences:

To the

obsession with the wallpaper accrues a series of images and
irrational thoughts, and insanity.
We have seen evidence of this second model in the
psychological theory of William James (see Chapter 5).

In

James's model, the subliminal consciousness was the
repository of buried feelings, fixed ideas, traumatic
experiences, "forgotten" memories, religious convictions--a
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random collection of associated thoughts and sensations.S1
Under normal conditions there is reciprocity between the
levels of consciousness; under certain conditions, however,
an upsurge from the subliminal takes over waking
consciousness entirely.

Consciousness contracts. James

asserts, to a fixed idea that dominates all thought and
action.52 To Gilman no less than to James, the relation
between thought and action was incontrovertible.
Charlotte Gilman was not an introspective woman,
according to Lane, and her ideas, although reflecting a
Darwinian perspective, did not include an active interest in
psychological or philosophical issues.53 It would be
overstating the case to suggest that Gilman's ideas about the
relation between conscious thought and behavior were drawn
from James's ideas.

Indeed, the source of the

thought/behavior relation can be traced to Darwin, to
Scottish moral principles, and to Calvinist theology.
We have seen that the exchange between psychology and
literature is mediated by ideas that had become part of late
nineteenth-century culture:

evolutionary theory, physical

science, and medicine influenced both psychology and literary
naturalism to a greater degree than each influenced the
other.

However, where the psychologists drew primarily on

Darwin's ideas, many novelists found Spencer's ideas more
appealing.54

Aligned with Comtean positivism, Spencerian

evolutionism seemed to promise hope:

though natural law

prevailed, the end-result was human perfection.

As we will

see, Theodore Dreiser drew heavily on these ideas.
In the final section of this chapter, we will examine
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Theodore Dreiser's Sister Carrie. The novel, written in
1900, was Dreiser's first, and, though it was published over
the objections of Frank Doubleday (of the Doubleday
publishing company), it was commended by writers Frank Norris
and William Dean Howells as "a breakthrough in American
realism. "55
Theodore Dreiser (1871-1945)
Like many of his contemporaries, Theodore Dreiser was a
Spencerian first, a positivist second.

Dreiser, for example,

believed Spencer's "Unknowable" (the source of evolutionary
change) could be found in the composition of "chemisms"
within the blood that determined temperament, attitude,
personality traits.56

In addition, he believed Spencer's law

of inevitable progress ought to serve as a guiding principle
for alleviating social injustices and social inequities;

for

then, he writes, "all mankind will conform to laws which he
has written down, as they were given to him by the One whose
work is creation, and whose all-covering generosity has given
the world a mind so philosophic as that of Herbert Spencer."57
Comte, however, provided another perspective: the idea that
nineteenth-century culture marked a passage to the stage when
science would control the world.
The principal themes of Dreiser's work have been stated
succinctly by John Rathbun and Harry Clark:

"Life was flux;

stratification and stasis were bad; man was a complex of
chemical compounds sympathetically reacting to variations in
the physical environment... Free will was a superstition."58
The mind of humankind was either mechanistic or organic.
Spencer's theories seemed to suggest both.

Either mind
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operated, according to the mechanics of force and motion (and
thus determinism prevailed) or mind operated as one with the
great organism of life, wherein all life processes were
interconnected pulsations of the living whole (and thus
determinism prevailed) .59
The theme of Sister Carrie is brought out in the context
of a battle between instinctual desires and free-will.
Free-will, rationality, knowledge, judgment are all of piece,
Dreiser would assert; evil, instinct, passion, ignorance
compromise human existence:
ever beset.

We are never wholly free; we are

Resolution is not granted the reflective

consciousness any more than knowledge guarantees success.
These themes are central to Sister Carrie.
The novel begins with Carrie's trip to Chicago to live
with her sister and her sister's husband.

On the train,

Carrie meets a salesman who promises to introduce her to the
city.

Always wanting more from life than she has at any

moment, Carrie eventually leaves her sister to live with the
salesman; leaves the salesman to live with a man who
represents wealth and status; leaves him to become a
successful actress.

The novel ends as she waits for the

fulfillment of her dream.

And Dreiser, ever the moralist,

comments:
Oh, the tangle of human life! How dimly as yet we see.
Here was Carrie, in the beginning poor, unsophisticated,
emotional; responding with desire to everything most
lovely in life, yet finding herself turned as by a
wall....Not evil, but longing for that which is better,
more often directs the steps of the erring. Not evil,
but goodness more often allures the feeling mind unused
to reason.60
Like Henry Adams, Dreiser imagines the world comprised
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of forces in perpetual opposition, neutral as to the destiny
of humankind.
absolutely.

There might be God, but God does not control
The very randomness of the forces, their base

neutrality, ensures that success is but a chance event.

As

Henry Adams's identity was solely taken up with his search
for "education," the heroine of Dreiser's story is solely
taken in by desire.

The following passage is the clearest

example of Dreiser's ideas and thus it is the only one I will
quote from his work.

This passage occurs as Carrie prepares

to leave her sister's house; Dreiser intends that the reader
understand that her action follows desire, rather than
reason:
Among the forces which sweep and play throughout
the universe, untutored man is but a wisp in the wind.
Our civilization is still in the middle stage, scarcely
beast, in that it is no longer wholly guided by
instinct; scarcely human, in that it is not yet wholly
guided by reason. On the tiger no responsibility rests.
We see him aligned by nature with the forces of life--he
is b o m into their keeping and without thought he is
protected. We see man far removed from the lairs of the
jungles, his innate instincts dulled by too near an
approach to free-will, his free-will not sufficiently
developed to replace his instincts and afford him
perfect guidance. He is becoming too wise to hearken
always to instincts and desires; he is still too weak to
always prevail against them. As a beast, the forces of
life aligned him with them; as a man; he has not yet
wholly learned to align himself with the forces. In
this intermediate stage he wavers--neither drawn in
harmony with nature by his instincts nor yet wisely
putting himself into harmony by his own free-will. He is
even as a wisp in the wind, moved by every breath of
passion, acting now by his will and now by his
instincts, erring with one, only to retrieve by the
other, falling by one, only to rise by the other--a
creature of incalculable variability. We have the
consolation of knowing that evolution is ever in action,
that the ideal is a light that cannot fail. He will not
forever balance thus between good and evil. Where this
jangle of free-will and instinct shall have been
adjusted, when perfect understanding has given the
former the power to replace the latter entirely, man
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will no longer vary. The needle of understanding will
yet point steadfast and unwavering to the distant pole
of truth.61
The conscious mind is presented as a battleground of
competing forces:
desire.

free-will and reason oppose instinct and

Desire will out in those in whom free-will is not

"sufficiently developed to...afford him perfect guidance."
But time promises success; "[humankind] will not forever
balance thus between good and evil.

Where this jangle of

free-will and instinct shall have been adjusted, when perfect
understanding has given the former the power to replace the
latter entirely," there will be no indecision and no
conflict.
Like Howells, Dreiser gives us little insight into
Carrie's conscious thoughts.

Like Howells, Dreiser expects

us to infer Carrie's thoughts from her behavior and from the
narrator's interpretive presence.

Unlike Howells, Dreiser

presents a character who is beset by forces beyond her
control, by instinctual desires operating in accord with
natural law.

This, of course, is a central theme of

naturalist literature.

Howells's character was lost because

he would not engage in the kind of reflection that would
yield information about the world; Dreiser's character was
lost because instinct overpowered reason.
Discussion:
It iscorrect
absence of
literature:

Part II

to assert, as Ryan has, that there is an

acentering, coherent

self in naturalist

HenryAdams searches for

meaning to replace his

sense of alienation; he finds it in the conscious act of
interpretation.

Charlotte Gilman finds her sense of self
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restored in conscious acts of affirming work.

"Carrie,"

caught between a rational will and instinctive desire,
affirms a "self" (even if temporarily) in every desire. In
the works I have discussed, Adams, Gilman, and Dreiser appeal
to a consciousness that has neither defined boundaries nor a
central core.

Henry James, William Dean Howells, and

Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, in contrast, consistently appeal to
a consciousness whose boundaries are the physical being and
whose core is the self; all thought streams outward from that
core.

A brief comparison will reveal the difference. From

Chapter 4, Elizabeth Stuart Phelps describes a wakeful night:
Visions which he would just then have gone blind to
forget electrotyped themselves upon the half-lit room.
Long odorous country twilights, the scent of honeysuckle
about a farm-house door, the pressure of confiding
fingers on his arm, the uplifting of a young face, the
touch of trustful life, pursued him rather with the
force of sensations than reflections. With these came
other ghosts, incoherent fancies, aimless fevers,
nameless dreams.62
Contrast this with a passage from Henry Adams:
Nothing forbids one to assume that the man-meteorite
might grow, as an acorn does, absorbing light, heat,
electricity--or thought; for, in recent times, such
transference of energy has become a familiar idea; but
the simplest figure, at first, is that of a perfect
comet...which drops from space, in a straight line, at
the regular acceleration of speed, directly into the
sun, and after wheeling sharply about it, in heat that
ought to dissipate any known substance, turns back
unharmed, in defiance of law, by the path on which it
came. The mind, by analogy, may figure as such a comet,
the better because it also defies law.63
Though both passages consist of a series of visual images,
the quality of those images differ.

For all its melancholic

sentimentality (though, perhaps, because of that), Phelps's
passage conveys

passivity: the conscious self falls victim
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to the remembered past.

Adams's passage, in contrast,

conveys motion, change, action:

the consciousness is

portrayed as a force to be reckoned with, equal to the forces
of Nature, and no less powerful.

In literary naturalism we

see revealed what John Rowe refers to as "an incomplete self
repeatedly transformed by the effort of consciousness to know
itself," a self that can only be known through a series of
conscious acts perpetuated upon the world.64

Indeed, this

conception of consciousness is fundamentally akin to that of
the late-nineteenth-century psychologists, who, following
William James, concluded that consciousness had a crucial
role in ensuring survival.

It is consciousness, asserted

James, that selects out of a "theatre of possibilities" those
ends that are favorable to the organism and consciousness it
is that represses those ends that are not. "Every actually
existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a
fighter for ends. of which many, but for its presence, would
not be ends at all."65
By the turn of the twentieth century, the idea that
consciousness acted upon the world to achieve certain ends
would become the focus of experimental research.

For

example, in 1901 Joseph Jastrow, following James, would
declare in his presidential speech before the American
Psychological Association that psychology was a "science of
mental function." not content.

Later, in 1903, James Rowland

Angell declared that " (c)onsciousness is not merely
epiphenomenal, but is really an efficient agent in the
furtherance of the life activities of the organism."66

As we

have seen, the literary naturalists had already taken up this
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view.
Though these conceptual similarities suggest crossdisciplinary influence, there is little evidence that turnof-the-century psychologists drew their ideas from naturalist
literature.

For example, William James did not reference any

of the works we have discussed in his Principles of
Psychology (1890)67: a survey of the index and footnotes
reveal instead a wide-ranging knowledge of philosophical and
psychological work of the period, as well as several
references to Romantic literature, including the works of
Jane Austen, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and John Makepeace
Thackeray.

James's work published after the Principles shows

a similar pattern:

In the edited volume William James.

Writings 1878-1899, amid the usual references to philosophers
and psychologists, the explanatory Notes reveal once again
James's preference for Romantic literature; citations to
Tennyson, Emerson, Longfellow, Laurence Sterne (Tristram
Shandy) , and Walt Whitman abound.68 Though this brief survey
does not rule out the possibility that literary naturalism
exerted an indirect influence on James's thought, the
possibility is unlikely.

All that is known about James's

work and style strongly support his extraordinary sensitivity
to the interplay of ideas and his scrupulousness in the
matter of citations.

It would be out of character (and, from

his perspective, unnecessary) to overlook (deliberately or
accidentally) any connections to the wider cultural arena in
which he worked.

Moreover, a brief survey of the indexes and

footnotes of the works of James Mark Baldwin and George
Trumbull Ladd fail to reveal references to any literary
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tradition, suggesting that that influence, if it existed at
all, was of little importance in their work.
Similarly, there does not seem to be any direct link
between the work of the late-nineteenth century psychologists
we have examined and the works of the literary naturalists we
surveyed in this chapter.

Though Henry Adams's Education.

does suggest familiarity with the philosophical and
historical traditions, no references, however indirect,
suggest that his ideas were based upon psychological works of
the time.

Charlotte Perkins Gilman, as we have noted, was

all too well acquainted with the popular notion of
"neurasthenia" and the accepted medical treatment; there is,
however, nothing in her work to suggest an acquaintance with
the ideas perpetuated by Ladd, Baldwin, and James, despite
her belief in active employment as an antidote for mental
anguish.

And Theodore Dreiser's tale of Carrie's battle

between desire and free-will is more closely aligned with a
Spencerian consciousness (see Appendix) than a Jamesian one.
All this is to suggest that cross-disciplinary influence
in this latter period (1885-1910) is an unlikely and
unsupportable assumption.

It seems more reasonable to assume

that these two disciplines, engaged at this time in forging
their own traditions, drew on ideas that had become common
currency in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
specifically, the evolutionism of Charles Darwin and Herbert
Spencer (see Appendix). Perhaps it is even more to the point
that these

novelists and psychologists show at this time a

pronounced differential preference for these ideas:

though

acquainted with the work of Spencer, most psychologists (not
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acquainted with the work of Spencer, most psychologists (not
least the psychologists we have examined) took up Darwin's
concept of evolutionary adaptation as an overriding theme.
The novelists, in contrast, though acquainted with Darwin's
work, were more inclined to the Spencerian concept of psychic
and cultural competition.

We saw this theme in Adams's

concept of the mind/consciousness as a force in competition
with other natural forces; in Gilman's belief in competing
conscious acts; and in Dreiser's concept of the competition
between free-will and instinctual desire.

In the next

chapter, these differences will be treated in some depth.
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CHAPTER 7

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
"Never Know When It Might Come in Useful"
There is a story about a man named Nasrudin, who sometimes
took people for trips in his boat.

One day a fussy pedagogue

hired him to ferry him across a very wide river.

As soon as

they were afloat, the scholar asked whether it was going to
be rough.
"Don't ask me nothing about it," said Nasrudin.
"Have you never studied grammar?"
"No," said the boatman.
"In that case, half your life has been wasted."
The boatman said nothing.
Soon a terrible storm blew up.
filling with water.

The boatman's ferry was

He leaned over toward his companion.

"Have you ever learned to swim?"
"No," said the pedant.
"In that case, schoolmaster, all your life is lost, for
we are sinking."1
As Robert Ornstein points out, the two characters in
this story represent two different ways of understanding
consciousness.

The scholar, ever rational, concerned with

logical form and insistent on perfection in language use
(though, perhaps, not in

the social realm), represents the

analytical, scientific approach.

The boatman, aware that

form is of little concern when survival is concerned,
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represents the creative and pragmatic view.

These two

perspectives are paralleled in the psychological and literary
approaches to consciousness with which this study has been
concerned.

The psychologists and philosophers, rationalists

all, approached mind and consciousness in terms of specific
operations that could be introspectively observed, described,
and classified, often in minute detail.

Objectively,

consciousness takes the form of an entity with independent
existence composed of identifiable parts.

The novelists,

realists and naturalists, approached consciousness as that
aspect of human function responsible for the relation of
individual to the conditions of life.

Consciousness,

subjectively perceived, assumes the form of a vital, active
life-force, capable of movement in time and capable of
generating movement in space.
It is the nature of science and literature, broadly
conceived and commonly apprehended, that they pursue
independent courses.

Ideally, science opts for explanation,

description, prediction, and control.

Literature, in

contrast, seeks to impress, and (occasionally) to instruct.
The crucial difference is not the source of ideas, but its
textual representation, the rhetorical "trappings."

The

novelist contextualizes experience, enriches it, through a
powerful interplay of metaphor and emotion-laden analogy.
The scientist, as we will see, begins with metaphor, a
theoretical context that envelopes and, thus, explains the
phenomena of experience.
Recent scholarship has questioned the claims of complete
objectivity in scientific description and fact-gathering.
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For example, Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper have stated that all
scientific practice begins with an imaginative construction
of the to-be-observed events.

Pointedly, these philosophers

suggest that scientific observation is colored by this
imaginative construction--the theoretical context--that
allows the scientist to "select out" relevant observations.
Kuhn, in particular, has suggested that scientific research
programs are based on acts of faith which their adherents go
to great lengths to protect.2 Michel Foucault goes further in
suggesting that all thought (scientific and literary) is
enveloped within a conceptual system defined and maintained
by a culture; accordingly, Foucault would expect similarities
between disciplines scientific and literary so different in
intended outcomes.3
We have found similarities.

In the first period of

this study (1865-1885), we discovered that both psychological
and literary models of consciousness drew on ideas that had
been set forth by the Scottish philosophers of the early
eighteenth century, represented in this review by Thomas
Reid. Specifically, both models included the idea that
consciousness consists of both immediate, sensory experience
and the capacity to reflect on that experience, as memory and
the present sensory experience coalesced.

Both models

incorporated the idea that consciousness is the source of a
unified self-concept, whether given in the moment, or given
in reflection.

And both models of consciousness were

grounded in the belief that consciousness is the means by
which humankind is made aware of the operations of the mind
and the eternal presence of Higher Power.

From both the
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literary and psychological perspective, we are presented with
a consciousness that has the capacity to transcend the
present moment.
Perhaps the most fundamental similarity in the literary
and psychological models of this early period is that both
traditions approached consciousness as though it was entirely
contained within the physical body and limited to acts within
that body.

There was little concern in either discipline

that consciousness would act upon the external world in
particular ways that would, in turn, fundamentally alter the
nature of consciousness itself.

In the post-Civil War

period, for all the talk of consciousness as a "perceiver" of
mental acts; for all its representation as an affectivelytoned sensory series; for all that, consciousness was
conceived as a stable, constant, whole, a mere responder.

It

was this view of consciousness that would change dramatically
in both disciplines just before the turn of the century.
There were differences as well.

From this same world

view (which corresponded with what was understood as
"reality"), the novelists developed a consciousness that was
to foreshadow the "stream of consciousness" perspective of
the next generation of psychologists.

Granted that the idea

of a conscious stream had been already expressed by Reid (see
Figure 1).

It is clear, however, that that stream is not

what Reid meant when he referred to consciousness.

In Reid's

formulation, consciousness is a separate power of the
Understanding, endowed with the capacity to observe the mind.
By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, however, that
"stream" would be become the focal point of the development
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of the new psychology.
Indeed, given the intuitive "rightness" of the idea that
consciousness appears to us as an on-going series of mental
events, it is all the more surprising that the
philosopher/psychologists of the early period were so
apparently certain that their classificatory schema
accurately reflected the way the mind-system worked.

The

most likely reason for this is that these men, most of whom
were writing in response to Locke and Hume, were so intent
upon dividing the mind into mental "powers" rather than
"sensations," that they were apt to consider every mental
aspect they could discover as a power of one sort or another;
accordingly, consciousness was the power of internal
observation.

A "power," if we consider the term in its most

literal sense, could not also be a stream.
My point is that the model of mind and consciousness
advanced by the Scottish philosophers (and those who followed
their example) emerged out of a set of ideas that had less to
do with mind/consciousness as experienced and much more to do
with the rhetoric of refutation.4 In order to oppose Locke's
sensationalism and Hume's skepticism, Scottish philosophy
re-establish certainty and God within the human mind.

As

John O'Donnell explains it:
Mental science...constituted the psychological
linchpin that made plausible arguments from analogy that
joined the natural and moral universes. It endeavored
to prove that man's non-material mind was capable of
comprehending natural and moral laws both intuitively
and inductively....Protestant Scholasticism therefore
depended ultimately upon a fundamentally conservative
psychology.5
Indeed, because they were vitally interested in specifying
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the means for solving epistemological problems (within the
Scottish moral tradition) , they were less inclined to to take
notice of, and to describe, the consciousness of their
experience.
The novelists, in contrast, unencumbered by these
particular motives, described a consciousness of conflicting
aims and emotive significance.

As we have seen, however, the

literary works we have examined in this study, were the
product of motives no less powerful.

Elizabeth Phelps and

William Dean Howells, for example, intended that their work
should make a statement about what they perceived as the
dangerous and unjust conditions of post-Civil War society:
the role of women in American culture; the perceived excesses
of a capitalist economy.

The difference is that these

conditions were grounded in a realistic appraisal of American
society as much as they reflected any personal bias.

Even

so, we have seen that a moral conservatism prevailed in the
literary realm as well.

This conservatism is revealed in the

dominant characteristic of American realism:

the

internalization of action with a central reflective
consciousness and the presence of a moral dilemma that would
be resolved by story's end.

In Henry James's work, this

method would be sufficient unto itself.
In the second period of this study (1886-1910)

(the

period in which consciousness, rather than mind, was
considered the "proper" subject-matter of a new American
psychology), psychologists were less concerned with the moral
question and more concerned with establishing a science of
the mind that paid heed to recent advances in knowledge of
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brain structure and function.

Evolutionary theories (Darwin

and, to some extent, Spencer) provided a context in which
questions that had not been asked before effectively re
focused the nature of the investigation.6

No longer

constrained by the necessity of devising an account of mind
in accord with Protestant theology, psychologists now
confronted the possibility that mind and consciousness were
little more than supernumerary additions to a physiological
process.

The new psychology was thus a concerted response

to the challenge to traditional assumptions about freedom and
the will posed by evolutionists and physiologists alike.

The

models of mind/consciousness of this later period reflect the
tension between the desire to incorporate the latest
scientific advances and the desire to provide a firm
foundation for belief in individual freedom and the
individual will.

As O'Donnell states the matter:

By defining the science of psychology as the study
of consciousness, by insisting that the principle method
of psychology was introspection...and by adopting the
axiom of psychophysical parallelism, the new
psychologists had assumed in principle what they feared
more radical reductionists would deny in fact.7
The problem facing psychologists became one of reconciling
evolutionary biology to traditional conceptions of
humankind's moral freedom.

It is for this reason, O'Donnell

asserts, that the focus of inquiry shifted from intrapsychic
mechanisms (classification and analysis of the structure of
mind and consciousness) to psychic-environmental interactions
(classification and analysis of the function of mind and
consciousness).8

The shift from structure to function

enabled psychologists to establish a conceptual link between
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mind and consciousness as the subject of psychological
inquiry and mind and consciousness as grounded in anatomical
structures.

As a theoretical construct, consciousness--as an

on-going stream of sensory and conceptual acts--more easily
accorded with the physiological facts.
A similar shift occurred in the literary realm.
Consciousness, no longer conceived as an internal response to
environmental conditions, was portrayed as actively engaged
in interpreting the world; indeed, it was conceived as a
force no less powerful and effective than those forces which
seemed to threaten human existence at every turn.

The

struggle played out in literary naturalism is thus grounded
in a struggle for self-affirmation.

The novelists,

abandoning the moral conservatism that led the psychologists
to assert the biological origin of the self-concept,
established a context in which the "self" was continually re
interpreted in light of new evidence.

Far from reflecting a

disappearance of the self (as Ryan suggests), naturalist
literature invoked the image of a self continually inprocess . We have seen evidence of this in Henry Adams's
search for "identity" within a world conceived as ruled by
change and variation.

We have seen this in Charlotte

Gilman's assertion that consciousness and behavior were
intimately linked (one is led to consider her breakdown as a
particularly adaptive response to abnormal conditions). And
we have seen the idea of self-in-process in Theodore
Dreiser's portrayal of Carrie's successive attempts to find
fulfillment of her desire.
It is this self-affirming quality of naturalist
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literature that Donald Pizer recognizes as its central theme.9
It is, perhaps, one alternative to the position adopted by
the psychologists of the same period: that is, the idea that
the self was grounded in evolutionary and biological
processes.

Indeed, the evidence would suggest that there was

a compelling need in the late nineteenth-century to affirm
the self as a viable force in the universe, at least in the
social science and literary traditions.

The difference

between them was not so fundamental as one might, perhaps,
expect; a matter of degree, rather than of kind.

The

psychologists, always more conservative, hoped to sustain the
image of a unified self; the novelists prepared to envision a
self that evolves.
HazQ Sides of £h£ Same Coin: She Psychology -Li t erature Debate
Despite recent attempts by literary historians to
redress the traditional view that science (more generally)
and literature are diametrically opposing modes of thought,10
there remains a reluctance on both sides of the debate to
acknowledge the possibility that the traditions have much in
common.

Hayden White, for example, in assessing the tendency

of literary criticism to invoke the methods of science to
lend authority to scientific pronouncements, suggests that
certain disciplines, particularly those most self-conscious
about their scientific status, tend to be more exclusionary
than others regarding inter-disciplinary "encroachments."
"The problem, " he writes,
has to do with the fragmenting of humanistic studies
into discrete disciplines which must feign to aspire to
the status of sciences without any hope of achieving the
kind of procedures developed in the physical sciences
for the resolution of conflicting interpretations of the
specified objects of study. The result of this
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circumstance is that, in order to enable research in any
field of humanistic studies, investigators must
presuppose that at least one other field of study or
discipline is effectively secured, that is to say, is
effectively free of the kind of epistemological and
methodological disputes that agitate their own area of
inquiry.11
From this perspective, it is natural to expect that
psychology would identify itself with the methods and even
form of the physical sciences and in doing so, would disavow
any connection to the literary tradition.

This is not to

suggest that psychologists of the late nineteenth century had
no firm grounds for doing so.

The purpose of science is to

accumulate certain knowledge about a specified subject area;
one expects that observation, classification, and analysis
will culminate in a model that effectively takes into account
all matter of topics and relation that comprise that domain.
If this study is any indication of the general condition of
psychology, it would suggest that psychologists have
regularly "borrowed" models from other disciplines or domains
of inquiry and then attempted to make the facts of their
experience accord with the model.
This is not an indictment of either psychology or its
method.

(Similar methods have been used by biologists,

physicians, and physicists.12) Rather, I am pointing out that
psychology--as a science--is informed by extra-disciplinary
concerns and that those concerns strongly influence and even
limit the focus of inquiry.

In the natural sciences, because

of the nature of the phenomena with which they are concerned,
Nature fairly shouts her agreement or disagreement with the
scientist's model.

In psychology, Nature's voice is much

softer, at times, barely audible.

The psychologist is more
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easily led to overlook these small voices and there is every
reason to expect that the facts of experience will take their
place within the model with little more than a whimper.13
This anthropomorphic account is certain to elicit
vigorous responses from the more methodologically-minded.
And I grant that it is only partially true of psychology as a
whole, and certainly more true of psychology in the
nineteenth century than of twentieth-century psychology.
However, my point is to establish a context in which
psychology and literature will be seen as two sides of the
same coin--as attempts to understand the human condition that
are informed by and dependent on ideas drawn from the wider
culture and which are brought into being by adherence to a
prescribed set of conventions.
This "double-aspect" perspective is not without its own
pitfalls:

There is an opportunity for a too-easy neglect of

important differences between the two traditions.

For

example, nowhere in this discussion have I attempted to
account for the significant impact of statistical procedures
on the analysis of psychological phenomena.

And nowhere have

I discussed changes in conceptions of "style" and "form" that
marked the transition from literary realism to literary
naturalism.

Taking the double-aspect view as my central

theme, I will focus on similarities, rather than differences,
and attempt to provide a model in which correspondences can
be understood.
The Rhetoric of Real ism
In the introduction to his Cosmologies of Consci ousness r
E. C. Barksdale proposes that the history of human
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consciousness involves attention to both the facts of science
and the "facts" of experience:
A history of human consciousness which bases the
development of life and awareness of self on biological
facts alone would be incomplete. A series of evaluative
statements on that most subjective and personal
possession of every human being--his consciousness-without reference to facts would be inadequate.14
Similarly, the history of the concept of consciousness
entails a history of its representation in scientific
discourse as well as its representation in literary
discourse.15 When considered as discourses, rather than as
modes of apprehending the world (each more or less
"correct"), the boundaries between science and literature
become blurred and the simple oppositions of fact and value,
objectivity and subjectivity, deduction and intuition no
longer seem sufficient to sustain a distinction between the
two.16

In this context, the double-aspect view, advocated

also by Barksdale, becomes a singularly compelling way of
making sense of both differences and similarities.
In Barksdale's account, it is clear that he envisions
science and literature as existing on a continuum defined by
the conceptual oppositions of objectivity on one end and
subjectivity on the other.17

Science, in its purest form (if

such pure form there be) would take its place on the
objective end; literature (art, poetry, music), in its purest
form, would take its place on the subjective end.

The image

he conveys is particularly useful when it is considered that
there exist sciences (such as psychology?) that may contain
more of the subjective than, say, physics; and forms of
literature (documentary?) that contain more of the objective.
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Placement on the continuum would, accordingly, represent the
proportion of objective/subjective which comprised any one
tradition or, in another sense, the proportion of the
discourse common to a discipline that could be traced to
subjective or objective sources.
With this concept of a continuum in mind, I submit that
in the late nineteenth century, in both literary and
psychological discourses on consciousness, the
objective/subjective dimensions were represented almost
equally, with the preponderance of objectivity associated
somewhat more with the literary tradition than with the
psychological tradition.
straight-forward:

My reason for this conclusion is

American psychologists were intent upon

fitting the facts of their experience to models that were
informed by and limited to a prescribed agenda which
entailed:

adherence to "proper" (that is, traditional)

scientific procedures and methods; and, the compelling need
to ensure that the application of those procedures to the
mind would not result in devaluation of mind, soul, God, the
individual man or woman, free-will or moral responsibility.
(This, of course, is the reason why Locke's and Hume's ideas
failed to gain support in America until after the turn of the
century.)

Both these ideas influenced the development of the

new psychology far more than the mental "facts" with which
they were concerned.18
The novelists, in contrast, though equally concerned
with moral issues, were much less concerned with the methods
of science, classification and analysis.

Their more

profoundly social agenda were well served by representing
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consciousness as, for example, a series of emotive events.
In the latter period, toward the end of the nineteenth
century, the second generation of novelists explored the
feelings of alienation and fragmentation they experienced.
The psychologists of that period, however, were still
concerned with the tension between consciousness conceived as
a biological process, and consciousness conceived as evidence
of humankind's freedom to choose, though by that time the gap
between literary representation and psychological
representation had begun to close.19
As I have attempted to show, psychologists and novelists
drew on a number of ideas common to nineteenth-century
culture:

the notion of free-will, moral responsibility, and

duty to God; the evolutionary ideas of Herbert Spencer and
the evolutionary theory of Darwin; the opposition of free
will and determinism; the idea that the individual self must
be accounted for (and must count for something); the
knowledge that advances in human physiological function
encroached upon the vision of humankind as a free agent (the
mind/body problem); feelings of alienation and fragmentation
in the last quarter of the century; the possibility of a
supernatural aspect to consciousness that suggested unknown
capacities for human knowledge; the idea that consciousness
served an adaptive function.

These ideas were "realities" no

less real than the measurable entities of the physical world,
for they strongly influenced the problems with which the
emerging disciplines of literature and psychology were
concerned.
Kearns has suggested that the metaphors of mind and
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consciousness in the nineteenth century evolved from mind-asentity to mind-as-sentient-being.

His analysis also suggests

that novelists adopted the mind-as-sentient-being metaphor
somewhat earlier than psychologists.
study are in agreement.

The results of this

This study, however, because it is

founded on a more detailed analysis of psychological and
literary texts, suggests several reasons for Kearns's
results.
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1 Adapted from Robert Ornstein, The Psychology of
Consciousness. 3rd. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1986), p. 81.
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4 That Locke and Hume had to be refuted is compellingly
clear. The Scottish philosophers would save a place for God
in their mental philosophy.
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12 See, for example, Howard Gruber's interesting
discussion of the metaphorical source of Darwin's thought in
his Darwin on Man: A Psychological Study of Scientific
Creativity (London: Wildwood House, 1974); Gerald R. Holton,
The Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to
Einstein (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1973) .
13 It may be that the "true" history of psychology (if
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there be such a history) is to be found less in the
succession of events and discoveries, the efforts of "great"
men and great women, than in the succession of changes
wrought upon psychology by the adoption and rejection of the
models that have framed inquiry.
14 E. C. Barksdale, Cosmologies of Consciousness.
Science and Literary Myth in an Exploration of the Beginnings
and Development of Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Scherikman
Publishing, 1980), p. 4.
19 As George Levine points out, however, the
transformation of science into discourse seems to suggest
that science can no longer be considered the repository of
certain knowledge, but rather as one means by which knowledge
is conveyed (see George Levine, ed., One Culture. p. 4).
16 Thomas Kuhn, "Comment on the Relations of Science and
Art," The Essential Tension: Selected studies in Scientific
Tradition and Change (Chicago, Illinois: University of
Chicago Press, 1977, p. 340. Cited in George Levine, ed.,
One Culture. p. 4.
17 E. C. Barksdale, Cosmologies of Consciousnessf p. 47.
18 Given the state of psychological experimentation at
the time, these "facts" spoke softly, indeed.
19 This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that
there is a concrete and measurable reality "out there" that
is the source of objectivity and an unmeasurable reality
"within" that is the source of subjectivity. Such a model of
consciousness was proposed by Barksdale in connection with
the development of consciousness. The first level of
consciousness consists of sensations and impressions that
enter consciousness from the external world. Barksdale
refers to this level as the primary world. "The adult world
of early days or that of the m o d e m infant, the person waking
up...or the fanatic in a mob all share a tendency toward
unity," he writes, "toward non-differentiation of thought,
toward non-reflection, toward the immediacy of gut-level
experience."
Modern humans spend much of their waking days
in reflective thought, according to Barksdale, and the
capacity to realize it is the "I" who sees and hears is the
core of self-awareness. The distinction between simple and
reflective consciousness is retained even in this twentiethcentury work.
Beyond this, according to Barksdale, there are three
more levels: the world of secondary imagination, "the realm
of subjective thought, the interior private world of the
emotions," the source of creativity; a tertiary level "which
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involves the higher brain functions...the power to formulate
hypotheses." And, finally, the quartemary level,
the channel of consciousness used to view the other conscious
levels.... the congruities and the incongruities, the pauses,
and the onrushing sequences...rationalization, goals,
purposes. (E. C. Barksdale, Cosmologies of Consciousness. pp.
36-38.)
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Appendix
The Literary Heritage:
Transcendentalism. Spencer and Taine
The Transcendentalists of early nineteenth-century New
England were less concerned with epistemological issues than
with establishing the presence of God - the Over-Soul within human experience.

Under the influence of Hegel and

German idealist thought, they reaffirmed the idea, which Reid
had proposed, that mature reflection (in their words,
"intuition") would lead the human spirit beyond the confines
of earthly existence to the perception of "infinite nature,
and infinite futurity, to that infinite God in whom we, and
all things, live, move, and have our being."1
Richard Hildreth, although well known among nineteenthcentury Americans for his commitment to Unitarianism, offers
a succinct account of the Transcendental point of view:
The knowledge, however, to which Religious feelings
lead, is not according to the new theology, a knowledge
in any respect like that which we obtain through the
medium of the understanding, by employing the sense, in
the observation of outward nature, or the faculty of
reflection in observing mental operations. That kind of
knowledge which goes to make up the physical and moral
sciences...is confined to our relations to outward
material objects, to the operations of the intellect
itself, and to our social relations.... [The knowledge
of religious feeling] is above the understanding; it is
transcendental. It is perceived by a faculty which has
been given the name of self-consciousness, or the
transcendental reason, a sort of intuition, a faculty of
which Locke and his followers have denied the existence,
and which they have explained away as an operation of
memory repeating the lessons of childhood, or as mere
play of the imagination.2
The Transcendentalists were not much impressed with Reid's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

230

moral philosophy; although they believed he had corrected
some of the errors of Locke and Hume, they did not believe he
went far enough in describing

the power of consciousness to

transcend experience.
In the Transcendentalist vision, consciousness was that
which contained Sensibility, Activity, and Reason and in
Reason was contained all the ideas of the Absolute as well as
all the purely intellectual facts.

It was through Intuition,

rather than Reason alone, however, that the transcendent
experience was made possible, as this journal entry from
Emerson shows: "We live in succession, in division, in parts,
in particles," he writes:
Meantime within man is the soul of the whole; the wise
silence, the universal beauty, to which every part and
particle is equally related; the eternal One....We see
the world piece by piece, as the sun, the moon, the
animal, the tree; but the whole, of which these are the
shining parts, is the soul....And so always, the soul's
scale is one; the scale of the senses and understanding
is another.3
Following in the German/Kantian tradition, Emerson
distinguished between Reason (which underlies the
transcendent experience) and Understanding (which was bound
to sensory experience and the external world). This passage
affirms the idea that knowledge of God and God's work was
beyond the reach of sensory functions and the understanding.
True knowledge, or knowledge beyond appearance, could be had
only by those who learned "to detect and watch that gleam of
light which flashes across his mind from within."4 The
metaphor is tellingly similar to the one adopted by Hickok in
his description of consciousness as the illuminating
"revealer" of the conte -.s of mind, but, for the
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Transcendentalists, that "gleam of light" was Reason.
There is some of the Transcendental spirit in literary
realism--the sense, for example, that reason offers a clear
path toward resolution of the difficulties of daily life.
The consciousness portrayed in literary realism is wholly
contained within the experiencing subject {the reader will
recall, for example, Masie's experience of "knowing most").
Though the power of "reflection" defined by Reid does capture
the internalized action characteristic of realist fiction, so
too, does the Transcendental "intuition."

What is

transcended in realist literature, however, rarely leads to
the timeless form of the Over-Soul.
Evolutionary Positivism
Both Herbert Spencer and Hippolyte Taine may well be
considered two of the most important influences on late
nineteenth-century literature.

There is some evidence that

each of the authors whose work is the subject of this study
were acquainted with the ideas of these men, in general, if
not in specifics.
positivistic ideal:

Both Spencer and Taine promoted a
the belief that social progress was

linked to the growth in scientific knowledge, exclusive of
metaphysics and religious overtones.5
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)
One of the most influential systems of thought in mid
nineteenth- century America was that of Herbert Spencer, whose
pre-Darwin evolutionary ideas were widely disseminated in the
popular press around mid-century both under his own name and
by such popularizers as John Fiske and Edward Youmans, who
served as editor of the Popular Science Monthly for many
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years, William Graham Sumner, and Andrew Carnegie.

Although

Spencer's work was regarded in the post-Darwin years
(approximately 1865-1900) with more derision than respect, in
the period before Darwin published his Origin of Species
(1859), his Synthetic Philosophy caught the imagination of
scientists, theologians, writers, psychologists.

Even

William James used Spencer's Principles of Psychology as a
textbook for his course on Physiological Psychology during
187 6-1877, though James was prone to regard Spencer's concept
of development--"from incoherent heterogeneity to coherent
homogeneity"--as an oversimplification.6 Spencer's
description of consciousness as an internal sequence of
states--feelings, sensations and their relations7--is a clear
postscript to Reid's description of the "train of thought."
For this reason, Spencer's model of consciousness is included
in this study.
In a chapter titled "The Dynamics of Consciousness" from
the second volume of his Principles of Psychology. Spencer
defines consciousness as an internal sequence of states
consisting (primarily) of feelings (including pleasure and
unpleasure) and both visual and auditory sensations and their
relations.3 These states of consciousness are continually
changing, continually in flux.

"Thus," writes Spencer, " a

discussion in consciousness proves to be simply a trial of
strength between different connexions...- a systematized
struggle serving to determine which are the least coherent
states of consciousness."

The fundamental law of

consciousness, according to Spencer, is that "the least
coherent states of consciousness separate while the most
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coherent remain together."9

(This illustration represents a

direct application of a "survival of the fittest" metaphor.)
The basis of the sense of personal identity, argues Spencer,
is an extraordinarily "coherent" cohesion of conscious
states.
Figure 4 is a representation of Spencer's concept of
consciousness.

The horizontal dashed line represents the

"train of thought" (consciousness). The horizontal solid
line represents the movement in time:
going.

consciousness is on

The symbols {*, ~, +, !) represent feelings,

memories, visual sensations, and auditory sensations,
respectively.
diagram.

Symbol combinations are explained in the

Vivid states, those that compel our attention, are

enclosed in circles; faint states are unenclosed. The diagram
is intended to depict the Spencerian notion of competing
ideas within consciousness.
The Spencerian consciousness bears only a faint
resemblance to Reid's "perceptual act" or Hickok's "inner
light."

Rather, Spencer describes a consciousness that

appears as a microcosm of the social world- -a world in which
"discussion" identifies cohering elements; in which there is
a continual struggle ("a trial of strength") between
different relational aggregates.

Spencer repeatedly refers

to the "broad procession" of conscious states, which "slide
by restlessly," "moving in parallel," as pedestrians on a
crowded city street.
The Spencerian consciousness v/as neutral as to God, or
mankind's spirituality, or the prioritizing of faculties,
Spencer does not suggest that consciousness should serve
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Figure 4.
Representation of Herbert Spencer's concept of consciousness (adapted from Herbert Spencer,
of Psychology [2 vols.] [1899], from Herbert Spencer,
System of Synthetic
[Osnabruck: Proff & Co., 1966], pp. 157, 447-453, 461, 494. * = feelings
(pleasure/unpleasure); + = visual sensations; ! = auditory sensations; ~ = memories; the
combination
= sense of self. Vivid states are enclosed within circles; faint states
appear unenclosed.
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morality or the state or even that it should (necessarily)
reflect actual conditions of the real world.

That it does r

in fact reflect those conditions is no more than what must
occur given the assumption Spencer makes that inner and outer
must correspond:

"(E)ach change in the objective reality,"

he writes, "causes in the subjective state a change exactly
answering to it."10 We have seen this idea before, in Thomas
Reid's assertion that our perceptions correspond exactly to
the "nature and conditions" of real-world objects.

"The

Realism we are committed to," Spencer asserts,
is one which simply asserts objective existence as
separate from, and independent of, subjective existence.
But it affirms neither that any one mode of this
objective existence is in reality that which it seems,
nor that connexions among its modes are objectively what
they seem. Thus it stands widely distinguished from
Crude Realism; and to mark the distinction it may
properly be called Transfigured Realism.11
As we will see, theidea that
the inner world had

any

neither the external world nor

prior claim to the"real" is a

prominent theme in late nineteenth-century literature--both
the new realism and

the

later naturalism.

Spencer's influence on late nineteenth-century
literature is profound.12 There are likely many reasons for
this, but the most obvious one is that Spencer's psychology
was popularly known (at least in its superficial aspects) and
thus served well those writers who wished to establish a
particular psychological context for their work.

Moreover,

his psychology was decidedly a social psychology, his
evolutionary consciousness was a social consciousness, and
this extension of traditional psychological theorizing to a
v/ider context was particularly useful for the early realist
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novels of experience.
Yet, it is rash to assume that Spencer's detailed
analysis of consciousness was the source of the new realist
model:

Popular culture (then, as now) drew on generalities

from such work as Spencer's work, not specifics.

Spencer's

work may simply have served to reinforce the idea that
consciousness itself may develop over time, in Spencer's
words, from an "indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a
definite, coherent heterogeneity."13 Nonetheless, his
"survival of the fittest metaphor" is an apt metaphor for a
consciousness often portrayed as engaged in the working
through of a moral dilemma.

As we have seen, these ideas

were also foreshadowed by Reid, though not under the banner
of consciousness.
H.ippojLyte Taine (1828 - 1893 )

Spencer's Transfigured Realism is well within the
positivist tradition. He rejects metaphysical assumptions in
principle, maintains a respectable 'scientific' neutrality,
and presents an account of consciousness that is more
descriptive than explanatory.

Hippolyte Taine, noted

nineteenth-century historian, literary critic, and
philosopher-psychologist, explicitly and unreservedly applied
positivist principles to the analysis of consciousness.

His

analysis of consciousness deserves to be quoted in full
because it serves as a fitting review of the present study:
(W)e picture consciousness as the glance of an
internal eye, directed to a present internal event, just
as we picture memory as the glance of an internal eye
directed to a past event. Metaphors lend their aid; in
fact, psychologists continually speak of consciousness
as of a spectator or internal witness which observes,
compares, takes notes on the various conceptions,
imaginations, and representations passing in review
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before it. The truth is that in such a case there are
not two events in my mind, my conception on the one
hand, and, on the other, an act by which I am acquainted
with it, but one single event, my conception itself. We
split it in two because it has two phases, the first, in
which it appears an external object or past event...the
second, in which, being rectified, it appears an
internal and present event, an optical phantom, then
included in ourselves.14
Taine's account of consciousness parallels Spencer's
account in the main (though not, perhaps, in specifics).
Both these men argue for a dual-level consciousness, whether
of a "faint or vivid" series or of a first (externalized) or
second (internalized) phase.

(We have seen this idea of

"faint and "vivid" expressed by William James.)

Indeed,

Taine (and Spencer) argue for a single stratum of
consciousness which contains both strong and weak sensory
elements, a model of consciousness that is more conversant
with Kearns's "mind-as-sentient-being" metaphor than with
that of "mind-as-entity" which informed the work of the
Scottish philosophers and their followers.
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Appendix Notes

^ Richard Hildreth, "A letter to Andrews Norton,"
reprinted in Perry Miller, The Transcendentalists. An
Anthology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950),
pp. 222-223.
3 Richard Hildreth, "A letter to Andrews Norton."
3 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays. First Series (1841),
from Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson. ed., william
H. Gilman (New York, Signet; 1965) pp. 257-280, 281, 283 (my
italics).
4 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays. First Series, p. 258.
5 Auguste Comte named this movement positivism in the
early nineteenth century, though many of his ideas had been
expressed centuries earlier by Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton,
and David Hume. The basic tenets of Comtean positivism
included rejection of hypotheses, unobservable entities, and
metaphysical explanations. There are many descriptions of
Comtean positivism. A very brief review is given by Thomas
Leahey, A History of Psychology. Main Currents of
Psychological Thought (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp. 146-148.
6 William James, Manuscript Lectures (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1988), p. xxxi. The edition of
Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychology (2 vols.) to which
I shall refer throughout this text is a reprint of the 1899
(3rd) edition published in Osnabruck by Proff &Co., 1966 as
part of A System of Synthetic Philosophy.
7 Spencer's dynamic consciousness contains two such
autonomous but somewhat interdependent states. In the vivid
series. relations are absolute and uniform, either when they
predicate relations of a general nature or when they
predicate relations among particulars. In the vivid states,
an identifiable antecedent cannot always be determined or
observed. In the faint series. relations among the elements
are easily disrupted, either by will or through the intrusion
ofother impressions. There are always identifiable
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